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MAKING THE EXPEDITIONARY AEROSPACE FORCE WORK – NOW!

A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO
THE INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL SECURITY STUDIES
AND
AIR UNIVERSITY

BY
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAR – Air-Air (Aerial) Refueling
A/C – Aircraft
ACC – Air Combat Command
ACG – Air Control Group
ACW – Air Control Wing
AEF – Aerospace Expeditionary Force
AEW – Aerospace Expeditionary Wing
AF – Air Force
AFDD – Air Force Doctrine Document
AFPAM – Air Force Pamphlet
AFRC – Air Force Reserve Command
AMC – Air Mobility Command
AMCI – Air Mobility Command Instruction
AMW – Air Mobility Wing
ANG – Air National Guard
ARG – Air Refueling Group
ARS – Air Refueling Squadron
ARW – Air Refueling Wing
AS – Airlift Squadron
AVAIL – Available
AVE – Average
AV PKG – Aviation Package
AW – Airlift Wing
BLK – Block
BS – Bomb Squadron
BW – Bomb Wing
C2 – Command and Control
CAF – Combat Air Forces
CAS – Close Air Support

CINC – Commander in Chief
CONUS – Continental United States
CSAR – Combat Search and Rescue
DIST – Distance
“E-” – Engagement Time
EAF – Expeditionary Aerospace Force
EO – Execute Order
EQUIV’S – Equivalents
EST. – Estimated
EX/CONT – Exercise/Contingency
FM – Field Manual
FS – Fighter Squadron
FW – Fighter Wing
FY – Fiscal Year
GCC – Gulf Cooperation Council
GEO – Global Engagement Operations
GMFP – Global Military Force Policy
GP – Group
HQ AMC/XOBA – “Barrel Taskers” at Headquarters Air Mobility Command
HQ USAF/XOPE – Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation Division at the Pentagon
HUMRO – Humanitarian Relief Operations (HR also commonly used)
IAW – In Accordance With
IMA – Individual Mobilization Augmentee
INT – Interdiction
JA/AAT – Joint Air Force – Army Training
JV2010 – Joint Vision 2010
KM – Kilometers
LBS/HR – Pounds (of fuel) per Hour
LD/HD – Low Density/High Demand
“M-” – Mobilization Time
MAX – Maximum

MEFPAK – Manpower Equipment Force Packaging System
MOB – Mobility
MOOTW – Military Operations Other Than War
MSNS – Missions
MTW – Major Theater War
NBC – Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
NCA – National Command Authority
NEO – Non-combatant Evacuation
NM – Nautical Mile
OPLAN – Operations Plan
OPS – Operations
OPSTEMPO – Operations Tempo
PAA – Primary Aircraft Assigned
PACAF – Pacific Air Forces
PAX – Passengers
PERSTEMPO – Personnel Tempo
PKG – Package
QDR – Quadrennial Defense Review
REGEN – Regeneration
RQS – Rescue Squadron
REQ'D – Required
RW – Rescue Wing
SEAD – Suppression of Enemy Air Defense
SPACECOM – Space Command
SQ'S – Squadron's
SSC – Small Scale Contingency
S/T – Short Ton
TACC/XONB – Point of Contact for the Air Mobility Command Operations Daily Summary
TDY – Temporary Duty
TNK – Tanker
TOT – Total

TRANSCOM – United States Transportation Command

UE – Unit Equipment

U.S. – United States

USAF – United States Air Force

USAFE – United States Air Forces Europe

USAF/ILXX (CSC) – The Air Force office responsible for the Manpower Equipment Force

Packaging System

WG – Wing

WO – Warning Order

YR – Year

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This paper proposes a detailed Aerospace Expeditionary Force (AEF) plan, including individual squadron alignment and concept of operations that uses the current force structure and disposition, and will allow the Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) “vision” to become a reality now. This topic was chosen primarily for one reason: the current operations tempo (OPSTEMPO) throughout the U.S. Air Force is driving the retention rate so low that it threatens the finely tuned, decisive combat capability crafted so masterfully over the last 10 – 20 years. A fully implemented EAF “vision” will not only meet and exceed any military requirements foreseen over the next 10 years, but it has the potential to dramatically reduce our OPSTEMPO. Reducing the OPSTEMPO should directly affect retention rates. While AEF operations began in October 1999, full implementation of the EAF “vision” is not predicted to occur for another four to five years. This is simply too long to wait.

There are four main parts to this proposal. The first part contains a quick review of the background leading up to the transition to the EAF. The second part consolidates several sources to describe and outline the full EAF “vision.” This part of the paper compares the “vision” to the reality of on-going operations today. Furthermore, this part analyzes who must be convinced that the “vision” is the right way to go and how it can be accomplished. The third part of the paper contains the proposed plan itself. The plan includes all assumptions and planning factors used, a list of squadron-by-squadron tasking, a detailed concept of operations for each segment of the plan, and an in-depth analysis of each AEF segment’s capabilities and restrictions. Finally, the fourth part of the paper analyzes what the net result implementation of the “vision” will have on OPSTEMPO.

In development of the plan, numerous compromises and agreements are proposed within the Total Force, e.g., active duty, Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC). These planning factors and assumptions must be the foundation of any AEF plan. If all ANG and AFRC squadrons are tasked to sit on a 12 or 24 hour “on call” alert all the time then it would be unrealistic to think these reserve forces could continue to operate in their current mix of part-time and full-time personnel. If all “on call” forces are put on a 72+ hour alert then actual combat employment timing is more than likely stretched to the point of unacceptability to the regional Commander-in-Chiefs (CINCs). To allow part of the forces to have short duration “on call” alert periods and other forces longer “on call” alert periods would be akin to piecemealing

combat power into the fight when it is needed the most. The bottom line is that compromises and agreements must be made within the Total Force if the EAF vision is ever going to become a reality. This paper has proposed several “planning factors” that are the basis for these compromises and agreements.

Some of the key planning factors in the proposal concern “on call” alert periods, number of aircraft required per squadron, visibility of squadrons (particularly airlift and tankers), and use of squadrons during non-AEF periods or when “on call” units are not deployed. With the planning factors and assumptions plainly stated, development of the proposed AEF plan – a plan that is taken directly from the EAF vision - can be finished.

This proposed AEF plan has broken the Total Force into 12 Combat AEFs (2 “paired” together), 5 Bomber Alerts, and 5 Mobility AEFs. The Combat AEFs have 90 day “on call” periods and the Bomber Alerts and Mobility AEFs have 108 day “on call” periods. This puts all AEFs on an 18 month rotational cycle. This is critical since airlift and tanker squadrons are assigned specific AEF taskings. If all the AEFs were not on the same overall rotational cycle then equitably assigning airlift and tanker squadrons to AEFs would be next to impossible to accomplish.

Each Combat AEF has an average of 23 operational squadrons with 182 aircraft tasked for combat and combat support missions. The Combat AEFs are further sub-divided into four “presentable,” rapid-reaction force packages called Aviation Packages (AV PKG) # 1 - # 4. The associated Bomber Alerts average 3 squadrons with a total of 18 KC-135Rs available to support immediate operations of the B-1, B-2, or B-52 bombers assigned to the Combat AEFs. Between the AV PKGs and associated Bomber Alerts, the full spectrum of combat power is available to regional CINCs. If the CINC needs combat power now, it will be clearly shown that any Combat AEF bombers, supported by any Bomber Alert tankers, can strike targets half way around the world within 39 hours. While this is going on, one of the AV PKGs will be deploying.

Each AV PKG # 1 has 9 squadrons and 74 aircraft. This package can generate 160 “surge” sorties per day (95 combat missions). Each AV PKG # 2 has 11 squadrons and 90 aircraft. They can generate 190 “surge” sorties (119 combat missions) per day. Because airlift and tanker squadrons are assigned to the Combat AEFs, both AV PKG # 1 and # 2 can mobilize, deploy, and begin full combat employment half way around the globe in 88 hours.

If the contingency is larger and the CINC requires more combat power, AV PKG # 3 or # 4 could be deployed. These packages are full Combat AEF deployment with the basic difference that AV PKG # 3 is designed for deployment to an established base(s) and AV PKG # 4 to a bare base(s). Both of these AV PKGs average about 17 squadrons and 133 aircraft. They can provide 271 “surge” sorties (178 combat missions) per day. They can begin combat operations half way around the globe within 112 hours and can bring complete combat power to bear within 198 hours. This combat power represents only one of the two “paired” Combat AEFs. If the situation requires it, both Combat AEFs could deploy and provide 542 “surge” sorties (356 combat mission) per day.

Having developed the Combat AEF and Bomber Alert forces, possible scenarios for their use can be analyzed. Three scenarios are analyzed. Each scenario centers around the physical location of U.S. and/or allied ground troops and the assessed level of threat. Times for deployment and employment plus available combat power are compared to various contingencies and the resulting conclusion is that, from a strictly military standpoint, unless U.S./allied ground troops are physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation and the assessed threat is moderate to high, AEF forces should remain “on call.” Knowing that strictly military reasons are not the only considerations that force forward deployment, several “compromises” are proposed for situations when U.S./allied ground troops are not physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation and an AV PKG is required to be “on station.” The recommended “compromise” is to reduce the deployed forces to an AV PKG-sized force and set up a 90 day rotational schedule with the Combat AEFs, our allies, and the U.S. Navy. This would fulfill the military requirements for any politically driven forward presence and reduce OPSTEMPO for all forces concerned. After analyzing the combat portion of the AEF plan, the mobility portion of the plan is detailed.

The five Mobility AEFs average 7 squadrons and 37 aircraft each. During “emergency” non-combat mobility operations, each Mobility AEF can generate 44 C-141 “equivalents” of mobility missions per day. When the situation is declared “normal,” each Mobility AEF can continue to sustain 25 C-141 equivalent missions per day. The initial 44 C-141 equivalents of supplies can be delivered to a location 6,700 Nautical Miles (NM) from the Continental United States (CONUS) 121 hours from the word “go.” The AEF plan would not be complete without

analyzing whether the Air Force can sustain normal daily requirements after assigning the forces to the different AEFs.

This proposed plan assigns all non-AEF tasked squadrons for “Normal Daily Tasking” duties. Normal Daily Tasking includes direct tasking, joint training, and unit-level training. Squadrons are assigned Normal Daily Tasking in accordance with (IAW) their status, e.g., active or reserve, recent or upcoming AEF taskings, etc. These forces alone can generate 129 C-141 equivalents and 108 KC-135R equivalents per day. When combining these forces with those AEF-assigned forces that are not directly fulfilling actual AEF duties, there are 212 C-141 equivalents and 168 KC-135R equivalents available for Normal Daily Tasking on a day-to-day basis. This compares very favorably to the 198 C-141 equivalents and 115 KC-135R equivalents AMC historically has performed each day. A note of caution is emphasized when analyzing the ability to conduct Normal Daily Tasking. Visibility of operations such as Air Mobility Command’s (AMC) are monitored closely on a day-to-day basis. However, Total Force mobility operations have not been centrally monitored. Therefore, inclusion of the Total Force into the AEF plan must include better visibility of all Total Force mobility assets. The areas that require the closest monitoring are training and below-AMC-level tasking. While the proposed Normal Daily Tasking plan is workable, it needs to be monitored and possibly adjusted as theory becomes reality.

Adopting the proposed plan would result in an overall “on call” average of 83 days per year for all Total Force tasked squadrons. Active duty tasked squadrons will average 93 days per year “on call,” ANG tasked squadrons will average 77 days per year “on call,” and AFRC tasked squadrons will average 74 days per year “on call.” It must be emphasized that these “on call” averages are the maximum AEF-related deployment times possible within a one year period. Even using the absolute worst case assumptions, the average squadron’s “on call” would equal AEF-related deployment times only during a year long Major Theater War (MTW). When this proposed plan was developed using the EAF vision, the planning factors/assumptions taken into account, and the detailed concept of operations analyzed, the resulting predicted AEF-related deployment rates were exactly where the EAF vision suggested they would be – very manageable.

If these AEF-related deployment rates were the only area analyzed, only half of the OPSTEMPO picture would be presented. To find a true picture of the average squadron’s

OPSTEMPO, these AEF-related deployment rates must be added to predicted “normal” squadron-level Temporary Duties (TDY). Several “worst case” general assumptions were made such as all active duty combat and combat support squadrons were TDY 4 weeks a year outside of their “on call” periods, all ANG and AFRC combat and combat support squadrons were TDY 2 weeks a year outside their “on call” periods, all active duty Inter-theater airlift squadrons were TDY 53 days outside their “on call” periods, etc. When this proposed plan’s predicted actual AEF-related deployment rates were added to the predicted TDY rates, a very reasonable picture of the average squadron’s OPSTEMPO can be drawn. The results are extremely encouraging.

For Total Force combat and combat support squadrons, this proposed plan results in an overall predicted average OPSTEMPO of 48 days per year. Active duty combat and combat support squadron’s average 54 days per year, ANG squadrons average 44 days per year, and AFRC squadrons average 39 days per year. That’s actual days a squadron is away from home base. For Total Force airlift and tanker squadrons, the predicted average OPSTEMPO is 72 days per year. Active duty squadrons average 85 days per year, ANG squadrons average 69 days per year, and AFRC squadrons average 62 days per year.

The Air Force has the capability to fully implement the EAF vision now using the force structure currently available. Any regional CINCs military requirements can be met within the timeframe needed by organizing IAW the EAF vision. Putting these facts together with the predicted results on the overall Total Force OPSTEMPO and it becomes very clear that pressing ahead with the full EAF vision now is the only way to go. This proposal is an avenue to expedite the process.

MAKING THE EXPEDITIONARY AIR FORCE WORK – NOW!

I. INTRODUCTION

World events over the past 10 years have spawned the current focus of the United States Air Force – transitioning to an Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF). Based on real and perceived threats and the current force structure, this focus is far-sighted, appropriate, and necessary. Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEF), the combat power of the EAF, began official operations 1 October 99. These initial operations are but the first step towards fulfilling the ultimate EAF vision. This vision centers around rapid reaction AEF force packages that are “on call” to meet any regional Commander in Chief’s (CINC) requirements anytime they are needed. Because AEF forces can remain “on call” as opposed to being forward deployed, the net result of a completed EAF vision is reduced Operations Tempo (OPSTEMPO). This reduced OPSTEMPO, in turn, will directly affect the downward slope of retention. The future is bright. However, in the period between the first EAF steps and completion of the vision, the very real problem of retention – the very problem that fulfillment of the vision will fix – threatens the fiber of the Air Force’s foundation. The Air Force has taken that giant first step. The remaining steps towards the goal of the full EAF vision are in sight. The EAF vision must become a reality now! This paper proposes an in-depth AEF plan that uses the current force structure and fulfills the EAF vision.

Any AEF plan that has a chance for success must have several key parts. First, and foremost, it must be concrete and detailed enough that it can be presented to the CINCs as a realistic and viable alternative to forward deployed forces. Without their approval, the greatest plan in the world is not worth the paper it is written on. Secondly, the plan must use the current Total Force structure, e.g., active duty, Air National Guard (ANG), and Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC), to develop and align the forces. There are no earth shattering new acquisitions or force structure changes within the foreseeable future that will magically make the EAF vision come true – C-17 and F-22 buys notwithstanding. The plan is limited to the forces available now. To fulfill the EAF vision with current forces means the ANG and AFRC capabilities, assets, and limitations must be factored in to the equation. There must be agreements and compromises within the Total Force in order to meet the first, most critical requirement of getting the CINCs to “use” the vision. Third, the plan should realistically reduce OPSTEMPO and not just provide predictability and stability. An AEF plan that continues

“business as usual,” even with predictability and stability, will eventually be doomed to failure if for no other reason than the “line airman” will “vote” with his feet. The AEF proposal herein incorporates these key factors.

Before the plan can be proposed, there must be a review of the events leading up to the EAF transition and the additional challenges that OPSTEMPO and retention present. Once reviewed, all the various components of the EAF concept can be pieced together to arrive at a workable definition of the AEF concept of operations. It should then become clear that fulfillment of the EAF vision is necessary for the Air Force during this time in history. If fulfillment of the EAF vision is the right end product, it is critical to know where the Air Force stands today and what must be done to fulfill the vision. Following that, the audience must be narrowed down to those few who hold successful completion and implementation of the vision in their hands. The plan must be workable for them. Finally, a detailed plan can be developed that not only meets the Air Force’s military requirements but is also acceptable to all.

II. THE PARAMETERS WE MUST MEET.

A. THE WORLD – NOW

Since the late eighties and early nineties, the “...USAF’s active duty manpower has decreased 36 percent and its total force strength (including the Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard) has dropped 30 percent.”¹ The Air Force has shrunk from 39 fighter wings to 12. “The uniformed Air Force of the year 2000 is the smallest in history: 358,000 active-duty members plus 107,000 in the Air National guard and 74,000 in the Air force Reserve for a total of 539,000.”² In 1998 the Air Force participated in over 1,600 USAF exercises in 35 countries, completed nearly 30 deployments to Bosnia with over 2,200 sorties, flew over 30,000 mobility missions to 90 countries, engaged in nearly 300 mil-to-mil contacts in Europe and the Pacific, fulfilled 35 deployments to NORTHERN WATCH with over 4,700 sorties and over 60 SOUTHERN WATCH deployments with 23,000 sorties, provided nearly 60 counter-narcotics deployments to Latin America, and accomplished nearly 100 Denton Amendment humanitarian relief missions to 30 countries.³ In FY99, the USAF supported over 230 USAF exercise deployments to nearly 25 countries worldwide, nearly 40,000 mobility missions to over 140 countries, and flew over 36,000 sorties dropping 22,000 munitions in support of combat operations.⁴ These are today’s economic, political, and military facts of life.

B. THE WORLD – FUTURE

Lest one thinks these political realities currently faced today are simply an abnormal period, a quick review of what the experts are predicting is required. In 1998, the RAND Corporation published a document predicting the global trends for the next 25 years. They state that, “The U.S. military will be called upon to respond not only to major regional warfare but also to other crises, and to play a key role in shaping the future security environment.”⁵ This detailed report went on to say, “The U.S. will remain a globally engaged actor. We are convinced that the United States will remain engaged as a major player on the global scene through the first years of the 21st century...we believe that the nation simply has little choice in the matter.”⁶ Continuing with the RAND Corporation’s predictions,

“... ‘military operations other than war’ (MOOTW)...– lesser conflicts, punitive raids and expeditions, peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, and so forth – seem likely to remain a frequent feature of the world scene through the first part of the 21st century...Humanitarian assistance will remain a U.S. vocation...We do not see the demand for such aid decreasing over the years to come. Indeed, it seems to us likely that the number and severity of humanitarian crises will increase over the next 30 years...the U.S. military will remain the organization best equipped to respond to this menu of challenges.”⁷

With few variations, this prediction seems to be the consensus among the “experts.” Today’s reality and tomorrow’s outlook need to be understood for two reasons. First, knowing these facts highlights the importance of getting a handle on OPSTEMPO while there is a chance to do so. There is no predicted relief in sight. Second, when taken in context with current political and military strategies it becomes clear that the Air Force senior leadership is moving in the right direction for today’s world and tomorrow’s future.

C. “BIG PICTURE” STRATEGY

The current “Big Picture” national security strategy is the right one for today and tomorrow’s world. The U.S. National Security Strategy directs the armed forces “...to **shape** the international environment; **respond** to the full spectrum of crises; and **prepare today** for an uncertain future.”⁸ This seems to be a far-sighted approach. While preparing today is extremely important, the concepts of shaping the international environment and responding to the full spectrum of crises are more directly tied to the issues of the EAF, AEF, OPSTEMPO, and retention. An understanding of these concepts is critical. Shaping is defined by William T. Johnsen in a Strategic Studies Institute study.

“Shaping will be accomplished in a number of ways. The United States will promote regional stability through bilateral and multilateral relationships that build confidence with allies and partners, as well as improve transparency in security issues. Forces overseas, peacetime engagement activities, and preventive measures (such as, constraining or eliminating NBC capabilities, arms control regimes, and the prevention or deterrence of terrorism) will help prevent or reduce conflicts and threats. U.S. conventional and nuclear capabilities will help deter aggression and coercion. Responding to the full spectrum of crises includes deterring aggression and coercion in crises. This may entail a declaratory U.S. commitment or employing U.S. forces in a limited manner to convey U.S. concern. If these limited options are not successful, the United States may find it necessary to intervene militarily. These smaller-scale contingencies (encompassing the full range of operations beyond peacetime engagement activities, but short of major theater war) seek swiftly to contain, mitigate, or terminate a conflict before it expands. Responding also includes fighting and winning major theater wars (MTWs) ‘...in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames,...’”⁹

Directly supporting the National Security Strategy are two concepts that shape the development and structure of the EAF and employment of the AEFs. The first concept is Global Engagement Operations (GEO). This is a “...a comprehensive new formulation of...capabilities and strategy in the post-Cold War environment...GEO casts the Air Force strategic concept into five stages: shape, deter, halt, win, and re-shape...Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael E. Ryan has signed off on GEO...”¹⁰ The second concept is Joint Vision 2010 (JV2010). This document “...guides all the Services into the next century with its vision of future warfighting...JV2010 sets forth four overarching operational concepts: dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection...The aggregate of these four concepts allows joint forces to dominate the full range of military operations from humanitarian assistance through peace operations to the highest intensity conflict.”¹¹ The EAF vision can be directly traced to these principles of how the armed forces will form and plan (GEO) and how they will conduct operations (JV2010). How operations are conducted is key to the EAF and crucial to the issues of OPSTEMPO and retention. Within the four pillars of JV2010, the concepts of dominant maneuver and focused logistics provide the foundation for the EAF’s vision of AEF operations. This foundation allows room for the Air Force to directly impact the OPSTEMPO issue. In order to understand this relationship, these important concepts must be defined. Dominant maneuver means:

“Air and space forces are inherently maneuver forces with unmatched organic lethal and non-lethal ‘firepower’...the operational capability of airpower to project combat power rapidly anywhere in the world, without being physically based everywhere in the world, supports dominant maneuver on a regional and a global basis. The ability to strip away an adversary’s own air and space power and place the adversary’s forces under constant threat of attack from American airpower forces the adversary to maneuver at the discretion of the joint force commander...The freedom of action for joint forces made possible through air and space superiority, coupled with the leverage offered by information superiority, enables all joint forces to gain advantages in achieving dominant maneuver.”¹² Moreover, focused logistics “...requires a combination of information and logistics technologies that ensures required supplies arrive at the right time at the right place every time, no matter the level of conflict...agile combat support is key...[it] ensures rapid movement of supplies directly from factory to flight line. This process provides a ‘reach back’ sustainment capability that gives our forces a smaller logistical footprint in the theater.”¹³

Along with these overarching operational and strategic concepts are a few other key “big picture” factors that have shaped the EAF vision and can impact OPSTEMPO and retention. Specifically, the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) report noted “...[while] the United States can neither afford to retreat into isolation nor become the ‘world’s policeman,’ the United States will continue to pursue a national security strategy of engagement...[and]...seek to protect and promote U.S. national interests around the globe.”¹⁴ The National Defense Panel report, forwarded to Congress on 15 Dec 97, urged the Department of Defense “...to examine:...Projecting military power (more rapidly, absent significant forward access, with smaller units and footprints, with greater lethality, and with the ability to conduct effective urban operations)...”¹⁵ General Ryan summed it up best when he wrote,

“Now we are faced with more numerous challenges that require the capability for rapid, tailored responses to many regions and many situations, from humanitarian operations to full-scale combat. That paradigm shift demands that we change our mind-set, procedures, and, when necessary, our employment structure...We will adapt procedures to operate as a rapid deployable force that is more capable of exploiting the unique aspects of air and space power: range, speed, flexibility, and precision – to the fullest capacity.”¹⁶

From all these factors the EAF vision was born. Within these overarching concepts lie the keys to meeting mission requirements and dealing directly with OPSTEMPO and retention.

III. ADDITIONAL CHALLENGES: OPSTEMPO AND RETENTION.

A. OPSTEMPO

In Feb 00, the Honorable F. Whitten Peters, Secretary of the Air Force stated, “There is one central question that the Chief [General Ryan] and I face: Can we sustain this superb force in the face of the highest peacetime OPTEMPO in the history of the Air Force and the best economy we’ve had in the United States for at least several generations?”¹⁷ General Ryan, writing in the U.S. Air Force Posture Statement 2000, went on to say, “On any given day, 90,000 airmen – almost one-sixth of the Total Force – are operating forward at 12 overseas bases and 16 forward operating locations.”¹⁸ The Strategic Studies Institute summed it up like this,

“Some have described the post-Cold War era as a period of strategic pause - a period in which the United States can rest while it awaits the emergence of a new or revitalized global competitor. But recent events have seriously undermined the belief that the United States can stay home and catch its breath... These experiences confirm that no strategic pause is possible and argue, instead, that the U.S. armed forces are going to be globally engaged, shaping the international security environment for years to come.”¹⁹

The result of this unbridled OPSTEMPO is devastating – a rate of retention so low that it threatens the very fiber of our force.

B. THE DIRECT RESULT: DEVASTATING RETENTION

General Ryan proudly calls our airmen “...a national treasure – they are a combat-proven, decisive, fighting force...”²⁰ General Richard Hawley, recently retired Commander of Air Combat Command (ACC), amplified General Ryan’s remarks when he stated, “People really are our most important warfighting element.”²¹ The problem is simple, we can not keep these “national treasures” and “our most important warfighting elements” in the service. Not only is this a burden because of the extra time and money spent training replacements that will take years to compensate for the experienced veterans they replace, but it could potentially have catastrophic effects on the Air Force’s ability to fulfill strategic and operational employment concepts so skillfully crafted to meet current and future challenges. Furthermore, Major General Donald A. Lamontagne, Commander of the Air Force Personnel Center, stated, “Pilot retention is threatening the Air Force and the AEF (aerospace expeditionary force) concept. We are about seven percentage points under the requirement (for pilots). We’ve never been that low before—and we are headed even farther south...[additionally]...The NCO corps is the backbone of the Air Force, if we lose them, their loss will threaten our future every bit as much as [the loss of]

our pilots. The warning light is on here and we have to stop this problem before it grows.”²²

The U.S. Air Force Posture Statement 2000 gave the latest retention summary:

“Our need to retain a highly skilled force remains a top priority. The Air Force’s high level of concern has increased because of continued declines in enlisted and officer retention...From FY98 to FY99, first-term enlisted retention dropped from 54% to 49%, short of our goal of 55%. Likewise, career airmen retention fell from 93% to 91%, below our goal of 95%. Although second-term airmen retention stabilized at 69%, it is below our goal of 75%...Officer retention is also challenging, especially among our pilots. Last year, pilot retention fell from 46% to 41%. However, the FY99 long-term pilot bonus take rate, a forward-looking measure of pilot retention, rose to 42%, up 15 points from FY98’s long-term rate of 27%, permitting a measure of guarded optimism...we believe that this leading indicator of pilot retention will continue to reflect an improved retention environment as we implement the FY00 program.”²³

Hopefully, this “guarded optimism” will continue to prevail. However, two additional factors must be taken into consideration. First, General Hawley’s statement in Jul 99 that pilot retention problems were, “...pointing toward a 2,000-pilot shortage by 2002.”²⁴ Additionally, Secretary Peters stated as recently as Feb 00 that, “We have not seen a positive sign that last year’s pay and retirement reforms are gaining traction.”²⁵ The second factor concerns two major events that occurred during 1999. First, ALLIED FORCE occurred. As Secretary Peters noted, “Most relish the opportunity to serve their country by employing the skills they have been taught. However, we are now 33% smaller and 400% busier. There are families who are separated over 200 days every year – we feel lucky if we can get that down to 120 days a year – one day in every three!”²⁶ Second, and perhaps the most telling in the long-run, the “advertisement” campaign for the implementation of the AEFs was in full swing. This campaign advertised predictability, stability, and hinted at reduced OPSTEMPO. No matter what was specifically advertised, if these “hints” of reduced OPSTEMPO do not bare fruit quickly, there may be a wide spread feeling among all airmen that this new AEF concept is simply “business as usual, only under a different label.” Let there be no doubt, OPSTEMPO is the main cause of retention problems. General Hawley stated this fact in the clearest voice when he said, “The high operational tempo and time away from families are the main reason pilots give for leaving, not low pay.”²⁷ An article in Air Force News verified General Hawley’s statement. “We’ve been trying to fix pilot retention with more money—but that’s not the problem. It’s going back and forth to the desert that’s causing the problems.”²⁸ General Ryan reiterated this point in the U.S.

Air Force Posture Statement 2000 when he wrote, “High operations tempo has consistently been a leading motivator to separate.”²⁹ The EAF vision, if implemented fully, can reduce the OPSTEMPO burden as much as physically possible given the political, economic, and military realities of today’s world.

IV. OUR RESPONSE TO THE PARAMETERS AND CHALLENGES: THE EAF VISION.

A. ADJUSTING TO THE STRATEGY

Given today’s strategic and operational guidance, the underlying concept behind the EAF vision is quite simple. “We need to be postured so that we can respond rapidly in hours with light, lean, and lethal forces tailored to what the [regional] commander-in-chief [CINC] needs.”³⁰ The EAF Implementation Division (HQ USAF/XOPE), provides the “broad-brush” view of the EAF:

“The Expeditionary Aerospace Force (EAF) embodies the Air Force vision to organize, train, equip and sustain its future Total Force – Active, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve – to meet the security challenges of the 21st Century. The EAF addresses these challenges through enhanced sustainability, readiness and responsiveness and through fostering an expeditionary warrior mindset. The fundamental objective of the EAF is to enhance the operational capabilities the US Air Force provides today to its clients, the warfighting Commanders in Chief (CINCs), while sustaining a viable force that can also provide those capabilities in the future.”³¹

They go on to state that the EAF “...is reaffirmation of the vital role aerospace power plays across the full spectrum of military operations in support of the National Military Strategy. It is recognition of the growing tendency to employ aerospace power frequently and over sustained periods as a part of that strategy. And, it is recognition that this demand for aerospace power is driven by it’s unique characteristics – range, speed, flexibility, and precision.”³² The June 1999 Factsheet: EAF, explains what it means to be expeditionary. “Being expeditionary means the Air Force conducts global aerospace operations with forces based primarily in the US that will deploy rapidly to begin operations on bed-down...Expeditionary nature means we can deploy to austere locales without a robust support infrastructure and operate there for an unknown duration supporting joint military operations.”³³ Employment out of this expeditionary nature takes the form of AEFs.

B. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

“The Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) makes the final transition from a force founded on the strategy of forward-based presence to one built on the vision of global engagement.”³⁴ Brigadier General William R. Looney, III summed up the AEF mission – “...to give regional commanders in chief (CINC) rapid, responsive, and reliable airpower capabilities and options that meet specific theater needs.”³⁵ AEFs are force packages “...that the Air Force uses to ‘present its forces’ to the theater commander and to meet global steady state and contingency operational requirements.”³⁶ Air Force Doctrine Document 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, describes how the AEFs will meet the requirements of the mission and provides the best insight into how OPSTEMPO can be reduced. “The exceptional speed, range, and lethality of expeditionary air and space forces allow global operations far from the operational area...Air and space expeditionary forces will increasingly be able to influence a distant operational area without being physically present. The quick-reaction response and global reach of air and space forces make theater boundaries and organizational structures less constraining.”³⁷ EAF “...planners envision the AEF operating in three scenarios – as deterrent, an additive force, or a filler force.”³⁸ The EAF vision has the AEFs providing packages of forces to the CINCs, tailored to the situation, that operate from an established infrastructure (e. g., home base) and are not tied to a specific theater. While this concept of operations may not be feasible in certain situations, as will be shown later in the paper, the bottom line is that this concept of operations can fulfill the vast majority of requirements and, in so doing, will drastically reduce the OPSTEMPO burden.

C. FORCE PACKAGING

AEFs are the tailored packages the Air Force will use to present its forces to the theater commanders. The EAF vision shows that these tailored packages will be formed from several large groups of “across-the-board” forces. They are divided into two sets of “groups.” One set will deal primarily with combat and combat support missions, called Combat AEFs. The second group will be formed for non-combat mobility purposes and called Mobility AEFs. Under certain circumstances, the Combat AEFs will be provided oversight by lead wings.

“Force preparedness of [Combat] AEFs is focused through designated ‘lead wings’ who will provide contingency operation leadership (at the tactical level) for some deployments where there is no pre-existing command structure. The lead wings would designate command elements should the AEF have to provide group or wing-level leadership to expeditionary locations and also the bulk of ECS team taskings, such as

large numbers of security forces, civil engineering and communications personnel.”³⁹

The make-up of the Combat AEFs will “...represent aerospace capability (air superiority, air-to-ground, precision attack, mobility, bombers) in pre-determined, scheduled sets of forces...AEFs include a cross section of Air Force weapon systems (150+ total aircraft of dissimilar types) and people (10,000-15,000) providing forces for theater commanders’ air campaigns.”⁴⁰ The “vision” clearly shows that these large Combat AEFs will contain all the organic combat and combat support aircraft, equipment, and personnel they would require to accomplish any mission.

“AEFs are configured with basic capabilities inherent in strike packages – air superiority, precision strike, and suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD). Other necessary capabilities such as command and control, jamming, electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) interception, combat search and rescue, and air refueling would in most cases be provided by in-place theater assets. Sending AEFs to parts of the world without such in-place assets would require deploying those assets also...In cases where in-place tanker assets are not available or are unable to provide required support, an AEF would also include four tankers... Additionally, CONUS-based bombers could launch from the United States and be integrated into AEF strike packages.”⁴¹

The important point to note here concerning the vision of AEFs is that they will be “all encompassing” large packages that contain all the assets they need to fulfill any mission. “In the future, AEFs will comprise complete, versatile aerospace packages with different capability mixes, including not just fighters but other aircraft such as C-130s and refueling tankers. AEFs will consist of geographically separated but operationally linked Air Force units providing a menu of rapid-response capabilities that can be tailored to deal with the full spectrum of contingencies...”⁴² “Each force will have air-superiority, multirole fighter, multirole bomber, stealth, tanker, and theater-airlift capabilities.”⁴³ Major General Donald Cook, Director of Expeditionary Aerospace Force Implementation clearly emphasized this point. “Ultimately, each wing will have air-superiority, multirole fighter, multirole bomber, stealth, tanker and theater air-lift capabilities.”⁴⁴ While the current AEF organization contains ten combat AEFs and two “rapid-response” Aerospace Expeditionary Wings (AEWs)⁴⁵, the EAF vision shows that, “In the future...the rapid-response wings will be dissolved into the expeditionary forces.”⁴⁶ Once they have dissolved, we can initiate a “...smarter way of scheduling units that deploy [which] will mean that each might only have to go overseas once every 15 to 18 months instead of more

frequently...during their designated response windows, if at all.”⁴⁷ This seems to imply that there may be 12 Combat AEFs instead of only 10 after dissolving the rapid-reaction AEFs.

The “tailored” packages used to present forces to the theater commanders are derived from these large Combat AEFs. “The AEF is an aerial task force structured to respond swiftly to overseas contingencies, with ample air-to-air and air-to-surface firepower. The standard AEF package has been a mix of about 30 F-15 and F-16 aircraft, with US-based long-range bombers on dedicated alert as backup.”⁴⁸ “AEFs will have about 30 fighters. US-based heavy bombers will be on designated alert to support each of 10 standing AEFs.”⁴⁹ It is envisioned that these tailored packages are the types of forces “...that national command authorities may deploy to defuse a developing crisis situation, to quickly increase a theater’s air-power capability, or to maintain a constant theater airpower capability.”⁵⁰

Summing up the vision of the Combat AEFs, there are 10 to 12 large, all encompassing, force packages that contain between 150 and 200 aircraft of all types, up to 20,000 personnel, are provided rough oversight by lead wings, and can be “tailored” down to about 30-40 aircraft with accompanying equipment and personnel.

The second large group of forces that make-up the AEFs are designated Mobility AEFs. The EAF vision has five such Mobility AEFs.⁵¹ As with the Combat AEFs, the Mobility AEFs are provided oversight by lead wings. The “Five mobility ‘lead wings’ paired to the AEFs provide expeditionary leadership and airlift expertise for response to non-combat military operations such as humanitarian relief operations (HUMRO or HR), disaster response, aid relief and non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) from hostile areas.”⁵² While the EAF vision does not specify the size or make-up of the Mobility AEFs, it is known that “One of the five humanitarian AEFs, with a mix of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and various support assets, will be on call at any given time.”⁵³

D. COMBAT EMPLOYMENT

Combat AEFs exist to put bombs-on-target. If the Air Force is to fulfill its strategic and operational world-wide missions and accomplish the EAF vision of providing rapid-response forces, it must be able to support any theater CINC’s requirements. Air Force Doctrine Document 2, Global Engagement, spells out this basic principle. “In some situations decisive operations can be conducted globally, reducing or even negating the requirement for the forward deployment of friendly forces.”⁵⁴ EAF planners fully understand that the ability to conduct

global operations within the timeframe CINCs need it, thereby reducing the requirement for forward deployed forces, is a “make or break” part of the EAF vision. Timing is everything. While each contingency is different, the EAF vision does spell out a rough timeframe that must be met. “The goal of the AEF is to launch combat sorties in-theater 48 hours after an execute order is issued and then sustain combat airpower for the duration of the conflict or crisis.”⁵⁵ While the “main body” of the AEF is deploying in order to meet the in-theater goal of 48 hours, “...heavy bombers would still provide the fastest response to aggression. USAF’s B-1B, B-2A, and B-52H bombers, from a cold start at their home bases in the continental United States, could attack virtually anywhere on Earth in 18 hours.”⁵⁶ The EAF vision entails “...some mixture of fighters, attack airplanes, heavy bombers, tankers, airlifters, air defense suppression airplanes, and other types, [that] an AEF can deploy to a forward base, arm airplanes, and strike enemy targets in force within a few days. The AEF’s first bombers could hit targets within 24 hours, but fighters could deploy and do the same within 48 hours.”⁵⁷ One of the “Main points of the EAF vision [is that]...we reduce demand for forward presence by being more responsive (e.g., bombs on target in 72 hours).”⁵⁸

The EAF vision is right on target for mission accomplishment. Having force packages of 150-200 aircraft that can put sustained combat power on any target in the world within “a few days” after an execute order should fulfill just about any strategic or operational mission required by any CINC. The question now turns to whether or not the EAF vision directly attacks OPSTEMPO and retention.

V. DOES THE EAF CONQUER OPSTEMPO AND RETENTION?

The short answer is yes and no. When the EAF vision becomes a reality and this force packaging and concept of operations is accepted as a realistic operating procedure by theater CINCs, the AEFs should have a tremendous effect on OPSTEMPO reduction. This should directly affect retention problems. However, until the EAF vision becomes a reality, OPSTEMPO must be analyzed in light of how current AEF operations are conducted.

A. REALITY

While the EAF has been initiated and AEF formation and employment has begun, the Air Force senior leadership has elected to slowly bring the full vision into reality. As was mentioned previously, the ten combat AEFs are currently being supplemented by two rapid-reaction combat AEFs called Crisis Response AEWs. The EAF Implementation Division stated that “Full EAF

evolution will take time and programmed investment until each AEF will contain the same combat capability and specialized weapons systems. Throughout this process, two ‘on-call’ crisis response AEWs, scheduled back-to-back, will provide rapid force projection capability. They share, with the paired residual AEF forces, ‘on call’ responsibilities to provide rapid (within 48 hours from warning) effects-based aerospace forces to meet rapidly developing global contingencies.”⁵⁹ Operations using this force packaging will continue “...until all 10 [combat AEFs] are fully functioning in four to five year’s time...”⁶⁰ Since AEF employment officially began 1 October 99, it can assume that the EAF vision will not become a reality until approximately October 2003 or 2004.

Until 2003 or 2004, AEF force packaging will not look like the EAF vision. “When the AEF concept becomes a *reality* [italic added by author], tanker and transport aircraft will be added to the AEF packages.”⁶¹ These, and other less numerous aircraft, such as the E-3, labeled “enablers” by EAF planners, “...will [also] not be assigned to specific expeditionary forces because they are in short supply, their job is too specialized or they support other military services.”⁶² Additionally, the Mobility AEFs “...have few of their own forces, so they will draw manpower from the 10 expeditionary forces that are on call at the same time the mobility forces are.”⁶³

Likewise, until 2003 or 2004, it can assume that the AEF concept of operations will not look like the EAF vision. According to the U.S. Air Force Posture Statement 2000,

“...we have created a rotational structure by reorganizing our Active and Reserve Component deployable forces into 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). These AEFs are employed two at a time for 90 days over a 15-month rotation cycle. During every cycle, the two engaged AEFs have enough equipment and forces to address steady-state contingency requirements, such as Operations SOUTHERN and NORTHERN WATCH, the Balkans, and counter-drug operations, as well as significant contingency operations short of major theater war. In addition, there are five lead mobility wings responsible for opening and operating airfields and assisting in humanitarian relief operations; each wing is on call for 90 days every 15 months. Finally, there are also two contingency response wings held in reserve to satisfy unplanned requirements above steady-state commitments. These wings will alternate on-call every 90 days and will eventually become part of the 10 AEFs as the EAF concept matures.”⁶⁴

“Two of the 10 forces would be on call for 90 days every 15 months. Units would be deployed to ongoing contingencies such as those in Southwest Asia and Bosnia.”⁶⁵ A specific break-out of this 15-month cycle is provided by Major General Cook: “15 Month Cycle divided into four

periods: (1) Deployment/On Call, (2) Pause, (3) Normal Training and Exercises, and (4) Spin-Up/Deploy Prep.”⁶⁶

B. REALITY AND THE OPSTEMPO ISSUE

The current AEF force structure and concept of employment addresses stability and predictability. The intent is that “AEF force elements fulfill a 90-day ‘on-call’ period every 15-months so AEF-affiliated members will know when they are ‘in the window’ for deployment, when they are training and when to prepare for the ‘on call’ rotation so they can plan their lives accordingly.”⁶⁷ Secretary Peters stated “...a known and predictable rotation schedule gives all our airmen predictability and stability in their lives, which allows them to plan time with families, time for higher education, and time for themselves. This is essential if we are to keep airmen for a 20-year career.”⁶⁸ General Ryan added that “The EAF concept is meant to bring predictability and stability into the lives of Air Force people and is intended to make life easier on them and their families.”⁶⁹ Finally, the EAF Implementation Division wrote that the “EAF offers...greater stability and predictability by operating on an established and equitable 15-month deployment lifecycle.”⁷⁰ Providing stability and predictability is a very important part of the EAF vision. Unfortunately, with the conduct of ALLIED FORCE occurring so close to the start of AEF employment, the initial “stability and predictability” was justifiably shaken up in order to provide relief to those units that participated. This shake-up will affect at least the first two cycles (approximately 30 months) of the AEF rotation.

Stability and predictability by themselves do very little, if anything, to reduce OPSTEMPO. It has been shown that the fully implemented EAF vision has the potential to positively affect OPSTEMPO. However, while the EAF vision is being slowly implemented, it appears that the current AEF employment concept only addresses the OPSTEMPO issue by “spreading the wealth.” The Total Force, e.g., the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, have “signed up” to support EAF implementation in what would appear to be a “good faith” team effort. Secretary Peters stated that “...the rotational structure of EAF gives us much larger access to our reserve forces, because it allows our traditional reservists and their employers a year or more to resolve schedule conflicts. Perhaps the best measure is that 25,000 Guardsmen will take EAF assignments in each rotation – providing more than 10% of the deployed manpower requirement by using 25% of Guard manpower in each rotation.”⁷¹ The EAF: Factsheet proclaimed “Additional TEMPO relief results from distributing the deployment

workload across the Total Force (Active Duty, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve) with the Air Reserve Component (ARC-the latter two elements above) deploying its assigned forces forward.”⁷² When a fully implemented EAF vision is in place in 2003 or 2004 and the vast majority of AEFs deploy only as “rapid-reaction” packages to a contingency, this “good faith” team effort that allows the active force to “spread the wealth” throughout the Total Force could pay high dividends. Until that time, it is almost guaranteed that those reserve forces that have “signed up” to participate in AEFs will, in fact, deploy for their 90-day “on call” periods. One can easily see these reserve forces and their civilian employers, agreeing to these long periods of absence for one, maybe even two, rotations. However, four to five years of such rotations (again, until the EAF vision becomes reality) may cause some serious strain between the reserve forces and their civilian employers and, ultimately, the “good faith” effort agreed upon with the active force.

Putting all these things together, the picture of the EAF through 2003 or 2004 looks a lot like what the Air Force has been doing for the last 10 years. Based on this reluctantly pessimistic review, the effect on OPSTEMPO relief for the next four to five years looks negligible. A bluntly gloomy prediction is that if OPSTEMPO relief does not occur within the next year or so, the timeframe when the ALLIED FORCE and the EAF advertising campaign after-glow wears off, the overwhelming feeling throughout the Total Force by the “line airman” is likely to be that the EAF concept is a failure. Retention, both active and reserve, will take an even more dramatic turn for the worse, propped up only by the addition of the recently initiated ten-year pilot commitment. Of course, this does not make up for the experienced mid-level leadership that will be needed over the next 2-5 years until pilots coming in under the longer-term commitment gain experience. It also does not bode well for the enlisted corps. There is no ten-year commitment for them. Fortunately, the Air Force leadership has developed the right plan to face this challenge in developing the EAF vision and AEF concept of operations. All that is needed is to implement it fully – now.

VI. WHY DON'T WE FULLY IMPLEMENT THE EAF VISION NOW?

To be sure, fully implementing the EAF vision, especially the vision’s concept for AEF employment, is faced with constraints.

“First and foremost, an AEF would require access to the host country and/or clearances into any airspace that requires transit to get to the fight...without access the AEF is not an option...Second, an AEF

needs an established base (usually an operational host-nation base) to furnish a runway, an area for a tent city, and some basic water and fuel infrastructure...Although the requirements would be minimal, an AEF must operate out of an established base in a host country in order to meet the combat sortie requirements immediately...Third, strategic airlift and tanker assets must be made readily available...the deployment of an AEF would most likely occur during periods with normal day-to-day airlift requirements, not, for example, during a severe crisis, a major regional conflict about to erupt, or early in an isolated crisis situation... The airlift requirement has not been fine-tuned to date, but will probably fall in the neighborhood of 50 to 60 C-141 equivalents depending on the amount of prepositioning in-theater...Finally, the ability to get munitions into the location can be both a logistical and diplomatic issue. Prepositioned dumb/smart bombs along with missiles, either brought in on deploying fighters or airlifted, will offer initial combat capability. But to sustain operations, munitions transfer will be required. The key, of course, is moving the munitions from in-theater locations rather than from CONUS in a timely and efficient manner.”⁷³

These issues, and many more like them, are important ones for sure. However, the question arises as to what will change in the next four to five years to make these issues “go away?” Access, basing rights, and munitions storage will always be concerns. While the Air Force leadership has, perhaps, some say in these matters, these seem to be issues for the offices that can directly affect them - the State Department and regional CINCs. Whether the full EAF vision was in-place or not, these issues would still be on the table. Along these lines, another seemingly major concern is that “...there is a point between the trigger point and full mobilization where the EAF can no longer retain any semblance of a predictable schedule and other sustainment options, to include Presidential Selective Reserve Call-up of Full Mobilization, are considered. **A major task for the EAF implementation** is to define these points, the place where multiple actions are required (e.g., criteria such as PSRC, greater than four AEFs committed, selective disengagement, impact on MTW OPLAN execution).”⁷⁴ Within a large degree, this question has already been answered. “Two Aerospace Expeditionary Forces define the level of deployment our combat and combat support units can sustain over time...The AEF cycle defines the policy and procedures by which the EAF will rotate forces through these deployment commitments. The first objective is no more than 90 days deployed every 15 months and on a predictable schedule. The second objective is to maintain normal hours and tempo at home station in order to allow for training and quality family life.”⁷⁵ Additionally, General Hawley stated, “With more than 800 US aircraft already committed by early May, the conflict over Kosovo, is – certainly

from an air perspective – this is a Major Theater War.”⁷⁶ Granted, some fine tuning is needed on this “big picture” parameter, but the answer is well within reach.

Though not stated directly, the amount and condition of airlift and tanker aircraft available to fulfill the EAF vision seems to be a major concern. Again, the question arises as to what major changes are going to occur within the next four to five years that will resolve the perceived shortfalls? According to General Charles Robertson, Commander of U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), “The service has planned to purchase 134 C-17s to replace its 270 aging C-141s. But...the swap may not provide enough aircraft for the demands facing the command...Even though tonnage capabilities remain close to the same, we lose tremendous flexibility with so many fewer tails.”⁷⁷ While Air Mobility Command (AMC) has presented several initiatives to strengthen the airlift and refueling fleet in their Air Mobility Master Plan, such as the C-5 Reliability Enhancement and Re-engining Program,⁷⁸ addition of C-130Js, and upgrade of KC-135 avionics packages through the Global Air Traffic Management program,⁷⁹ these initiatives affect the condition of the fleet, not the size. There was absolutely nothing in the 5 Mar 99 force structure changes announcement that would indicate there are additional airlift and tanker projects in the works.⁸⁰ While the Air Force might be able to “tweak” the airlift and tanker force slightly over the next four to five years, the bottom line is that the current force structure must be incorporated into making the EAF vision a reality. The issue of strategic airlift seems to be an internal one that is already addressed within the EAF vision – plan it well and assign these forces to the AEFs!

Along the same lines as airlift and tankers, “...challenges remain as we fully implement the EAF concept. Global taskings for our low-density/high-demand (LD/HD) platforms – intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, command and control, and search and rescue assets – continue to strain our people and equipment.”⁸¹ The Air Force has initiated

“...efforts to improve the Global Military Force Policy (GMFP) used to provide [OPSTEMPO] monitoring and relief for low density/high demand (LD/HD) forces. The mobility steady-state commitment lines, monitored by AMC, already provide tools to monitor and control the TEMPO of those forces. Together, these tools provide a more comprehensive picture of the USAF TEMPO. And, together they provide a more ready menu from which tailorable force packages will be deployed to meet specific CINC taskings.”⁸²

Risking the chance of sounding overly redundant, without major purchases of additional aircraft to perform these missions, transference of these missions to other platforms, or altering

preconceived notions of how these platforms are tasked and employed, what significant changes will occur within the next four to five years that will allow the Air Force to operate the way it currently does and still fully implement the EAF vision? These platforms must be fit within the EAF vision “parameters.”

The EAF Implementation Division stated it best when they said, “...the EAF Vision will involve significant changes...These changes have been categorized into three key areas called vectors—structural, cultural, and operational...The EAF vision also requires significant cultural changes to institutionalize the rule sets and the planning concepts that create more effective force packaging; that make TEMPO visibility and relief happen; and that target investments to create more sustainable, ready and responsive forces.”⁸³ The Air Force has taken the first step towards these structural, cultural, and operational changes by initiating the current AEF employment concept. To a large degree, the Air Force must convince itself to make the necessary changes now in order to complete the change and fully implement the EAF vision. If a working plan can be developed that fulfills the EAF vision, who then, outside the Air Force itself, must be convinced?

VII. WHO MUST BE CONVINCED, AND CAN IT BE DONE?

A. WHO?

There are several key players the Air Force will have to convince of their ability to meet all mission requirements in order to fully implement the EAF vision. The President, Congress, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CINCs all play important roles in the implementation process. The President and Congress seem to be open to the EAF concept. General Hawley said,

“...he saw a turning point in the concept of AEFs last summer [1998], when US forces, having quickly deployed to the Persian Gulf region to deal with Iraq’s recalcitrance on UN weapons inspections, were ordered home again. A Defense Department spokesman, Hawley recalled, told the national media that the Air Force could return to the Gulf with substantial striking power within 48 hours. ‘That tells me that we have gained acceptance, at the senior levels of our government, of our concept of having forces on alert in the States, ready to deploy and respond with meaningful combat power in a short period of time,’ Hawley asserted. ‘We think it’s the right way to use airpower.’”⁸⁴

The Honorable William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, seems to be willing to embrace any concept that would continue to meet mission requirements and ease the OPSTEMPO burden. Secretary Cohen has stated to Congress that, “The United States needs a larger military force if it

wants to continue operations at the 1990s pace...We have a situation where we have a smaller force and we have more missions, and so we are, in fact,...wearing out systems, we're wearing out people..."⁸⁵ General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, expanded on Secretary Cohen's comments. "We have fewer people but more missions. And we have got to make adjustments to bring that back into balance...[The troops will conclude] 'We can do better on the outside. Life will be easier. I'll be home weekends or evenings with my wife or husband, and I'll have a better quality of life with my family.' That's the real danger that we face, that we've got to find a way to either increase the size of our forces or decrease the number of our missions..."⁸⁶ Senior government officials as well as the Joint Chiefs are already on board with the EAF vision. Thus, it appears that only leaves the functional and regional CINCs.

Space Command (SPACECOM) can be a major player in implementation of the EAF vision. When U.S. forces are "on call" and not directly assigned to a specific Area Of Responsibility (AOR), reconnaissance and surveillance platforms, such as the E-3, will not be available day-to-day. This "slack" has to be taken up, at least partially, by some other means. During these periods, regional CINCs must continue to have "information superiority" within their AORs. SPACECOM must step up and fill that potential void. This would seem to be a desirable "mission" for the command. If, due to budgetary constraints, SPACECOM is not able to "expand" its capabilities (if necessary) to fulfill this requirement, perhaps a slight altering of priorities within SPACECOM's current force structure could accomplish close to the same thing. Assuming regional CINCs clearly state their requirements for reconnaissance and surveillance, it seems very feasible that SPACECOM would gladly welcome the opportunity to fill this needed mission.

TRANSCOM is directly affected by implementation of the EAF vision. Allocation of airlift and tankers to specific AEFs is contrary to how TRANSCOM and AMC have traditionally been operating. While no background data could be found suggesting General Robertson (CINCTRANSCOM) embraces this aspect of the EAF vision, there is plenty of evidence that he is willing to entertain any proposal that accomplishes the mission and reduces OPSTEMPO for his troops. General Robertson stated, "Peacetime missions for Air Mobility Command keep its crews and assets constantly tasked. TRANSCOM taps AMC for support during natural disasters such as hurricanes or earthquakes as well as for ongoing military operations and contingency

support. The command's assets are often stretched thin.”⁸⁷ Part of General Robertson's concern is that

“...air mobility planners now realize that early estimates of the assets needed to support the power-projection force might have been understated. A large part of the 'US-based' fleet that would be required to support a major deployment of US forces from bases in the US is actually operating outside the country on any given day supporting routine deployments, contingency operations, humanitarian missions, and other 'real-world' activities. The hours routinely run up by these aircraft figure prominently in transport and tanker upgrade and replacement programs.”⁸⁸

His concerns are certainly real. However, as has been shown, there are not any significant force structure changes occurring within AMC over the next four to five years that would change this situation. What must be done is to develop a detailed AEF plan for airlift and tankers that uses the current assets available, adheres to the EAF vision, and emphasizes the Air Force core competencies of rapid global mobility and agile combat support.⁸⁹ The plan must have two main aspects. First, it must show that the Air Force can dedicate enough airlift and tankers to fulfill AEF “tailored” package requirements. Second, it must show that “normal daily tasking” requirements can be met after dedicating the forces. The bottom line is that it does no good to have AEFs available to go anywhere in the world on a moments notice if day-to-day operations cannot be sustained. This paper proposes a plan that can fulfill both requirements. That leaves only the regional CINCs.

The regional CINCs are “where the rubber meets the road.” They have direct responsibility for combat and combat support operations within their respective theaters. They represent front line protection for American and/or indigenous personnel within their AORs. Forces on the ground and within their direct control represent immediate combat power. The EAF vision tends to take away that immediate combat power and replace it with a promise of the required force arriving “on time, on target.” While all regional CINCs are well aware of the retention woes throughout the Services and are willing to consider alternative methods to reduce these problems, they have a combat mission to perform and, quite frankly, Air Force OPSTEMPO and retention problems are an Air Force issue. In Congressional testimony, General Hawley “...attributed some of what he called the chronic overtasking of Air Force units to the Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms. The 1980s-era legislation reduced the service chief's ability to control deployment rates. ‘The result is a tendency for the geographic CINCs and their components to place unconstrained demands on scarce resources.’”⁹⁰ General Hawley continued, “The regional

commanders in chief cannot balance their demands against the needs of other regions, and the services' force providers, such as ACC, are prevented by Goldwater-Nichols from making those trade-offs.”⁹¹ While General Ryan stated “...that regional commanders in chief are becoming more accepting of AEFs...,” he did note that “...they would prefer having dedicated forces on hand under their command...”⁹² It thus appears to be the regional CINCs that are delaying full implementation of the EAF. They are driving the increased OPSTEMPO because they each want what's best for their region. While they are aware of the “big picture” effect on the armed forces, their requirements must none-the-less be fulfilled. So, how can they be brought on board to the concept?

B. HOW?

First, and foremost, there must be a detailed plan for AEF deployment/employment that completely fulfills the EAF vision. HQ USAF/XOPE is tasked with supplying the plan. This paper proposes an independent solution. Second, this plan must be “sold” to military and government officials outside the Air Force span of control. As discussed above, the President, Congress, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are willing to embrace the concept. CINCSpaceCOM will probably accept the increased combat and combat support importance of his mission. Given a clear plan for implementation of the EAF vision that can accomplish his missions, CINCTransCOM should also accept the concept of reducing OPSTEMPO for all the troops. Finally, the regional CINCs must be convinced that, quoting General Ryan, “...an AEF on call in CONUS is ‘almost as good’ as having one already deployed.”⁹³

Brigadier General Looney summed up what must be proven to the regional CINCs. “If all we consider is our ability to launch within 24 hours of an execute order, we focus on only one aspect of the global engagement doctrine. Airpower does little for a regional CINC facing a crisis if it takes two or three days to arrive in-theater and then another few days before a combat sortie is generated.”⁹⁴ The Air Force must be able to provide “...the warfighting commanders, and the nation three things: 1) known, rapid response capability tailored to support operations across the spectrum of crisis; 2) predictability and stability across the force improving morale and retention of high-quality people, and 3) further integration of the special partnership between active, guard, and reserve forces.”⁹⁵ The regional CINCs must be convinced that “...As a package of airpower tailored to the situation at hand, the AEF can be deployed quickly to show

that the US is ‘willing to put aircraft forward...on the ground, to share risk with a nation under duress.’⁹⁶ They must know “...an early-arriving aerospace expeditionary force may get to the crisis quickly, within days of unambiguous warning but before the enemy invasion force gets rolling. Its arrival may dissuade the enemy from making an attack. This situation – ‘enhanced deterrence’ in GEO parlance – is comparable to an existing Army concept...called ‘strategic pre-emption’ where one side can act so quickly that the other side’s options or potential for success are nil.”⁹⁷ However, “...before any serious thought is given to deployed force structure reductions, the AEF has to prove it can accomplish its demanding missions.”⁹⁸ The EAF vision does this.

“Nothing says more about how far the Air Force has come in the past decade than last year’s air war over Kosovo. Operation ALLIED FORCE proved that many of the concepts central to our vision of an Expeditionary Aerospace Force in the 21st century worked the way we planned them to. For example,...We deployed to 21 expeditionary bases. Essentially, we ‘set up shop’ in 21 places where no shop existed! This truly Herculean effort was executed so smoothly that it has deserved no mention in any of the “lessons learned” briefings I [Secretary Peters] have seen.”⁹⁹

The momentum is there. It is time to press forward!

VIII. MAKING THE EAF VISION A REALITY – NOW: A PROPOSAL.

A. OVERVIEW

The following proposal is a concerted effort to show that the EAF vision can be fulfilled now. In several cases, slight alterations to the ideal vision were made in order to fit the current force structure. In other cases, where the vision is unclear or simply does not go into great detail, several assumptions were made. These assumptions and planning factors are described below.

The Total Force has been divided into 12 Combat AEFs, 5 Bomber Alert Assignments, 5 Mobility AEFs, and 12 “Normal Daily Taskings.” Stepping through the plan, the development, structure, capabilities, restrictions, and response times of each of these forces will be shown in detail.

B. PLANNING FACTORS AND ASSUMPTIONS

First, if the regional CINCs are to support the EAF concept, all the AEFs must be “guaranteed” that they are able to accomplish their military missions. As previously shown, these missions cover a wide range of operations from MTWs to Peacekeeping. The EAF vision

uses large AEFs that can be broken down into tailored force packages the Air Force can “present” to the regional CINCs to carry out a wide variety of missions.

Each of the 12 Combat AEFs has their designated lead wing, Air Superiority (F-15A-C), Long Range Strike (B-1, B-2, or B-52), Stealth/Deep Interdiction (F-117 or F-15E), Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD - F-16C Blk 50), Close Air Support (CAS)/Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR - A-10), Rescue (HH-60G and HC-130), Command and Control (C2 - E-3), Interdiction (INT - F-16A-C Blk 15-40), Tankers (KC-10 and KC-135E/R), Inter-theater airlift (C-5, C-17, and C-141), and Intra-theater airlift (C-130) assigned to them. The 12 Combat AEFs have been “paired up,” e.g., 1-2, 3-4, etc., and assigned 90 day “on call” schedules (noted in julian date format). The six “paired” Combat AEFs, at 90 days “on call” per “pair,” encompass an overall 18 month rotational period between Combat AEFs 1-2 and 11-12. While the individual Combat AEFs each effectively comprise their own force, each set of “paired” Combat AEF’s airlift and tanker assets support each other under certain circumstances (spelled out in the proposal). To meet the “presentable packaging” ideal, each individual Combat AEF has further been “tailored” into four separate elements of combat power. These deployable packages are labeled Aviation Packages (AV PKG) # 1 - # 4.

Each AV PKG # 1 (Partial AEF Deployment to an Established Base – Peacekeeping), has a support element, Air Superiority, SEAD, CAS/CSAR, Rescue (HH-60G only), C2, INT, Tankers (KC-135E/R only), Inter-theater, and Intra-theater airlift assigned to it. This is the smallest AV PKG and would be ideally used for raids, small-scale extended combat, deterrence, or peacekeeping operations. AV PKG # 2 (Partial AEF Deployment to an Established Base), is essentially the same as AV PKG # 1 with the addition of another INT (F-16A-C BLK 15-40) squadron for more combat power and, where required, Tanker and/or Intra-theater airlift squadrons. AV PKGs # 3 (Full AEF Deployment to an Established Base), and # 4 (Full AEF Deployment to a Bare Base), are “full” Combat AEF deployments and could be used for the entire spectrum of operations. The difference between these two packages is in the support equipment required. AV PKG # 3 assumes “full” Combat AEF deployment to an established base(s), such as Al Jabar, Kuwait or Suwon, Korea. At these “established” bases, it is assumed that munitions, and basic infrastructure are pre-positioned. AV PKG # 4 assumes “full” Combat AEF deployment to a “bare base.” Here, it is assumed that munitions and basic support

equipment must be deployed along with the aircraft. Each AEF's specific capabilities and limitations are discussed in detail later in the paper.

In order to ensure the bombers assigned to each Combat AEF have enough tanker support to enable them to truly be the first line of deterrence or the first in combat, tanker resources have been allocated to these Long Range Strike aircraft. This resulted in the additional five Bomber Alert assignments. The main reason this was done was to guarantee the "first strike" capability of the bombers assigned to the Combat AEFs. Due to the relatively scarce amount of aerial refueling assets available, some tanker units have tasking for both Bomber Alert assignments and Combat AEFs. In order to minimize the tanker assets required and to accommodate this varied tasking, the Bomber Alert assignments are scheduled as 108 day "on call" periods (noted in julian date format). This puts the five 108 day Bomber Alert assignments on the same overall 18 month rotational period as the Combat AEFs. The Bomber Alert assignments overlap the Combat AEFs.

When analyzing the sheer volume of airlift and tanker requirements for deployment/redeployment and employment of the Combat AEFs and Bomber Alerts, then comparing them against the unstated and vague requirements for the Mobility AEFs, it becomes clear that there is simply not enough tankers available (within a reasonable "on call" average) to assign them to Mobility AEFs. Since the Mobility AEFs are primarily tasked with Inter- and Intra-theater non-combat mobility support, an assumption was made that the EAF vision would be best served by assigning the tankers to the Combat AEFs, Bomber Alert taskings, and Normal Daily Taskings and to allow Inter – and Intra-theater airlift to perform the Mobility AEF taskings without assigned tanker support. This does not mean that the Mobility AEFs are always without tanker support. It simply means that any tanker support required would come out of the tankers assigned Normal Daily Tasking missions and would not be from "dedicated" Mobility AEF support.

Each of the five Mobility AEFs has their lead wing, Inter-theater airlift (C-5) and Intra-theater airlift (C-130) assigned to it. For the same reasons the Bomber Alert assignments are on an overall 18 month rotational cycle made up of five 108 day "on call" periods, the Mobility AEFs are assigned 108 day "on call" periods.

The Normal Daily Tasking assignments were prepared for confirmation that enough resources can be allocated to the AEFs to ensure their mission accomplishment and, when using

the Total Force, enough resources remain available to fulfill day-to-day requirements. These assignments show all aircraft available and are broken out on the Combat AEF (90-day) timeline since this is the most task-saturating.

The second most important planning factor concerns OPSTEMPO. HQ USAF/XOPE has stated that one of the main objectives of the EAF vision is "...no more than 90 days deployed every 15 months..."¹⁰⁰ Deployed is the key word here. A critical distinction must be noted between being "on call" and actually being deployed. In the EAF vision, a significant portion of aerospace forces "on call" would not deploy unless needed for some contingency operation.

As was mentioned previously, basic "on call" schedules for the AEFs are divided up into 90 day cycles for the Combat AEFs and Normal Daily Tasking and 108 day cycles for the Mobility AEFs and Bomber Alerts. In developing this proposal a look beyond these cycles was required in order to focus on the long-term effects on each unit. Therefore, each individual unit's yearly "on call" average has been calculated on a three-year basis over a six year period (e.g., a unit's three year "on call" average for years one-three, two-four, three-five, and four-six, divided by four). The three year time frame was used because it most realistically relates to the average active duty tour length. The six year period was used to show the long-term effects of implementing the plan, to be able to build in the fact that individuals can come and go from a unit at anytime during the cycles, and to be able to compare the current way operations are conducted to how operations will be conducted under a fully implemented EAF vision.

Using this three year average over a six year period, under the current 15 month AEF cycle, a unit assigned to only one AEF will average 75 days per year "on call" and 94 days "on call" every 15 months. If that AEF deployed every time it was "on call" (which is very close to the truth right now) this would put the squadron right about at the goal of no more than "90 days deployed per 15 month cycle." While this is "doable" when only looking at the more numerous "type" units such as INT squadrons in a Combat AEF, a 75 day "on call" average per year simply becomes impossible when attempting to fulfill the requirements for both the Combat AEFs and Mobility AEFs and incorporate the airlift, tankers, and "enablers" into the plan. The enablers are currently deployed much more often. Based on this, the proposed plan started with several goals:

The first goal was to develop the plan in sufficient detail that it can be taken to the regional CINCs and used as verifiable proof that the Air Force can dedicate the assets necessary

to support their requirements within the timeframe needed, thereby allowing each of them to keep the forces “on call” whenever possible (e.g., the EAF vision). While regional CINC support of the EAF vision will probably be an on-going process continually sought for by the Air Force leadership, development of a detailed plan was a necessary part of this proposal.

The goal during development was two-fold: first, to get the “on call” averages down as low as possible; and, second, to build in “alternative” ways to manage the force within the Air Force span of control that allows Air Force leaders flexibility to manage individual squadron deployment rates within an AEF’s tasked “on call” period.

In order not to talk “apples and oranges,” the goal of reducing the overall “on call” average was sub-divided into several categories: 1) *All Units*, 2) *All Tasked Units*, 3) *Tasked Active Duty Units*, 4) *Tasked ANG Units*, and 5) *Tasked AFRC Units*. Since this plan involves Total Force assets, and each “asset” of the Total Force has differing capabilities, requirements, and restrictions, it was imperative to break down the analysis in order to provide a detailed look at the impact on each branch.

All Units includes every deployable squadron in the Total Force. Some “types” of aircraft, e.g., Air Superiority, actually have more squadrons available than taskings required. These non-tasked units “on call” average (e.g., zero days “on call”) were averaged into this category to provide a “big picture” look at the Total Force. Based on the interpolation that 75 days deployed per year was roughly equivalent to the EAF goal of no more than 90 days deployed every 15 months, the goal for this category was to get the overall “on call” average to 75 days per year. This would mean that under worst-case conditions, e.g., 100 percent deployment of all AEFs, the EAF goal would be met as a service. Granted, some units would average less than this and some more; however, this was the starting point. The actual proposed plan resulted in an 80 day “on call” average per year for All Tasked Units. The averages ranged from a low of 41 days “on call” for Air Superiority squadrons to a high of 104 days “on call” for HC-130, E-3, and C-130 squadrons.

All Tasked Units includes all active duty, ANG, and AFRC squadrons that were actually tasked to support one or more of the AEFs under the proposed plan. The goal here was to make the Tasked Unit’s “on call” average as close as possible to the overall force average. The set goal was 80 days “on call” average per year for all tasked units. The plan resulted in an 83 day

“on call” average. The averages ranged from a low of 60 days “on call” for B-52 squadrons to a high of 109 days “on call” for C-141 squadrons.

All Tasked Units had to be further broken down into active, ANG, and AFRC. Despite making some fundamental planning differences between the active forces and reserve forces such as “sustainment” rates for airlift and tankers during “normal” AEF operations, it was still imperative to reduce the reserve forces commitment as much as feasibly possible. Whereas, in most cases, the proposal uses a “spread the wealth” philosophy, this was not always the case in the overall tasking of units. Based on the overall goal of 80-days “on-call” per year for *All Tasked Unit’s*, sub-goals of 90 days “on call” for *Tasked Active Duty Units* and 75 days “on call” for *Tasked Reserve Units* were set. The plan resulted in a 93 day “on call” average for *Tasked Active Duty Units* with a low of 60 days “on-call” for B-52 squadrons to a high of 124 days “on call” for KC-135 squadrons. The result for *Tasked ANG Units* was 77 days “on call” per year and for *Tasked AFRC Units* it was 70 days “on call” per year. The low was 60 days “on call” for F-15A-C, B-52, F-16C BLK 50, and E-3 (Associate Unit) squadrons and the high was 122 days “on call” for C-141 squadrons. Table 1 has the overall “On Call” Summation.

Given that the Air Force leadership may or may not have control over whether the regional CINCs reduce forward presence and that the proposed plan reduces the “on call” periods to the lowest possible averages, the only remaining option is to build in “alternatives” available within Air Force control that would enable the Air Force leadership to better manage actual deployment rates. These “alternatives” involve how squadrons assigned to the individual AEFs are used. In the Combat AEFs, certain aircraft “types,” such as Air Superiority, actually have more squadrons available than what are physically tasked. These “extra” squadrons are designated “Reserve Squadrons.” One “alternative” assumes that if a Combat AEF’s AV PKG is tasked to deploy during one AEF cycle, one of the “Reserve Squadrons” would “fill in” for the assigned squadron during the next AEF cycle. In other words, if X Fighter Squadron (FS) deploys with AV PKG # 1 from Combat AEF # 1, the next time Combat AEF # 1 is “on call,” Y (Reserve) FS would be assigned the tasking. During the subsequent Combat AEF rotation, X FS would once again assume AEF responsibility. This same logic applies to tanker and Intra-theater airlift (C-130) squadrons. While all tanker and C-130 squadrons assigned to the Combat AEFs are tasked for deployment and redeployment operations, not all of them are tasked to physically deploy themselves. Each Combat AEF averages one KC-10 squadron and four KC-135E/R

TABLE 1
“ON-CALL” SUMMATION

"ON CALL" SUMMATION									
AIRCRAFT TYPE	# OF SQ'S	TOTAL # PAA	# A/C REQ'D	% PAA	3-YEAR "ON CALL" AVERAGE				
					TASKED ACTIVE DUTY	TASKED ANG	TASKED AFRC	ALL TASKED UNITS	ALL UNITS
AIR SUPERIORITY (F-15 A-D)	18	342	216	63	61	60	N/A	61	41
LONG RANGE STRIKE (B-1B)	6	63	34	54	61	61	N/A	61	61
LONG RANGE STRIKE (B-2A)	2	14	10	71	62	N/A	N/A	62	62
LONG RANGE STRIKE (B-52H)	4	50	24	48	60	N/A	60	60	60
STEALTH/DEEP INTERDICTION (F-15E)	6	132	72	55	91	N/A	N/A	91	91
STEALTH/DEEP INTERDICTION (F-117)	2	42	24	57	92	N/A	N/A	92	92
SEAD (F-16C BLK 50)	11	201	126	63	67	60	N/A	66	66
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10)	13	222	156	70	61	61	61	61	56
RESCUE (HH-60G)	10	69	37	54	101	81	61	81	73
RESCUE (HC-130)	7	27	13	48	122	81	121	104	104
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3)	7	28	14	43	112	N/A	60	104	104
INTERDICTION (F-16A-D BLK 15-40)	39	630	468	74	61	61	61	61	56
TANKERS (KC-10)	8	52	40	77	122	N/A	61	91	91
TANKERS (KC-135)	47	464	260	56	124	74	67	91	91
INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT (C-5)	11	104	59	57	122	75	89	100	100
INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT (C-17)	8	48	36	75	121	N/A	61	91	91
INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT (C-141)	16	122	73	60	122	122	99	109	95
INTRA-THEATER AIRLIFT (C-130)	42	396	214	54	109	111	86	104	104
AVERAGE:	14	167	104	60	93	77	74	83	80

squadrons. In the proposed plan, none of the KC-10 squadrons are tasked to physically deploy themselves. Depending on the AV PKG deployed, only two or three KC-135E/R squadrons are tasked to physically deploy. Given the fact that only three of the five assigned tanker squadrons actually deploy, it is assumed that those squadrons that physically do deploy during one Combat AEF cycle would not deploy during the next Combat AEF cycle.

The same scenario applies to C-130 squadrons. There are three C-130 squadrons assigned to each Combat AEF. AV PKGs # 1 and # 2 average only two C-130 squadrons tasked to physically deploy while AV PKGs # 3 and # 4 (full AEF deployment) have all three squadrons tasked to deploy. Assuming that either AV PKG # 1 or # 2 deploys during one Combat AEF cycle, and, therefore, two of the three C-130 squadrons physically deploy, it would be prudent during the next Combat AEF cycle to task the non-deploying C-130 squadron to physically deploy, if required. While doing these things will not reduce the “on-call” average for each unit, it certainly has the potential to cut down on the amount of time deployed, e.g., OPSTEMPO, for the eligible units.

For the more “plenty-full” units such as fighters, applying this rotational alternative could reduce the time deployed (assuming 100 percent deployment during all “on-call” periods) from about 60 days per year to about 45 days per year! For the “enablers” such as KC-135s and C-130s, this could reduce the time deployed from about 100 days a year to about 55 days a year!

Another recommended “alternative” that could be built into the force structure and would allow the Air Force leadership, specifically the ANG and AFRC leadership, more control over the OPSTEMPO of their forces would be to create “phantom” squadrons. These squadrons would be somewhat of a cross between Individual Mobilization Augmentees (IMA), the Associate Unit program, and the current practice of “rainbowing” reserve units.

The concept is this: ANG/AFRC squadrons assigned to AEFs and Bomber Alerts are given an Execute Order (EO). Upon EO, the ANG/AFRC squadron specifically tasked to deploy is responsible for deploying 100 percent of the required personnel, equipment, and aircraft. This 100 percent of the personnel will remain in-place for 30 days (longer than the current practice of rotating part-time personnel after 2 weeks). After the initial 30 days, the tasked squadron will re-deploy the majority of “part-timers” and be responsible to provide only 50 percent of the required manning for the remaining 60 days of the deployment. Obviously, the remaining 50 percent will be the majority of “full-timers” and should include the squadron’s leadership. Now,

the remaining 60 days of the deployment will be broken up into two 30 day periods. The 50 percent of the squadron that re-deployed will be “replaced” by personnel from the created “phantom” squadrons. One group of “phantoms” will deploy for each 30 day period. This is the part that resembles the “rainbowing” practice used now.

The IMA and Associate Unit portion of the plan comes into play as to how the “phantom” squadrons are organized and trained. These “phantom” squadrons will not have unit designations, aircraft, or equipment. However, the qualifications and make-up of these personnel would resemble that of the squadron they would “augment,” e.g., XX number of pilots, XX number of crew chiefs, XX number of engine mechanics, etc., per “phantom” squadron. Additionally, these personnel would not be assigned or attached to “replace” any particular reserve unit but would be kept in a “pool” of all the “phantom” squadrons for mobilization and deployment during any AEF period. The “contract” these personnel would agree to must state they are a volunteer to deploy for 30 days (or higher with Presidential call-up) per year. Therefore, when the originally tasked unit has been deployed for 30 days and needs to replace 50 percent of their personnel, they turn to this “pool” of “phantom” squadron personnel.

These personnel are kept current by being evenly “attached” to the squadrons throughout the Total Force. They would be “attached” to a specific unit (active duty or reserve) for training purposes and would participate in training just enough to keep current. Although attached to a particular unit for training, they could deploy to augment any reserve squadron. In this aspect they are similar to reserve “part-time” personnel. However, if they were “attached” to a reserve unit for training, they would resemble IMAs in that they would not be required to attend weekend drill or the annual two week deployments (only enough to keep qualified).

Based on initial calculations, adopting this “alternative” would create approximately 45 “phantom” squadrons and involve about 9,000 to 13,500 personnel across-the-board. Each aircraft “type” would require the following “phantom” squadrons to be created: F-15A-C – 0; B-1 – 1; B-2 – 0; B-52 – 1; F-15E – 0; F-117 – 0; F-16C BLK 50 – 1; A-10 – 1; HH-60G – 2; HC-130 – 2; E-3 – 1; F-16 – 10; KC-10 – 2; KC-135 – 8; C-130 – 16.¹⁰¹ It must be emphasized here that this is the one recommendation that is outside the current force structure. While the present IMA program could be altered to encompass some of these “phantom” squadrons, it is more than likely that additional Total Force personnel would have to be authorized by Congress to accomplish this recommendation.

There are several basic assumptions made during the course of developing this plan that are crucial to meeting the overall objective of fulfilling the EAF vision, thereby allowing the Air Force to actually have “presentable” forces for the CINCs that will meet their needs and enable a reduction in forward-presence and OPSTEMPO.

The first, and most important, assumption is that the ANG and AFRC will continue their “good faith effort” in working with the active force on implementation of the EAF vision. It is assumed that the current “good faith effort” will be expanded into several concrete agreements between the active and reserve forces. The first agreement involves visibility of the reserve forces, especially airlift and tanker assets. The reserve forces contain a significant amount of the Total Force airlift and tanker assets. According to HQ AMC/XOBA, the “Barrel Taskers,” AMC uses their Daily Operations Summary to track active duty airlift and tankers and only those few reserve forces that “sign up” to support direct AMC missions.¹⁰² AMC theoretically tracks the remaining reserve forces by estimating a “Notional 25% UE” is available.¹⁰³ While the reserve forces do have a better method of tracking the availability of their own forces, they “...do not have an Operations Summary per se.”¹⁰⁴ One assumption is that in order to provide the “centralized control” required to fulfill the EAF vision, AMC and the reserve forces will need to agree upon a similar format to track the availability of Total Force airlift and tanker assets and either allow AMC to become the lead element or, at minimum, supply the information to AMC on a daily basis.

The second agreement between the active and reserve forces concerns the amount of forces available and their response times. This agreement comes in two parts. First, fighters, bombers, rescue and C2 (Associate units only) must be addressed. In order to supply the combat power needed for Combat AEF employment, the proposed plan tasks all squadrons, including reserve forces, to supply 12 fighters, 6 bombers, 4 HH-60Gs, 2 HC-130s, and 2 E-3s for each Combat AEF. In those rare cases where tasked squadrons do not have the designated number of Primary Aircraft Assigned (PAA), it is assumed that PAA minus two will be supplied.

To fully analyze the combat power of each Combat AEF and AV PKG, sortie rates had to be plugged into the proposed plan. For deployed combat and combat support units conducting “normal” day-to-day Combat AEF operations, it is assumed that the squadrons would provide enough manpower and equipment to support “front lines,” e.g., daily available aircraft, equaling 60 percent of their deployed PAA, e.g., 12 fighters deploy, 7 are available. Inter-theater airlift

and non-deployed Intra-theater airlift and tankers would provide a “sustainment” level of missions (discussed below). During “surge” operations, it is assumed that all deployed fighters and bombers would supply enough manpower and equipment to support 2.0 times deployed PAA (e.g., 12 fighters deploy, 24 sorties per day), all combat support aircraft would support 1.6 times deployed PAA (e.g., 10 C-130s deploy, 16 sorties per day), and all non-deployed airlift and tanker assets would provide their “threshold” level (e.g., the mobility steady-state commitment line) of missions (discussed below). Response times for these forces will be IAW what the airlift and tankers can provide and will be discussed later.

The second part of this agreement concerns airlift and tankers. The initial response time and ability to deploy the Combat AEFs and/or Combat AEF bombers are crucial in the fulfillment of the EAF vision. Without a concrete agreement for a realistic response time that regional CINCs can live with, the entire EAF vision is in peril. Therefore, with the exception of those tanker squadrons sitting Bomber Alert, it is assumed that the reserve airlift and tanker squadrons “on call” for the Combat and Mobility AEFs will agree to the active duty “response times” listed in AMCI 10-403. It is further assumed that these response times begin at the Execute Order (EO). This means those reserve tanker squadrons “on call” for Combat AEFs agree to a 48-hour response time from EO and airlift squadrons “on call” for Combat or Mobility AEFs agree to a 36 hour response time from EO (current guidance for reserve forces is a 72 hour response time for each type aircraft). For those reserve tanker squadrons “on call” for Bomber Alert, it is assumed that they agree to a 24 hour response time from execute order. Adding an estimated 40 hours between Warning Order (WO) and EO,¹⁰⁵ reserve squadrons on Bomber Alert should have a minimum of 64 hours to prepare. All other reserve tanker squadrons should have 88 hours to prepare while all reserve airlift squadrons should have 76 hours to prepare.

As stated above, once the response time is agreed upon the next crucial step is deployment of one of the AV PKGs. While sustainment of the forces once deployed only requires a “reasonable” amount of airlift and tankers, deployment in a timely manner requires a large amount of airlift and tankers. In order to fulfill the promise of adequate combat power in-theater in a timely manner, it is assumed that those reserve airlift and tanker squadrons “on call” for Combat AEF, Mobility AEF, and Bomber Alert taskings will provide the active duty AMC-mandated “threshold” levels (for deployment/redeployment purposes only) for their particular airframe. These “threshold” levels are: 55 percent for C-5s, 75 percent for C-17s, 55 percent for

C-130s, 65 percent for C-141s, 75 percent for KC-10s, and 56 percent for KC-135E/Rs.¹⁰⁶ The amount of aircraft required per squadron is based upon PAA, e.g., a 10-PAA squadron of C-5s with a threshold level of 55 percent would deliver 6 aircraft for deployment and redeployment purposes. Once an AV PKG is deployed, or during periods when no AV PKG from their assigned Combat AEF is deployed, the reserve forces assigned to that particular Combat AEF would then be required to provide one-half the active duty threshold level to perform Combat AEF sustainment operations and/or fulfill Normal Daily Tasking requirements. This is roughly equivalent to the “Notional 25 % UE” AMC tracks under the current operation. The sustainment/Normal Daily Tasking levels for reserve squadrons would be: 27.5 percent for C-5s, 37.5 percent for C-17s (Associate Units), 27.5 percent for C-130s, 32.5 percent for C-141s, 37.5 percent for KC-10s (Associate Units), and 28 percent for KC-135E/Rs, e.g., a 10-PAA squadron of C-5s would provide 3 aircraft. Furthermore, a key planning factor “assumption” is that any airlift or tanker squadron assigned to a Combat AEF and performing Normal Daily Tasking missions will do so with the following restrictions: overnight(s) CONUS missions, out-and-back overseas missions, or local missions only.

For those reserve squadrons assigned to Mobility AEFs, if an “emergency” is declared by National Command Authorities (NCA), it is assumed they will provide the active duty AMC-mandated threshold levels stated above. During “normal” periods of Mobility AEF operations or, when no Mobility AEF tasking is present, it is assumed that reserve squadrons would provide the “sustainment” threshold level of aircraft for either the Mobility AEF or Normal Daily Tasking. As with the Combat AEFs, any airlift or tanker squadron assigned to a Mobility AEF and performing Normal Daily Tasking will do so with the following restrictions: overnight(s) CONUS missions, out-and-back overseas missions, or local missions only.

Those reserve tanker squadrons tasked for Bomber Alert are required to provide the active duty AMC-mandated threshold level of aircraft only during periods of deployment and redeployment or when the bombers are performing combat operations from their CONUS base. Once the bombers deploy to a forward location, the tanker squadrons assigned to that particular Combat AEF are responsible for their refueling operations and the Bomber Alert squadrons are relieved of their Bomber Alert tasking. If the bombers assigned to the Combat AEFs are not being deployed, redeployed, or performing combat missions from their CONUS base, the reserve tanker squadrons on Bomber Alert must provide the “sustainment” level of aircraft to support

Normal Daily Tasking. Once again, any tanker squadron assigned to Bomber Alert and performing Normal Daily Tasking will do so with the following restrictions: overnight(s) CONUS missions, out-and-back overseas missions, or local missions only.

It is also assumed that those reserve airlift and tanker squadrons not assigned to Combat AEFs, Mobility AEFs, or Bomber Alerts will be available for Normal Daily Tasking. The amount of aircraft required varies with recent or expected tasking. For those reserve airlift and tanker squadrons outside +/- 90 days of any AEF or Bomber Alert tasking, they are required to provide the “sustainment”/Normal Daily Tasking percentage of their PAA for Normal Daily Tasking missions. For those reserve squadrons within +/-90 days of any AEF or Bomber Alert tasking, they are required to provide a flat 20% of their PAA for Normal Daily Tasking missions. Normal Daily Tasking includes three categories of missions: Tasked (e.g., AMC missions), JA/AAT (e.g., joint training), and Training. Because those airlift and tanker units assigned to AEFs and Bomber Alert are assumed to be restricted to overseas out-and-back missions, CONUS overnight missions, and local missions, it falls upon those squadrons assigned Normal Daily Tasking duty to fulfill the overseas “long-haul” missions (not including those in direct support of AEF operations since those forces are already assigned). Since this proposed plan analyzes the Air Force’s ability to meet current AMC/TRANSCOM Normal Daily Tasking as a whole, e.g., Tasked, JA/AAT, and Training, it is assumed that each aircraft type providing airframes for Normal Daily Tasking will use them in the historical percentages flown by AMC aircraft. Table 2 depicts these historical percentages.

TABLE 2
AMC HISTORICAL PERCENTAGES

AMC HISTORICAL PERCENTAGES			
A/C TYPE	PERCENTAGES		
	TASKING	JA/AAT	TRAINING
C-5	62.6	0.7	36.7
C-17	54.4	6.0	39.4
C-130	47.1	14.6	38.3
C-141	50.4	5.3	44.3
KC-10	50.1	1.9	48.0
KC-135E/R	50.8	0.0	49.2
NOTE 1: These percentages were compiled from the Sep - Dec 99 AMC Operations Daily Summary.			

The third agreement between the active duty and reserve forces centers on the relationship between active duty airlift and tanker units and their assigned Associate Units. For the purposes of this plan, and in order to “spread the wealth,” Associate Units are treated as if they were their own independent squadron. Obviously, great care was taken when assigning the different squadrons to the AEFs and Bomber Alerts to ensure that the active duty squadron and its Associate Unit were not tasked during the same, or overlapping periods. It was assumed that during periods when the “twin squadrons” were not tasked for any AEF or Bomber Alert, they would operate as they currently do on a day-to-day basis. However, it was also assumed that if either one of the squadrons was tasked for an AEF or Bomber Alert and subsequently given an EO, that unit, be it active or the Associate, would be the one responsible for carrying out the mission at hand. When this happens, the non-tasked “twin squadron” is expected to reduce its manning and schedule as much as possible, e.g., a great time to schedule extended leaves, since they will only be working with the PAA remaining after deployment. There are alternative working agreements that can be reached, such as the active duty and reserve Associate Units agreeing to split the tasking, however, for purposes of this plan, when a specific squadron is tasked for an AEF or Bomber Alert, they are responsible for providing the aircraft, manpower, and equipment.

Without the ANG and AFRC agreeing to these basic assumptions, or to very similar agreements, it is hard to envision the regional CINCs accepting a much longer response time or unknown ability to deploy the AV PKGs. It is certainly realistic to imagine that initiation of these response times and deployment/redeployment requirements might necessitate some adjustments within the Total Force, e.g., possible increased “full-time” members of deployable reserve units, detailed agreements between active duty units and their attached Associate Units, etc. But, the bottom line to fulfillment of the EAF vision, and therefore, reducing OPSTEMPO for all, is the ability to get sustained combat power in-theater when the regional CINCs need it. A Total Force effort is the only way.

Another basic assumption concerns the force structure within the AEFs themselves. The EAF vision has been followed as close as physically possible. However, several assumptions were made regarding the so called “enablers.” First, a literal interpretation of the EAF vision would require “enablers” like the F-117 (stealth) to be in every Combat AEF. This is simply not physically possible with any consideration towards OPSTEMPO. The same logic applies for the

different “models” of aircraft available, e.g., F-16C BLK 40. Therefore, the following assumptions were made: Each Combat AEF would have 12 F-15 air superiority aircraft. The model, e.g., F-15A or F-15C, did not matter. Each Combat AEF would have 6 Long Range Strike aircraft. They could be either B-1s, B-2s, or B-52s. Each Combat AEF would have 12 Stealth or Deep Interdiction aircraft to fulfill the long-range precision attack requirement. Therefore, each Combat AEF has either 12 F-117s or 12 F-15Es. Each Combat AEF would have 36 INT F-16s assigned to it (3 squadrons of 12 each). While an attempt was made to ensure the majority of Combat AEFs have at least one squadron of F-16C BLK 40 aircraft (all LANTIRN/PGM capable), all Combat AEFs have at least one squadron of F-16C BLK 30 (some LANTIRN/PGM capable) aircraft.

The final assumption concerns authority to task the AEFs and Bomber Alerts. AEF and Bomber Alert squadrons come from the Total Force and therefore, have different chains-of-command on a day-to-day basis. Additionally, these forces are currently assigned to all theaters throughout the world and therefore, have different combatant commands on a day-to-day basis. One can envision the scenario where an ANG squadron stationed in the Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) region is tasked to support operations in the Balkans. Being assigned to the PACAF region, this squadron would not only fall under the ANG chain-of-command, but indirectly under CINCPACAF, and, ultimately, under the Commander, Pacific Command (CINCPACOM). There is a definite potential for this multi-layered chain-of-command to delay and/or inhibit the “rapid-reaction” capability of this squadron’s participation in the deployment of an AEF to another theater. The only way to avoid this potential pitfall to “rapid-reaction” is to assign AEF tasking authority to a level above these layers of command. Therefore, it is assumed that when squadrons are tasked for Combat AEF, Mobility AEF, and Bomber Alert duty, deployment/employment tasking authority lies with the Secretary of Defense. If these AEF-assigned squadrons are not currently tasked for deployment and/or employment, then Normal Daily Tasking authority will lie with the Major Command or Air Mobility Command (in conjunction with the ANG and AFRC). With the assumptions and planning factors stated, development of the proposal is possible.

C. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PROPOSAL

Given the EAF vision, planning factors, and assumptions outlined above, the first place to start is with an accurate listing of the deployable squadrons within the Total Force. These

“deployable” squadrons include Associate Units but do not include training units or special duty units such as Special Operations Forces. This list is broken out into the different categories, e.g., aircraft types, used in the proposal. The aircraft types are further broken down to show PAA assigned and aircraft type model. Appendices 1 – 11 have these listings broken out into Air Superiority (18 squadrons, 342 aircraft), Long Range Strike (12 squadrons, 127 aircraft), Stealth/Deep Interdiction (8 squadrons, 174 aircraft), SEAD (11 squadrons, 201 aircraft), Close Air Support (13 squadrons, 222 aircraft), Rescue HH-60G/HC-130 (13 squadrons, 69/27 aircraft), Command and Control (7 squadrons, 28 aircraft), Interdiction (39 squadrons, 630 aircraft), Tanker (55 squadrons, 516 aircraft), Inter-theater (35 squadrons, 274 aircraft), and Intra-theater aircraft (42 squadrons, 396 aircraft). All-in-all, there are 253 squadrons and 3,006 aircraft to work with.

If there is going to be a “show stopper,” it will be airlift and tankers. The details of these airframes have to be accurate. While there is a wide variety of capabilities among the different aircraft types, there are also significant differences in capabilities between different models of the same type aircraft. Therefore, in order to avoid confusion the plan must “convert” the different capabilities to a common language. The plan uses C-141 and KC-135R “equivalents” to describe requirements and assets available. ACMI 10-403 lists the capabilities of each airframe. Table 3 has consolidated those listings and converted them into equivalents based on short-tonnage (S/T) and off-load (refueling) capabilities.

TABLE 3
AIRLIFT AND TANKER AIRCRAFT CONVERSION TABLE

AIRLIFT AND TANKER AIRCRAFT CONVERSION TABLE									
TYPE	S/T	OFFLOAD	EQUIVALENTS						
			C-5	C-17	C-130	C-141	KC-10	KC-135R	KC-135E
C-5	61.3	N/A	N/A	1.4	5.1	3.2	N/A	N/A	N/A
C-17	45.0	N/A	0.7	N/A	3.8	2.4	N/A	N/A	N/A
C-130	12.0	N/A	0.2	0.3	N/A	0.6	N/A	N/A	N/A
C-141	19.0	N/A	0.3	0.4	1.6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
KC-10	32.6	156000	0.5	0.7	2.7	1.7	N/A	2.0	2.8
KC-135R	13	76400	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.7	0.5	N/A	1.4
KC-135E	13	55800	0.2	0.3	1.1	0.7	0.4	0.7	N/A
NOTE 1: S/T and offload capability come directly from ACMI 10-403. Offload fuel amounts are based on a 1,500 NM ferry distance.									
NOTE 2: Tanker conversion tables are to be used as "either or" numbers, e.g., the tanker either has a full load of fuel and is responsible for ferrying aircraft or is tasked with hauling cargo.									

After obtaining an accurate list of deployable squadrons/aircraft and developing a conversion table in order to talk a common language, the next task is to find out what AMC has historically flown. Given a historical track of AMC missions, an idea of current airframe usage and type missions can be formed. From there, it is possible to determine how many airlift and tanker assets are tasked to perform support of Combat AEFs, Mobility AEFs, and Normal Daily Taskings. The unclassified source used is the AMC Operations Daily Summaries prepared on a daily basis by TACC/XONB. The data was gathered during 13 Sep - 5 Dec 99. Table 4 shows AMC's overall historical taskings for C-5s, C-17s, C-130s, C-141s, KC-10s, and KC-135s during this period. As Table 4 shows, these AMC aircraft historically fly 237.6 C-141 equivalents and 123.5 KC-135R equivalents on a daily basis. These missions include all contingency operations support, e.g., AEF support, and Normal Daily Taskings. This summary serves as the foundation of analysis to see if it is possible to meet all mission requirements after assigning forces to the AEFs.

TABLE 4
AMC'S CURRENT NORMAL DAILY TASKING CONVERTED TO C-141 AND KC-135R EQUIVALENTS

AMC'S CURRENT NORMAL DAILY TASKING CONVERTED TO C-141 AND KC-135R			
TYPE AIRCRAFT	AMC HISTORICAL TASKING	C-141 EQUIVALENT	KC-135R EQUIVALENT
C-5	32	102.4	0.0
C-17	27	64.8	0.0
C-130	39	23.4	0.0
C-141	47	47.0	0.0
KC-10	32	0.0	64.0
KC-135	66	0.0	59.5
TOTALS:	243	237.6	123.5
NOTE 1: This table is based on historical data taken from the AMC Operations Daily Summary's from Sep - Dec 99. HQ AMC OPR is TACC/XONB, http://tacc.scott.af.mil/Information/Ext_Reports/opssum . The total average daily missions flown by all AMC aircraft is 275. However, for purposes of this table we have only analyzed the aircraft listed above.			

Appendix 12 shows the summary of total missions for all AMC aircraft and includes a breakout of each mission type. The important data from Appendix 12 is that 11.1 percent of

AMC's daily missions are dedicated to exercise or contingency operations. Appendices 13 – 18 show the breakout of mission data for C-5s, C-17s, C-130s, C-141s, KC-10s, and KC-135s. The data used to compile Table 4 was taken from these Appendices. Appendix 19 shows the ANG and AFRC data AMC tracks on a "Notional 25% UE" basis. These Appendices, taken together, dictated the need to make the remarks in the Planning Factors and Assumptions section that AMC and the reserve forces need to consolidate a method to initiate a "centralized" visibility over mobility assets. AMC does an outstanding job tracking its own forces or those reserve forces that "sign-up" for AMC missions, however, there is a large portion of the force that is not being tracked by this command element that could provide centralized control. For example, Appendix 11 shows that there are 42 deployable C-130 squadrons with 396 PAA throughout the Total Force. Appendix 15 only tracks 92 of these 396 aircraft. Appendix 19 shows a "notional" 73 C-130s available from the reserve forces but nowhere in the AMC Operations Daily Summary is there a format for tracking reserve missions. Granted, the reserve forces own their aircraft and do not fall under AMC's direct purview, however, the impression is that a large portion of the mobility force may be underutilized.

Appendices 13 – 18 show two other critical pieces of data. First, they show the different "threshold" levels AMC uses to control the tempo of their force. Secondly, they show the "percent possessed" for each aircraft type. These factors help determine how many aircraft should be available on a daily basis. AMC "owns" XX number of each type of aircraft. A certain number of those "owned" aircraft are always unavailable due to being in depot status, loaned to other commands, etc. The remaining "fleet" makes up AMC's "possessed" aircraft. The AMC mandated "threshold" levels apply only to "possessed" aircraft. From the historical data, it is possible to convert the number of daily aircraft "possessed" to a percentage. It is a reasonable assumption that this historical AMC "percent possessed" would be roughly the same percentage of reserve aircraft possessed. Therefore, that percentage is used for analyzing how many aircraft are available from the Total Force. A key assumption made in planning is that the reserve forces could support one-half the active duty "threshold" levels on a daily basis. With this in mind, all the pieces are in place to theoretically determine how many C-141 and KC-135R equivalents should be available on a daily basis.

Table 5 puts all these pieces together and shows the theoretical Total Force airlift and tanker aircraft available on a daily basis given the assumptions stated above. There are 310.2 C-

141 equivalents and 162.1 KC-135R equivalents available daily. Comparing Table 5 to Table 4 (AMC's current Normal Daily Tasking of 237.6 C-141 equivalents and 123.5 KC-135R equivalents), it becomes evident that there should theoretically be an additional 72.6 C-141 equivalents and 38.6 KC-135R equivalents to work into the AEF equation. Most importantly, Table 5 shows the specific amount of each type of aircraft that should be available on a daily basis. This works out to a bottom line figure of approximately 382 airlift and tanker aircraft available for all missions (tasking, JA/AAT, and training) on a daily basis.

TABLE 5
“TOTAL FORCE” AIRLIFT AND TANKER AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE ON A DAILY BASIS

"TOTAL FORCE" AIRLIFT AND TANKER AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE ON A DAILY BASIS																		
TYPE A/C	# AD PAA	# ANG PAA	# AFRC PAA	TOT PAA	% POSS.	NUMBER POSSESSED			THRESHOLD PERCENTAGE			AVAILABLE UNDER THRESHOLD			TOT AVAIL	"EQUIVALENTS" AVAIL ON A DAILY BASIS		
						AD	ANG	AFRC	AD	ANG	AFRC	AD	ANG	AFRC		C-141	KC-135R	
C-5	64	12	28	104	80.1%	51	10	22	55.0%	27.5%	27.5%	28	3	6	37	118.4	0.0	
C-17	48	0	0	48	81.2%	39	0	0	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	29	0	0	29	70.2	0.0	
C-130	125	183	88	396	91.0%	114	167	80	55.0%	27.5%	27.5%	63	46	22	130	78.2	0.0	
C-141	54	18	38	110	81.5%	44	15	31	65.0%	32.5%	32.5%	29	5	10	43	43.4	0.0	
KC-10	52	0	0	52	79.1%	41	0	0	75.0%	0.0%	0.0%	31	0	0	31	0.0	61.7	
KC-135	197	201	66	464	60.2%	119	121	40	56.0%	28.0%	28.0%	66	34	11	111	0.0	100.4	
TOTAL	540	414	220	1174	N/A	408	312	173	N/A	N/A	N/A	246	87	49	382	310.2	162.1	
NOTE 1: "% POSS." (Percent possessed): Possessed aircraft are those aircraft not in Depot status, loaners, chopped, etc. Possessed percentages are taken from the AMC Daily Operations Summary's and represent the average of the Sep - Dec 99 possessed versus owned numbers. Accurate numbers could not be found for the ANG/AFRC aircraft; therefore, an assumption was made that the ANG/AFRC possessed rates would be approximately the same as the Active Duty rate.																		
NOTE 2: Threshold levels for Active Duty aircraft units are taken directly from the AMC Daily Operations Summary's. The Threshold only applies to those aircraft possessed. No such threshold numbers could be found for the ANG/AFRC units. An assumption was made that the ANG/AFRC units could perform 50 percent of the Active Duty threshold on a daily basis and not impact their training and/or manpower pools.																		
NOTE 3: The current Active Duty force structure contains 66 PAA of C-141's owned by AMC. However, IAW the force structure changes announced 5 Mar 99, the Active Duty will retire 27 more C-141's from the total inventory affecting 3 separate wings. To make planning as conservative as possible, these retiring aircraft were not included in the calculations.																		

Before allocating airlift and tankers to different missions, AEF requirements must be determined. Since the large Combat AEFs will deploy in “presentable” packages (AV PKGs), the specific requirements for AV PKGs # 1 – 4 must be calculated. The Planning Factors and Assumptions section presented the “big picture” idea of what each AV PKG would contain. From this, a rough idea of how much airlift and how many tankers would be required to deploy and sustain each AV PKG can be determined. Unclassified cargo requirements for the different

“type” squadrons can be taken either directly from, or interpolated from, the 21 Jun 99 MEFPK Summary Report put out by HQ USAF/ILXX (CSC). Aerial refueling requirements can be calculated using data from AFPAM 10-1403. The only question to be answered is upon which distance to base AEF/Bomber Alert deployment calculations.

Since the two major “potential” hot spots in the world today are the Middle East/Balkan area and Korea, using an average deployment distance of 6,700 NM comes closest to a realistic power projection range. Based on the make-up of the AV PKGs and a 6,700 NM deployment, and using the MEFPK and AFPAM 10-1403, Tables 6 – 9 show the theoretical airlift and tankers required to deploy each AV PKG. AV PKG # 1 should need approximately 69.8 C-141 equivalents and 62.5 KC-135R equivalents to deploy; AV PKG # 2 should need approximately

TABLE 6
AVIATION PACKAGE # 1

AVIATION PACKAGE # 1 - PARTIAL AEF DEPLOYMENT TO AN ESTABLISHED BASE													
TYPE UNIT	#	REMARKS	PAX	CARGO REQUIREMENTS (S/T)				C-141 REQ'D	SPEED	FLY TIME	LBS/ HR	FUEL USED	KC-135R REQ'D
				BULK	OVERSIZE	OUTSIZE	TOTAL						
F-15A/C	12	EST. (83%)	170	59.4	118.9	2.8	181.1	9.5	439	15.3	7500	1373576	18.0
F-16C BLK 50	12	CW B	167	105.3	86.1	0	191.4	10.1	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
A/OA-10	12	EST. (83%)	248	108.5	113.2	0.0	221.7	11.7	300	22.3	4121	1104428	14.5
HH-60G	4	CSAR	98	63.4	23.5	31.0	117.9	6.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
E-3	2	EST. (83%)	129	38.8	81.8	0.0	120.6	6.3	439	15.3	10921	333352	4.4
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
AEF FTR	0	WG STAFF	36	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	ADVON TM	4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS ABGD	0	COORD ELE	4	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	SQUAD	13	4.2	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS (ELE)	0	WKNG DOG	3	3.1	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	CBT SPT LD	100	3.5	1.1	0.0	4.6	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
TOTALS:	90	PEACE PKG	1940	664.7	627.5	33.8	1326.0	69.8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	62.5
AIRCRAFT UNIT REQUIREMENTS:								67.4					
SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS:								2.4					

NOTE 1: Cargo requirements for the different units are taken either directly from, or interpolated from, the 21 Jun 99 MEFPK SUMMARY REPORT put out by HQ USAF/ILXX (CSC).

NOTE 2: The figures stated for each airlift aircraft in the "AIRLIFT REQUIRED" columns are based on S/T capability stated in AFPAM 10-403, 1 Mar 98 (i.e., C-141: 19 S/T). Since each AEF has all variants of airlift aircraft assigned to it, it is assumed that, if and when the actual deployment occurred, airlift planners would have developed a specific plan that dedicates the appropriate amount of oversize/outsize capable aircraft to the specific units that required them.

NOTE 3: The figures stated for "SPEED," "FLY TIME," and "LBS/HR" are taken directly from AFPAM 10-1403, 1 Mar 98. "KC-135R REQ'D" is based on a KC-135R/T offload of 76,400 lbs for a mission radius of 1500 NM, per AFPAM 10-1403.

approximately 79.4 C-141 equivalents and 75.3 KC-135R equivalents; AV PKG # 3 should need approximately 126.3 C-141 equivalents and 118 KC-135R equivalents; and AV PKG # 4 should need approximately 256 C-141 equivalents and 118 KC-135R equivalents. While this data provides a great planning guide, specific requirements and assets will have to be determined later when squadrons are actually assigned to the Combat AEFs.

TABLE 7
AVIATION PACKAGE # 2

AVIATION PACKAGE # 2 - PARTIAL AEF DEPLOYMENT TO AN ESTABLISHED BASE													
TYPE UNIT	#	REMARKS	PAX	CARGO REQUIREMENTS (S/T)				C-141 REQ'D	SPEED	FLY TIME	LBS/ HR	FUEL USED	KC-135R REQ'D
				BULK	OVERSIZE	OUTSIZE	TOTAL						
F-15A/C	12	EST. (83%)	170	59.4	118.9	2.8	181.1	9.5	439	15.3	7500	1373576	18.0
F-16C BLK 50	12	CW B	167	105.3	86.1	0	191.4	10.1	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
A/OA-10	12	EST. (83%)	248	108.5	113.2	0.0	221.7	11.7	300	22.3	4121	1104428	14.5
HH-60G	4	CSAR	98	63.4	23.5	31.0	117.9	6.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
E-3	2	EST. (83%)	129	38.8	81.8	0.0	120.6	6.3	439	15.3	10921	333352	4.4
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
AEF FTR	0	WG STAFF	36	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	ADVON TM	4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS ABGD	0	COORD ELE	4	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	SQUAD	13	4.2	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS (ELE)	0	WKNG DOG	3	3.1	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	CBT SPT LD	100	3.5	1.1	0.0	4.6	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
TOTALS:	102	PEACE PKG	2242	730.8	744.6	33.8	1509.2	79.4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	75.3
				AIRCRAFT UNIT REQUIREMENTS:				77.1					
				SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS:				2.4					

NOTE 1: Cargo requirements for the different units are taken either directly from, or interpolated from, the 21 Jun 99 MEFPK SUMMARY REPORT put out by HQ USAF/ILXX (CSC).

NOTE 2: The figures stated for each airlift aircraft in the "AIRLIFT REQUIRED" columns are based on S/T capability stated in AFPAM 10-403, 1 Mar 98 (I.e., C-141: 19 S/T). Since each AEF has all variants of airlift aircraft assigned to it, It is assumed that, if and when the actual deployment occurred, airlift planners would have developed a specific plan that dedicates the appropriate amount of oversize/outsize capable aircraft to the specific units that required them.

NOTE 3: The figures stated for "SPEED," "FLY TIME," and "LBS/HR" are taken directly from AFPAM 10-1403, 1 Mar 98. "KC-135R REQ'D" is based on a KC-135R/T offload of 76,400 lbs for a mission radius of 1500 NM, per AFPAM 10-1403.

After arriving at these theoretical assets available and assets required, it is necessary to logically review what physically can and cannot be done. To make the Combat AEF and AV

TABLE 8
AVIATION PACKAGE # 3

AVIATION PACKAGE # 3 - FULL AEF DEPLOYMENT TO AN ESTABLISHED BASE													
TYPE UNIT	#	REMARKS	PAX	CARGO REQUIREMENTS (S/T)				C-141 REQ'D	SPEED	FLY TIME	LBS/ HR	FUEL USED	KC-135R REQ'D
				BULK	OVERSIZE	OUTSIZE	TOTAL						
F-15A/C	12	EST. (83%)	170	59.4	118.9	2.8	181.1	9.5	439	15.3	7500	1373576	18.0
B-1B	6		246	48.6	158.0	27.2	233.8	12.3	439	15.3	25000	2289294	30.0
B-2	6	EST. (50%)	132	44.2	62.3	0	106.5	5.6	439	15.3	25000	2289294	30.0
B-52H	6		206	101.6	82.1	21	204.7	10.8	300	22.3	25000	3350000	43.8
F-15E	12		435	66.2	112.6	0	178.8	9.4	439	15.3	10586	1938757	25.4
F-117	12	EST. (83%)	282	92.3	142.4	49.3	284.0	14.9	375	17.9	9380	2011072	26.3
F-16C BLK 50	12	CW B	167	105.3	86.1	0	191.4	10.1	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
A/OA-10	12	EST. (83%)	248	108.5	113.2	0.0	221.7	11.7	300	22.3	4121	1104428	14.5
HH-60G	4	CSAR	98	63.4	23.5	31.0	117.9	6.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
HC-130	2	CSAR	49	49.0	8.4	0.0	57.4	3.0	270	24.8	5360	266015	3.5
E-3	2	EST. (83%)	129	38.8	81.8	0.0	120.6	6.3	439	15.3	10921	333352	4.4
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
AEF FTR	0	WG STAFF	36	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	ADVON TM	4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS ABGD	0	COORD ELE	4	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	SQUAD	13	4.2	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS (ELE)	0	WKNG DOG	3	3.1	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	CBT SPT LD	100	3.5	1.1	0.0	4.6	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
TOTALS:	176	PEACE PKG	4183	1288.5	1470.4	131.3	2890.2	152.1	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	247.2
				AIRCRAFT UNIT REQUIREMENTS:				149.8					
				SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS:				2.4					
NOTE 1: Aviation Package # 3 deployment will consist of either a B-1, B-2, or B-52 squadron and either a F-15E or F-117 squadron.													
NOTE 2: Cargo requirements for the different units are taken either directly from, or interpolated from, the 21 Jun 99 MEFPK SUMMARY REPORT put out by HQ USAF/ILXX (CSC).													
NOTE 3: The figures stated for each airlift aircraft in the "AIRLIFT REQUIRED" columns are based on S/T capability stated in AFPAM 10-403, 1 Mar 98 (I.e., C-141: 19 S/T). Since each AEF has all variants of airlift aircraft assigned to it, It is assumed that, if and when the actual deployment occurred, airlift planners would have developed a specific plan that dedicates the appropriate amount of oversize/outsize capable aircraft to the specific units that required them.													
NOTE 4: The figures stated for "SPEED," "FLY TIME," and "LBS/HR" are taken directly from AFPAM 10-1403, 1 Mar 98. "KC-135R REQ'D" is based on a KC-135R/T offload of 76,400 lbs for a mission radius of 1500 NM, per AFPAM 10-1403.													

PKGs concept of operations acceptable to the regional CINCs, they must have “rapid-reaction” capability. Interpreting this requirement to the extreme, that would mean one or all the AV

TABLE 9
AVIATION PACKAGE # 4

AVIATION PACKAGE # 4 - FULL AEF DEPLOYMENT TO A BARE BASE													
TYPE UNIT	#	REMARKS	PAX	CARGO REQUIREMENTS (S/T)				C-141 REQ'D	SPEED	FLY TIME	LBS/ HR	FUEL USED	KC-135R REQ'D
				BULK	OVERSIZE	OUTSIZE	TOTAL						
F-15A/C	12	EST. (83%)	170	59.4	118.9	2.8	181.1	9.5	439	15.3	7500	1373576	18.0
B-1B	6		246	48.6	158.0	27.2	233.8	12.3	439	15.3	25000	2289294	30.0
B-2	6	EST. (50%)	132	44.2	62.3	0	106.5	5.6	439	15.3	25000	2289294	30.0
B-52H	6		206	101.6	82.1	21	204.7	10.8	300	22.3	25000	3350000	43.8
F-15E	12		435	66.2	112.6	0	178.8	9.4	439	15.3	10586	1938757	25.4
F-117	12	EST. (83%)	282	92.3	142.4	49.3	284.0	14.9	375	17.9	9380	2011072	26.3
F-16C BLK 50	12	CW B	167	105.3	86.1	0	191.4	10.1	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
A/OA-10	12	EST. (83%)	248	108.5	113.2	0.0	221.7	11.7	300	22.3	4121	1104428	14.5
HH-60G	4	CSAR	98	63.4	23.5	31.0	117.9	6.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
HC-130	2	CSAR	49	49.0	8.4	0.0	57.4	3.0	270	24.8	5360	266015	3.5
E-3	2	EST. (83%)	129	38.8	81.8	0.0	120.6	6.3	439	15.3	10921	333352	4.4
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
F-16A/D BLK 15-40	12	EST. (83%)	302	66.1	117.1	0.0	183.2	9.6	439	15.3	5360	981649	12.8
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
KC-135E/R	10	ARC FOL	181	57.6	37.2	0.0	94.8	5.0	439	15.3	10921	1666759	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
C-130E	8		108	32.1	5.7	0.0	37.8	2.0	270	24.8	5360	1064059	0.0
AEF FTR	0	WG STAFF	36	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
AEF	0	COMM PKG	16	15.6	0.0	0.0	15.6	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
AEF	0	LD EQUIP	0	4.7	0.0	0.0	4.7	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	ADVON TM	4	0.4	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS ABGD	0	COORD ELE	4	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	SQUAD	13	4.2	0.0	0.0	4.2	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS	0	FLIGHT	44	15.3	0.0	0.0	15.3	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
SFS (ELE)	0	WKNG DOG	3	3.1	0.0	0.0	3.1	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	CBT SPT LD	100	3.5	1.1	0.0	4.6	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	SELF-SUS PKG	7	8.7	2.3	0.0	11.0	0.6	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	DP HI TH TM	2	1.5	0.0	0.0	1.5	0.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	TEAM	32	24.5	1.1	0.0	25.6	1.3	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	EOD LD TM	6	0.0	11.7	0.0	11.7	0.6	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
PRIME BEEF	0	EOD SUPT TM	6	3.3	4.3	0.0	7.6	0.4	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS B-1B	0	MUN MX	68	8.3	14.4	0.0	22.7	1.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MMS A-10	0	MUN MX	34	1.2	93.7	0.0	94.9	5.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MMS AEF	0	F-15C/E/F-16C	74	13.6	222.7	0.0	236.3	12.4	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MMS F-117	0	EST. (93%)	41	0.9	49.9	0.0	50.8	2.7	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	36 MK 82	0	0.0	14.1	0.0	14.1	0.7	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	16 MK 84	0	0.0	20.5	0.0	20.5	1.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	24 CBU-87	0	0.0	17.1	0.0	17.1	0.9	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	12 GBU-10	0	0.0	17.3	0.0	17.3	0.9	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	24 GBU-12	0	0.0	13.2	0.0	13.2	0.7	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	12 GBU-24	0	0.0	19.1	0.0	19.1	1.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	10 GBU-27	0	0.0	17.2	0.0	17.2	0.9	0	0.0	0	0	0.0

TABLE 9 (CONTINUED)
AVIATION PACKAGE # 4

MS	0	12 AGM-88C	0	0.0	9.9	0.0	9.9	0.5	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	12 AGM-65D	0	0.0	6.2	0.0	6.2	0.3	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	25000 MJU-7	0	0.0	20.6	0.0	20.6	1.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	35000 RR-170	0	0.0	37.4	0.0	37.4	2.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	42000 20MM	0	0.0	23.8	0.0	23.8	1.3	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	13800 30MM	0	0.0	16.6	0.0	16.6	0.9	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS GBU-31	0	(V) 1/B JDAM	0	10.5	0.0	0.0	10.5	0.6	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MMS	0	AGM-130 A-9	0	0.0	9.8	0.0	9.8	0.5	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MMS	0	AIM-9M	0	0.0	12.8	0.0	12.8	0.7	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MMS	0	AIM-120	0	0.0	6.8	0.0	6.8	0.4	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	FAC RCKT	0	10.2	0.0	0.0	10.2	0.5	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
MS	0	LUU FLARE	0	9.4	0.0	0.0	9.4	0.5	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
POL	0	72 PAA EQUIP	0	0.0	5.6	0.0	5.6	0.3	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
POL	0	03 R09 TNK	0	0.0	0.0	33.6	33.6	1.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
POL	0	03 50K BLAD	0	3.3	0.0	0.0	3.3	0.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
POL-LOX	0	02 400 GAL	0	1.6	0.0	0.0	1.6	0.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
POL	0	FUEL SUP KIT	0	1.4	0.0	0.0	1.4	0.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
POL	0	02 R22 PUMP	0	5.4	3.1	0.0	8.5	0.4	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
130 PER	0	25 SETS	0	62.5	0.0	0.0	62.5	3.3	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
TRN VEH	0	PKG D	0	0.0	91.2	63.1	154.3	8.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
BBS H20	0	DIST SYS	0	7.4	88.9	0.0	96.3	5.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
BBS BLTG TT	0	10-48X12 PER	0	560.3	0.0	0.0	560.3	29.5	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
BBS PLUMB	0	50-H20/WAST	0	80.0	0.0	0.0	80.0	4.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
BBS GEN	0	12-750KW	0	4.8	152.1	0.0	156.9	8.3	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
BBS KITCHEN	0	5-9-1/03TT	0	154.0	50.5	0.0	204.5	10.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
BBS FLT LN	0	INT SET	0	74.4	174.7	0.0	249.1	13.1	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
BBS	0	VEH OPS/MX	0	24.8	17.0	0.0	41.8	2.2	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
BBS AFLD	0	LT SET	2	4.4	10.0	0.0	14.4	0.8	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
WEA TAC	0	FORE SYS	0	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.0	0	0.0	0	0	0.0
TOTALS:	176	PEACE PKG	4515	2400.8	2726.0	228.0	5354.8	281.8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	247.2
AIRCRAFT UNIT REQUIREMENTS:								149.8					
SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS:								132.1					

NOTE 1: Aviation Package # 4 deployment will consist of either a B-1, B-2, or B-52 squadron and either a F-15E or F-117 squadron.

NOTE 2: Cargo requirements for the different units are taken either directly from, or interpolated from, the 21 Jun 99 MEFPK SUMMARY REPORT put out by HQ USAF/ILXX (CSC).

NOTE 3: The figures stated for each airlift aircraft in the "AIRLIFT REQUIRED" columns are based on S/T capability stated in AFPAM 10-403, 1 Mar 98 (i.e., C-141: 19 S/T). Since each AEF has all variants of airlift aircraft assigned to it, it is assumed that, if and when the actual deployment occurred, airlift planners would have developed a specific plan that dedicates the appropriate amount of oversize/outsize capable aircraft to the specific units that required them.

NOTE 4: The figures stated for "SPEED," "FLY TIME," and "LBS/HR" are taken directly from AFPAM 10-1403, 1 Mar 98. "KC-135R REQ'D" is based on a KC-135R/T offload of 76,400 lbs for a mission radius of 1500 NM, per AFPAM 10-1403.

PKGs would have to be able to deploy simultaneously in order to provide combat power within the timeframe spelled out in the EAF vision. Theoretically, there are 310.2 C-141 equivalents

and 162.1 KC-135R equivalents available on a daily basis to support the full deployment of AV PKG # 4 (256 C-141 equivalents and 118 KC-135R equivalents). But, in order to do this the Total Force would have to dedicate 82.6 percent of all available airlift assets and 72.8 percent of all available tanker assets to the Combat AEFs. Even if the overall Combat AEF plan factored in the use of a portion of the assigned Normal Daily Taskings and Mobility AEFs assets it would be physically impossible to support the entire spectrum of normal daily operations during the deployment. While the percentage of available airlift required to support the full deployment of AV PKG # 3 drops to 40.8 percent, the tanker requirement remains at 72.8 percent. This would still make it physically impossible to support AEF operations and complete all the Normal Daily Taskings.

Continuing this logic, full deployment of AV PKG # 2 requires 25.6 percent of the available C-141 equivalents and 46.5 percent of the KC-135R equivalents. Full deployment of AV PKG # 1 requires 22.5 percent of the available C-141 equivalents and 38.6 percent of the available KC-135R equivalents. While both airlift and tanker assets are in short supply compared to the requirements, it becomes clear that availability of tanker assets will be the limiting factor. Based on the requirement to “meet the mission,” these calculations, and the potential impact on OPSTEMPO, several concepts were incorporated into the Combat AEF/AV PKG development. First, it was decided to allocate approximately enough airlift and tanker squadrons (not all squadrons have the same PAA) to each individual Combat AEF to be able to fully deploy its own AV PKG # 1 with its own generic airlift and tankers. This accomplished the additional goal of providing each Combat AEF with enough generic assets to be able to support sustainment operations, even under surge conditions, for AV PKGs # 1 through # 4. Secondly, it was decided to allocate enough airlift and tanker assets between the two “paired” Combat AEFs to be able to simultaneously deploy an AV PKG # 2 using only internal assets and those airlift and tanker assets from the sister-Combat AEF that were not tasked to deploy (e.g., 5 tanker squadrons assigned to each Combat AEF and only 2-3 are tasked to deploy, therefore 2-3 are available to support this deployment). Doing this “guarantees” the “rapid-deployment,” e.g., simultaneous deployment, an AV PKG # 1 or # 2.

AV PKG # 3 airlift requirements for a simultaneous deployment can be met with internal airlift assets and those non-deployed assets from the sister-Combat AEF. However, it is physically impossible to allocate enough available tanker resources to each Combat AEF to

enable simultaneous deployment of an AV PKG # 3, maintain a reasonable OPSTEMPO, and support Normal Daily Tasking and Mobility AEF operations. Therefore, AV PKG # 3 is planned for two “trips” for both airlift and tanker squadrons. AV PKG # 4 deployment also requires two “trips” for both the airlift and tanker squadrons assigned to the “paired” Combat AEFs. For planning purposes, and since AV PKG # 4 entails full Combat AEF deployment to a bare base (e.g., huge cargo requirements), the proposed plan factors in the addition of the Mobility AEF assets to support deployment operations. It must be noted that use of the Mobility AEF assets for AV PKG # 4 deployment does not eliminate the requirement for “two-trips” by the airlift/tanker squadrons nor does it make a “two-trip” deployment impossible without use of the Mobility AEF assets. It is simply included as an additional option. Table 10 shows the recommended daily distribution of Total Force airlift and tankers. Tables 11 – 14 show the average make-up of the actual units assigned to each of the proposed plan’s AV PKGs. Additionally, Tables 11 – 14 show the deployment assets required versus assets available for each of the plan’s AV PKGs.

TABLE 10
RECOMMENDED DAILY DISTRIBUTION OF “TOTAL FORCE” AMC AIRLIFT
AND TANKERS

RECOMMENDED DISTRIBUTION OF "TOTAL FORCE" AMC AIRLIFT AND TANKER AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE ON A NORMAL DAILY BASIS								
TYPE A/C	NOTIOAL "TOTAL FORCE" A/C AVAIL	AEF	ALIGNED AEF	BOMBER ALERT	NORMAL DAILY TASKINGS	TOTAL A/C AVAIL	C-141 EQUIVALENTS	KC-135R EQUIVALENTS
C-5	37	5	5	0	15	25	80.0	0.0
C-17	29	7	7	0	12	26	62.4	0.0
C-130	130	9	9	0	59	77	46.2	0.0
C-141	43	10	10	0	14	34	34.0	0.0
KC-10	31	8	8	0	13	29	0.0	58.0
KC-135	111	13	13	16	63	105	0.0	94.6
TOTAL:	381	52	52	16	176	296	222.6	152.6
NOTE 1: Airlift and tankers dedicated to fighter/bomber AEF or Mobility AEF should perform local operational training missions, CONUS operational missions, or overnight overseas operational missions only. This will allow them to have 100 percent assurance of meeting the required 36/48 hours response times IAW AFP 10-1403, 1 Mar 98.								
Note 2: Airlift and tankers dedicated to Normal Daily Taskings should primarily perform the overseas "long-haul" missions. "Long-haul" missions within the CONUS and/or overnight overseas missions can be picked up by the fighter/bomber AEFs and/or Mobility aircraft not deployed.								

TABLE 11
AVIATION PACKAGE # 1 SUMMARY

AVIATION PACKAGE # 1 SUMMARY																																
AEF #	DEPLOYED SQUADRONS																				EQUIV'S TO DEPLOY				KC-135R CONVERTED TO CARGO							
	F-15A/C		B-1/2/52		F-15E/11		6C BLK		A-10		HH-60G		HC-130		E-3		5A/C BLK 1		KC-10		KC-135E/		C-130			REQUIRED		AVAILABLE				
	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA		C-141	KC-135R	C-141	KC-135R			
1	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	12	2	12	66.5	63.7	76.0	76.2	0.0			
2	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	12	2	16	66.1	63.7	74.8	74.4	0.0			
3	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	11	1	9	64.7	63.7	71.6	76.0	0.0			
4	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	13	1	9	64.8	63.7	78.6	74.2	0.0			
5	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	10	2	8	65.6	63.7	75.4	75.1	0.0			
6	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	12	1	8	65.2	63.7	79.2	77.1	0.0			
7	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	11	2	12	66.3	63.7	76.0	73.9	0.0			
8	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	10	1	8	64.0	63.7	74.8	74.4	0.0			
9	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	6	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	1	7	1	9	59.0	57.3	71.6	72.4	0.0			
10	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	11	1	9	64.4	63.7	83.6	74.6	0.0			
11	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	14	2	8	66.4	63.7	76.0	73.0	0.0			
12	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	12	2	11	66.4	63.7	77.4	70.4	0.0			
AVE	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	1	12	0	0	2	11	2	10	65.0	63.2	76.3	74.3	0.0			
TOTAL SQUADRONS:				9																												
TOTAL AIRCRAFT:				74				SORTIES (MISSIONS) AVAILABLE																		KC-135R EQUIV'S/DAY						
C-141 EQUIV'S AVAIL/DAY								DAY-DAY										SURGE								DAY-DAY				SURGE		
DAY-DAY		SURGE						#	TOTAL		COMBAT		SUPPORT		TOTAL		COMBAT		SUPPORT						REQ		AVAIL		REQ		AVAIL	
50.0		54.3						1	99		48		51		166		96		70						6.3		10.0		12.4		19.2	
51.4		57.2						2	102		48		54		170		96		74						6.3		10.8		12.2		17.3	
44.6		48.4						3	90		48		42		157		96		61						6.3		10.0		12.4		17.6	
49.6		53.4						4	97		48		49		163		96		67						6.3		10.2		12.2		17.7	
47.0		50.5						5	92		48		44		156		96		60						6.3		8.5		12.4		13.6	
49.0		52.5						6	96		48		48		162		96		66						6.3		10.2		12.4		16.3	
50.0		54.3						7	97		48		49		164		96		68						6.3		8.5		12.4		15.0	
46.6		49.5						8	92		48		44		154		96		58						6.3		10.0		12.2		16.0	
44.6		48.4						9	80		41		39		137		84		53						5.6		7.0		11.0		11.2	
52.6		56.4						10	98		48		50		163		96		67						6.3		8.5		12.2		15.0	
46.4		50.5						11	93		48		45		163		96		67						6.3		12.0		12.4		22.4	
50.8		55.4						12	98		48		50		166		96		70						6.3		10.4		12.4		18.5	
48.6		52.6				AVERAGE		95		47		47		160		95		65						6.2		9.7		12.2		16.7		

D. ASSIGNING THE FORCES

After establishing these basic premises, the next steps are to actually assign the forces to the different AEFs and then verify the capabilities of the individual AEFs. Since the Combat AEFs are the main portion of the EAF vision and realistically the make-or-break aspect of the plan, especially in light of the regional CINCs concerns, they are the starting point. Appendices # 20 through # 31 are the actual squadron assignments for Combat AEFs # 1 through # 12, respectively. Table 15 is a summary of all 12 Combat AEFs. As Table 15 shows, the average Combat AEF has a total of 23 operational squadrons assigned to it with a total of 293 PAA available to ensure 182 aircraft perform the combat and combat support missions.

As stated in the Development of the Proposal section, the “first strike” mission of the

TABLE 12
AVIATION PACKAGE # 2 SUMMARY

AVIATION PACKAGE # 2 SUMMARY																														
AEF	DEPLOYED SQUADRONS																				EQUIV'S TO DEPLOY				KC-135R CONVERTED TO CARGO					
	F-15A/C		B-1/2/52		F-15E/117		F-16C BLK 50		A-10		HH-60G		HC-130		E-3		F-16A/C BLK 15-40		KC-10		KC-135E/R		C-130			REQUIRED		AVAILABLE		
	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA		C-141	KC-135R	C-141	KC-135R	
1	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	12	2	12	74.7	73.7	76.0	76.2	0.0	
2	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	12	2	16	74.3	73.7	74.8	74.4	0.0	
3	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	11	2	13	74.2	73.7	89.6	76.0	0.0	
4	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	13	2	14	74.4	73.7	78.6	74.2	0.0	
5	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	3	16	2	8	76.6	70.9	76.6	73.4	1.8	
6	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	12	2	15	75.0	70.9	79.2	71.1	0.0	
7	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	11	2	12	74.5	73.7	76.0	73.9	0.0	
8	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	10	2	11	73.4	73.7	74.8	74.4	0.0	
9	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	6	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	13	2	13	71.9	70.1	72.3	72.4	1.0	
10	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	11	2	14	74.0	70.9	83.6	70.4	0.0	
11	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	14	2	14	74.6	70.9	76.0	73.0	0.0	
12	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	12	2	11	74.6	70.9	77.4	70.4	0.0	
AVE	1	12	0	0	0	0	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	0	1	2	2	24	0	0	2	12	2	13	74.4	72.2	77.9	73.3	0.2	
TOTAL SQUADRONS:							11																							
TOTAL AIRCRAFT:							90			SORTIES (MISSIONS) AVAILABLE																KC-135R EQUIV'S/DAY				
C-141 EQUIV'S AVAIL/DAY										DAY-DAY						SURGE								DAY-DAY		SURGE				
DAY-DAY			SURGE					#	TOTAL		COMBAT		SUPPORT		TOTAL		COMBAT		SUPPORT							REQ	AVAIL	REQ	AVAIL	
50.0			54.3					1	111		60		51		190		120		70							7.5	10.0	14.7	19.2	
51.4			57.2					2	114		60		54		194		120		74							7.5	10.8	14.5	17.3	
47.0			52.3					3	106		60		46		187		120		67							7.5	10.0	14.7	17.6	
53.2			58.2					4	115		60		55		195		120		75							7.5	10.2	14.5	17.7	
47.0			50.5					5	110		60		50		190		120		70							7.5	14.4	14.7	23.1	
53.2			59.2					6	115		60		55		197		120		77							7.5	10.2	14.7	16.3	
50.0			54.3					7	109		60		49		188		120		68							7.5	8.5	14.7	15.0	
47.8			52.4					8	106		60		46		183		120		63							7.5	10.0	14.5	16.0	
47.0			52.3					9	101		53		48		177		108		69							6.8	10.2	13.4	17.7	
56.2			61.2					10	116		60		56		195		120		75							7.5	8.5	14.5	15.0	
51.2			56.2					11	113		60		53		196		120		76							7.5	12.0	14.7	22.4	
50.8			55.4					12	110		60		50		190		120		70							7.5	10.4	14.7	18.5	
50.4			55.3					AVERAGE:		111		59		51		190		119		71							7.4	10.4	14.5	18.0

bombers and sheer amount of refueling assets required to perform this mission dictated assigning specific tanker assets to them. Additionally, to reduce the amount of tanker forces required, it was decided to place these tanker assets on the Mobility AEF (108 day) timeline. Table 16 shows the actual tanker assignments for Bomber Alert. IAW Table 16, there is an average of 3 tanker squadrons with a total of 34 PAA to get 19 KC-135E/Rs to support the Combat AEF bombers.

After assigning the Total Force assets to the Combat AEFs and Bomber Alerts, the Mobility AEFs could be assigned. Appendices # 31 through # 36 show the specific squadrons assigned to each Mobility AEF. Table 17 is a summation of the Mobility AEF assignments. Table 17 shows that the average Mobility AEF is assigned 7 squadrons with a total of 70 PAA to get 37 aircraft.

TABLE 13
AVIATION PACKAGE # 3 SUMMARY

AVIATION PACKAGE # 3 SUMMARY																																	
AEF #	DEPLOYED SQUADRONS																				EQUIV'S TO DEPLOY				KC-135R CONVERTED TO CARGO								
	F-15A/C		B-1/2/52		F-15E/117		F-16C BLK 50		A-10		HH-60G		HC-130		E-3		F-16A/C BLK 15-40		KC-10		KC-135E/R		C-130			REQUIRED		AVAILABLE					
	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA		C-141	KC-135R	C-141	KC-135R				
1	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	18	2	12	107.7	119.1	139.4	68.2	0.0				
2	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	20	2	16	110.7	118.2	141.2	68.4	0.0				
3	1	12	1	4	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	18	3	17	108.2	118.2	140.0	69.0	0.0				
4	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	1	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	2	14	106.6	116.5	140.0	69.2	0.0				
5	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	21	3	15	117.4	119.1	143.8	67.1	0.0				
6	1	12	1	4	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	18	103.9	118.2	145.6	67.6	0.0				
7	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	22	3	16	116.4	119.1	139.4	64.7	0.0				
8	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	21	3	19	114.0	114.7	141.2	63.4	0.0				
9	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	3	0	1	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	17	105.8	110.1	145.0	62.4	0.0				
10	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	21	2	14	110.7	118.2	145.0	63.4	0.0				
11	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	16	110.1	118.2	144.4	67.6	0.0				
12	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	18	3	15	108.4	118.2	143.8	66.2	0.0				
AVE	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	16	110.0	117.3	142.4	66.4	0.0				
TOTAL SQUADRONS:						17																											
TOTAL AIRCRAFT:						132			SORTIES (MISSIONS) AVAILABLE																				KC-135R EQUIV'S/DAY				
C-141 EQUIV'S AVAIL/DAY										DAY-DAY						SURGE								DAY-DAY		SURGE							
DAY-DAY				SURGE						#		TOTAL		COMBAT		SUPPORT		TOTAL		COMBAT		SUPPORT				REQ		AVAIL		REQ		AVAIL	
50.0				54.3						1		147		89		58		263		180		83				13.5		17.0		27.6		28.8	
51.4				57.2						2		152		89		63		270		180		90				13.3		17.6		26.9		28.8	
48.8				56.1						3		145		87		58		264		176		88				12.5		17.0		25.4		28.8	
53.2				58.2						4		153		89		64		268		180		88				13.3		17.1		26.7		28.8	
51.2				57.2						5		152		89		63		272		180		92				13.5		17.0		27.6		28.6	
55.0				62.1						6		154		87		67		274		176		98				12.5		17.1		25.4		28.8	
51.8				58.2						7		154		89		65		276		180		96				13.5		19.4		27.6		32.6	
53.2				60.0						8		154		89		65		276		180		96				13.3		16.7		26.9		31.1	
48.8				56.1						9		142		82		60		256		168		88				12.6		17.1		25.5		28.8	
56.2				61.2						10		156		89		67		274		180		94				13.3		17.6		26.9		31.1	
51.8				58.2						11		149		89		60		272		180		92				13.3		14.8		27.1		29.6	
52.6				59.2						12		150		89		61		270		180		90				13.3		16.0		27.1		27.1	
52.0				58.2				AVERAGE:		151		88		63		270		178		91						13.2		17.0		26.7		29.4	

Finally, after assigning the Total Force to the Combat AEFs, Bomber Alerts, and Mobility AEFs, the aircraft not assigned AEF/Bomber Alert tasking can be determined and assigned Normal Daily Tasking IAW the guidance laid out in the Planning Factors and Assumptions section. Appendices # 37 through # 42 contain the specific break-out, by squadron and aircraft required, of forces available for Normal Daily Tasking. Two points must be reiterated. First, the aircraft required for Normal Daily Tasking is determined with consideration for recent and upcoming AEF taskings and whether the squadrons were active duty or reserve. Second, since the Combat AEF timeline (90 days) is the most restrictive, squadron/aircraft availability for Normal Daily Tasking was aligned to the Combat AEF schedule. Table 18 is a summary of forces available for Normal Daily Tasking.

**TABLE 14
AVIATION PACKAGE # 4 SUMMARY**

AVIATION PACKAGE # 4 SUMMARY																																	
AEF	DEPLOYED SQUADRONS																				EQUIV'S TO DEPLOY						KC-135R CONVERTED TO CARGO						
	F-15A/C		B-1/2/52		F-15E/117		F-16C BLK 50		A-10		HH-60G		HC-130		E-3		F-16A/C BLK 15-40		KC-10		KC-135E/R		C-130		REQUIRED			AVAILABLE					
	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA	#	PAA		C-141	KC-135R	C-141	KC-135R		
1	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	18	3	16	238.4	119.1	183.0	68.2	0.0				
2	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	20	3	19	241.4	118.2	184.8	68.4	0.0				
3	1	12	1	4	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	0	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	18	3	17	237.9	118.2	183.6	69.0	0.0				
4	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	1	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	17	237.3	116.5	183.6	69.2	0.0				
5	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	21	3	15	247.1	119.1	187.4	67.1	0.0				
6	1	12	1	4	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	18	233.6	118.2	189.2	67.6	0.0				
7	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	22	3	16	246.1	119.1	183.0	64.7	0.0				
8	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	21	3	19	243.7	114.7	184.8	63.4	0.0				
9	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	3	0	1	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	17	235.5	110.1	188.6	62.4	0.0				
10	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	3	0	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	4	21	3	17	241.4	118.2	188.6	63.4	0.0				
11	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	16	237.7	118.2	188.0	67.6	0.0				
12	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	18	3	15	238.1	118.2	187.4	66.2	0.0				
AVE	1	12	1	6	1	12	1	12	1	12	1	4	1	2	1	2	3	36	0	0	3	20	3	17	239.9	117.3	186.0	66.4	0.0				
TOTAL SQUADRONS:				17																													
TOTAL AIRCRAFT:				133						SORTIES (MISSIONS) AVAILABLE																KC-135R EQUIV'S/DAY							
C-141 EQUIV'S AVAIL/DAY										DAY-DAY						SURGE								DAY-DAY				SURGE					
DAY-DAY		SURGE						#		TOTAL		COMBAT		SUPPORT		TOTAL		COMBAT		SUPPORT						REQ		AVAIL		REQ		AVAIL	
51.2		58.2						1		149		89		60		269		180		89						13.5		17.0		27.6		28.8	
52.0		60.0						2		153		89		64		275		180		95						13.3		17.6		26.9		28.8	
48.8		56.1						3		145		87		58		264		176		88						12.5		17.0		25.4		28.8	
55.0		61.1						4		156		89		67		273		180		93						13.3		17.1		26.7		28.8	
51.2		57.2						5		152		89		63		272		180		92						13.5		17.0		27.6		28.6	
55.0		62.1						6		154		87		67		274		176		98						12.5		17.1		25.4		28.8	
51.8		58.2						7		154		89		65		276		180		96						13.5		19.4		27.6		32.6	
53.2		60.0						8		154		89		65		276		180		96						13.3		16.7		26.9		31.1	
48.8		56.1						9		142		82		60		256		168		88						12.6		17.1		25.5		28.8	
58.0		64.1						10		159		89		70		279		180		99						13.3		17.6		26.9		31.1	
51.8		58.2						11		149		89		60		272		180		92						13.3		14.8		27.1		29.6	
52.6		59.2						12		150		89		61		270		180		90						13.3		16.0		27.1		27.1	
52.5		59.2						AVERAGE:		151		88		63		271		178		93						13.2		17.0		26.7		29.4	

IX. CAN THE PROPOSAL WORK? PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS.

Now that the forces have been allocated to the different AEFs and Normal Daily Tasking, two questions must be answered. First, can this plan work? Second, how might these forces be employed? While these are separate questions, they can both be answered by walking through a few practical applications. Since the combat mission of the Air Force is the main driving factor, the Combat AEFs will be analyzed first.

A. COMBAT AEFs AND BOMBER ALERTS

Logic would suggest that there are three basic operating concepts for employment of the Combat AEFs within the EAF vision. These three concepts center around whether or not U.S. ground troops are physically located on the ground in actual or potentially hostile territory and the assessed level of threat. The difference between these three basic concepts and how the Combat AEFs and Bomber Alerts react to each can best be visualized by running through three scenarios.

TABLE 15
COMBAT AEF'S # 1-12 OVERALL SUMMARY

AEF # 1-12 OVERALL SUMMARY																			
AEF #	LEAD WING			# SQ'S	TOT PAA	TOT A/C REQ'D	AD		ANG		AFRC		3-YR AVERAGE "ON CALL "						
							SQ'S	A/C	SQ'S	A/C	SQ'S	A/C	AEF	ASSOCIATED UNIT'S					
1	HILL AFB UT			23	313	183	18	153	3	16	2	14	63	102					
2	DYESS AFB TX			23	288	182	11	91	8	54	4	37	63	95					
3	ELMENDORF AFB AK			21	277	178	14	127	6	42	1	9	60	89					
4	RAF LAKENHEATH UK			22	303	182	15	132	5	30	2	20	60	95					
5	D-M AFB AZ			24	289	183	7	65	8	52	9	66	61	82					
6	SHAW AFB SC			24	305	185	12	98	5	39	7	48	61	99					
7	BARKSDALE AFB LA			23	294	181	11	84	9	74	3	23	60	94					
8	ELLSWORTH AFB SD			23	283	183	10	76	13	107	0	0	60	96					
9	CANNON AFB NM			20	273	167	15	129	5	38	0	0	61	93					
10	LANGLEY AFB VA			24	307	191	9	81	12	88	3	22	61	85					
11	MT. HOME AFB ID			23	285	183	8	71	6	50	9	62	60	88					
12	S-J AFB NC			24	295	182	9	69	9	73	6	40	60	101					
	AVERAGE:			23	293	182	12	98	7	55	4	28	61	93					
AEF #	F-15A/C			B-1			B-2			B-52			F-15E			F-117			
	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	
1	1	18	12	0	0	0	1	8	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	24	12	
2	1	18	12	1	15	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	24	12	0	0	0	
3	1	24	12	1	6	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	18	12	0	0	0	
4	1	24	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	15	6	1	24	12	0	0	0	
5	1	24	12	1	8	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	18	12	
6	1	24	12	0	0	0	1	6	4	0	0	0	1	24	12	0	0	0	
7	1	15	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	15	6	0	0	0	1	24	12	
8	1	15	12	1	15	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	24	12	0	0	0	
9	1	15	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	12	6	1	24	12	0	0	0	
10	1	24	12	1	8	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	24	12	0	0	0	
11	1	18	12	1	11	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	18	12	0	0	0	
12	1	24	12	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	8	6	1	24	12	0	0	0	
AVE	1	20	12	1	5	3	0	1	1	0	4	2	1	17	9	0	6	3	
AEF #	F-16C BLK 50			A-10			HH-60G			HC-130			E-3			F-16A/C BLK 15-40			
	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	
1	1	18	12	1	24	12	1	14	4	1	9	2	1	6	2	3	54	36	
2	1	18	12	1	15	12	1	4	3	0	3	2	1	6	2	3	45	36	
3	1	18	12	1	18	12	1	5	4	0	3	2	1	2	2	3	48	36	
4	1	18	12	1	18	12	1	4	3	0	1	1	1	6	2	3	51	36	
5	1	18	12	1	24	12	1	6	4	1	3	2	1	2	2	3	45	36	
6	1	24	12	1	18	12	1	9	4	1	3	2	1	6	2	3	45	36	
7	1	18	12	1	15	12	1	14	4	1	9	2	1	6	2	3	45	36	
8	1	15	12	1	15	12	1	4	3	0	3	2	1	6	2	3	45	36	
9	1	8	6	1	15	12	1	4	3	0	1	1	1	2	2	3	66	36	
10	1	24	12	1	15	12	1	4	3	0	4	2	1	6	2	3	45	36	
11	1	22	12	1	15	12	1	7	4	1	3	2	1	6	2	3	45	36	
12	1	24	12	1	15	12	1	8	4	1	3	2	1	6	2	3	45	36	
AVE	1	19	12	1	17	12	1	7	4	1	4	2	1	5	2	3	48	36	

TABLE 15 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF'S # 1-12 OVERALL SUMMARY

AEF #	KC-10			KC-135E/R			C-5			C-17			C-141			C-130					
	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C	SQ'S	PAA	A/C			
1	1	14	11	4	44	24	1	16	9	1	12	9	2	24	16	3	28	16			
2	1	12	9	5	47	26	1	16	9	1	12	9	2	19	13	3	34	19			
3	1	14	11	4	44	25	1	16	9	1	12	9	1	17	11	3	32	17			
4	1	12	9	4	43	24	1	16	9	1	12	9	2	27	18	3	32	17			
5	1	14	11	5	46	25	1	16	9	1	12	9	2	25	16	3	28	15			
6	1	12	9	4	47	26	1	16	9	1	12	9	3	27	18	3	32	18			
7	1	14	11	4	39	22	1	16	9	1	12	9	2	24	16	3	28	16			
8	1	12	9	5	48	27	1	16	9	1	12	9	2	19	13	3	34	19			
9	1	14	11	3	35	20	1	16	9	1	12	9	1	17	11	3	32	17			
10	1	12	9	5	47	27	1	16	9	1	12	9	3	34	23	3	32	17			
11	1	12	9	4	47	26	1	16	9	1	12	9	2	25	16	3	28	16			
12	1	14	11	4	41	22	1	16	9	1	12	9	3	27	18	3	28	15			
AVE	1	13	10	4	44	25	1	16	9	1	12	9	2	24	16	3	31	17			
AVE AAR CAPABILITY (KC-135R EQUIV'S):			20.0			22.1	AVE LIFT CAPABILITY (C-141 EQUIV'S)			28.8			21.6			15.8			10.1		
TOTAL AAR CAPABILITY:				42.1						TOTAL LIFT CAPABILITY:			76.3								
AEF #	EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY											AVERAGE AEF COMPOSTION									
	C-141		KC-135E/R										TYPE A/C		# SQ	PAA	A/C REQ'D				
1	47.6		28.0										F-15A/C		1	20	12				
2	47.8		25.2										B-1B		1	5	3				
3	45.2		30.0										B-2A		0	1	1				
4	50.8		26.1										B-52H		0	4	2				
5	47.6		27.2										F-15E		1	17	9				
6	50.8		26.2										F-117		0	6	3				
7	47.6		27.1										F-16C BLK 50		1	19	12				
8	47.8		26.2										A-10		1	17	12				
9	45.2		25.9										HH-60G		1	7	4				
10	53.8		26.2										HC-130		1	4	2				
11	47.6		25.8										E-3		1	5	2				
12	49.6		26.4										F-16A/C BLK 15-40		3	48	36				
AVE	48.5		26.7										KC-10		1	13	10				
													KC-135E/R		4	44	25				
													C-5		1	16	9				
													C-17		1	12	9				
													C-141		2	24	16				
													C-130		3	31	17				
TOTAL:															23	293	182				
NOTE 1: While the "Average AEF Composition" shows that all aircraft are represented in each AEF, the actual make-up of each AEF will consist of either a B-1B or B-2A or B-52H squadron and either a F-15E or F-117 squadron. Additionally, there are several Rescue squadrons that have both HH-60G's and HC-130's assigned to them. To get the specific break-outs for each AEF, please reference the detailed AEF tables.																					

TABLE 16
BOMBER ALERT ASSIGNMENTS

RECOMMENDED TANKER ASSIGNMENTS FOR AEF BOMBER ALERT											
ALERT PERIOD	ASSIGNED TANKERS					A/C REQ	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C REQ DAY-DAY	KC-135R'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNITS "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
	SQ	WG	BASE	TYPE	PAA						
ALERT PERIOD # 1 YR 1 (DAYS) 1-108 YR 2 (DAYS) 176-283 YR 3 (DAYS) 351-365 YR 4 (DAYS) 1-93 YR 5 (DAYS) 161-268 YR 6 (DAYS) 336-365 3-YR AVERAGE: 75	108 ARS	126 ARW	SCOTT AFB IL	KC-135R	10	6	6.0	3	3.0	0	75
	77 ARS	916 ARW	S-J AFB NC	KC-135R	10	6	6.0	3	3.0	0	75
	141 ARS	108 ARW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	KC-135E	10	6	4.2	3	2.1	0	75
				TOTAL:	30	18	16.2	9	8.1	AVE:	75
ALERT PERIOD # 2 YR 1 (DAYS) 109-216 YR 2 (DAYS) 284-365 YR 3 (DAYS) 1-26 YR 4 (DAYS) 94-201 YR 5 (DAYS) 269-365 YR 6 (DAYS) 1-11 3-YR AVERAGE: 73	336 ARS	452 ARW	MARCH ARB CA	KC-135R	9	5	5.0	3	3.0	0	73
	18 ARS	931 ARG	MCCONNELL AFB KS	KC-135E/R	11	6	5.4	4	3.6	0	73
	196 ARS	163 ARW	MARCH ARB CA	KC-135R	9	5	5.0	3	3.0	0	73
	314 ARS	940 ARW	BEALE AFB CA	KC-135E	10	6	4.2	3	2.1	0	73
				TOTAL:	39	22	19.6	13	11.7	AVE:	73
ALERT PERIOD # 3 YR 1 (DAYS) 217-324 YR 2 (DAYS) 0 YR 3 (DAYS) 27-134 YR 4 (DAYS) 201-309 YR 5 (DAYS) 0 YR 6 (DAYS) 12-119 3-YR AVERAGE: 72	349 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	KC-135E/R	11	6	5.4	6	5.4	AEF 11	132
	344 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	KC-135E/R	11	6	5.4	6	5.4	AEF 12	132
	350 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	KC-135E/R	11	6	5.4	6	5.4	0	0
				TOTAL:	33	18	16.2	18	16.2	AVE:	88
ALERT PERIOD # 4 YR 1 (DAYS) 325-365 YR 2 (DAYS) 1-67 YR 3 (DAYS) 135-242 YR 4 (DAYS) 310-365 YR 5 (DAYS) 1-52 YR 6 (DAYS) 120-227 3-YR AVERAGE: 73	911 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	KC-135R	11	6	6.0	6	6.0	AEF 1	136
	905 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	KC-135R	11	6	6.0	6	6.0	AEF 1	136
	906 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	KC-135R	11	6	6.0	6	6.0	AEF 1	136
				TOTAL:	33	18	18.0	18	18.0	AVE:	136
ALERT PERIOD # 5 YR 1 (DAYS) 0 YR 2 (DAYS) 67-175 YR 3 (DAYS) 243-350 YR 4 (DAYS) 0 YR 5 (DAYS) 53-160 YR 6 (DAYS) 228-335 3-YR AVERAGE: 72	96 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	KC-135R	12	7	7.0	7	7.0	AEF 3	132
	92 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	KC-135R	12	7	7.0	7	7.0	AEF 3	132
	93 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	KC-135R	12	7	7.0	7	7.0	AEF 3	132
				TOTAL:	36	21	21.0	21	21.0	AVE:	132
			OVERALL AVERAGE:		34.2	19.4	18.2	16	15.0	N/A	101
NOTE 1: Alert Periods are aligned with Mobility AEF cycles; however, the tankers are in direct support of the bombers assigned to the two concurrently aligned AEFs. Time periods will overlap slightly.											
NOTE 2: Tanker units assigned to Bomber Alert have a 24-hour response time to provide the aircraft listing under the "A/C REQ'D" column.											
NOTE 3: If the AEF-aligned bombers are ordered to launch during an AEF deployment, or when an AEF package is deployed but the bombers are still at home-base, the tanker unit's assigned are tasked to provide the enroute support stated in the "A/C REQ'D" column. Once the bombers have physically deployed, responsibility for providing tanker support now falls on the AEF-aligned tanker units. Bomber Alert-assigned tankers are then released for normal daily (i.e. "A/C DAY-DAY" tasking). For periods when the bombers are not being employed during AEF deployment, the tanker unit's assigned here will provide the aircraft listed in the "DAY-DAY" column for normal daily tasking. However, because of the nature of the response time (24 hours), these normal daily AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings will only involve local and/or out-and-back missions.											
NOTE 4: Tanker unit's assigned here are responsible for supporting AEF-aligned bomber deployment and re-deployment missions.											

TABLE 17
MOBILITY AEF'S # 1-5 SUMMATION

MOBILITY # 1-5 SUMMATION																	
MOB #	TOTAL #		ACTIVE		ANG		AFRC		AVERAGE		TOTAL #		TOTAL # "EQUIVALENT"				OVERALL 3-YR "ON CALL" AVERAGE
	SQ'S	A/C	SQ'S	A/C	SQ'S	A/C	SQ'S	A/C	PAA	A/C REQ'D	C-5'S	C-130'S	"EMERG"		"DAY-DAY"		
													A/C	C-141	A/C	C-141	
1	7	39	2	16	2	11	3	12	10	6	7	32	39	41.6	28	27.2	75
2	7	35	1	6	3	13	3	16	9	5	9	26	35	44.4	22	26.2	73
3	7	40	0	0	5	23	2	17	10	6	9	31	40	47.4	21	25.6	125
4	7	31	0	0	3	11	4	20	9	4	8	23	31	39.4	16	20	73
5	7	41	2	15	3	11	2	15	11	6	8	33	41	45.4	29	27.8	118
TOT:	35	186	5	37	16	69	14	80	49	27	41	145	186	218.2	116	126.8	464
AVE:	7	37	1	7	3	14	3	16	10	5	8	29	37	43.6	23	25.4	93

TABLE 18
NORMAL DAILY TASKING SUMMARY

NORMAL DAILY TASKING SUMMARY																																				
AEF #	F-15A/C			B-1B			B-2A			B-52H			F-15E			F-117			F-16C BLK 50			A/OA-10			HH-60G			HC-130			E-3			F-16A/C BLK 15-40		
	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C			
1/2	12	216	96	3	31	13	1	6	3	2	27	16	1	24	14	1	18	10	5	83	42	7	117	44	4	27	8	1	4	1	3	14	7	21	342	122
3/4	12	200	92	3	34	17	0	0	0	3	35	18	2	42	24	0	0	0	5	87	45	7	105	28	4	27	11	1	4	1	3	18	9	21	342	122
5/6	12	216	104	3	34	17	1	8	4	2	20	9	2	42	24	0	0	0	5	90	51	7	114	38	4	27	11	1	4	1	3	18	9	21	351	140
7/8	12	225	114	3	32	18	1	8	4	2	23	11	2	36	20	0	0	0	5	94	53	7	120	50	4	28	11	1	3	1	2	12	6	21	339	132
9/10	12	231	118	3	29	14	2	14	7	1	15	9	1	18	10	1	18	10	5	90	50	7	132	66	4	28	8	1	3	1	4	20	10	21	339	132
11/12	12	225	106	3	29	14	1	6	3	2	30	18	1	18	10	1	18	10	5	87	44	7	123	56	4	28	8	1	3	1	3	14	7	21	330	114
TOT:	72	1313	630	18	189	93	6	42	21	12	150	81	9	180	102	3	54	30	30	531	285	42	711	282	24	165	57	6	21	6	18	96	48	126	2043	762
AVE:	12	219	105	3	32	16	1	7	4	2	25	14	2	30	17	1	9	5	5	89	48	7	119	47	4	28	10	1	4	1	3	16	8	21	341	127
AEF #	KC-10			KC-135E/R			C-5			C-17			C-141			C-130			TOTAL PAA	TOTAL A/C REQ'D	C-141 EQUIVALENTS	KC-135R EQUIVALENTS														
	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C	SQ	PAA	A/C																		
1/2	2	26	13	31	307	62	3	46	19	2	24	12	7	67	17	24	214	49	1593	575		136.0		106.6												
3/4	2	26	13	32	319	70	3	44	15	2	24	12	8	66	11	24	224	53	1597	570		126.0		115.9												
5/6	2	26	13	31	310	66	3	40	6	2	24	12	6	58	17	24	232	64	1614	611		103.4		112.5												
7/8	2	26	13	31	311	65	3	42	16	2	24	12	7	67	9	24	232	71	1622	638		139.6		109.4												
9/10	2	26	13	31	303	60	3	44	18	2	24	12	7	59	12	24	226	61	1619	637		135.0		105.5												
11/12	2	26	13	31	299	54	3	46	18	2	24	12	6	58	15	24	220	57	1584	585		135.6		98.5												
TOT:	12	156	78	187	1849	377	18	262	92	12	144	72	41	375	81	144	1348	355	9629	3616		775.6		648.4												
AVE:	2	26	13	31	308	63	3	44	15	2	24	12	7	63	14	24	225	59	1605	603		129.3		108.1												

SCENARIO 1: If U.S. ground troops are physically located within the borders of an actual hostile nation, then logic would say that the United States is at war and one or both (paired) Combat AEF AV PKGs # 1 - # 4 would be deployed supporting the combat operations on the ground. If AV PKGs from both paired Combat AEFs are deployed, logic would further dictate that this is a Major Theater War (MTW). Given this already developed scenario, deployment and response time is somewhat irrelevant since the “long pole in the tent” would be

deployment of the ground forces. What matters in this case is the ability to provide combat power.

The planning factors for sortie generation must be re-highlighted as they are solely the author's assumptions and can easily be increased or decreased as the situation requires. Normal "sustained" daily sorties, e.g., these sorties can be continued indefinitely, are based on a two-launch ("go") day with 60 percent of the deployed PAA making up the first "go" aircraft and the second "go" being 1 or 2 aircraft less than the first "go," e.g., 12 fighters deploy, 7 aircraft in the first "go" for a 7 turn 5 daily schedule. "Surge" operations, e.g., 1 – 2 weeks, are based on combat aircraft generating two times deployed PAA (no amount of "go's" specified), e.g., 12 fighters deploy, 24 "surge" sorties; combat support aircraft generating 1.6 times deployed PAA, e.g., 10 C-130s deploy, 16 "surge" sorties; and Inter-theater airlift/non-deployed tankers generating the associated AMC "threshold" level, e.g., these will be "long-haul" missions from CONUS and the sortie length will prohibit a "turn." Finally, fuel and tanker requirements for these combat missions (shown in Appendices 20 – 31) are based on the deployment base being 500 NM (one-way) from the target area. Given a re-hash of the sortie planning factors, it is now possible to estimate the combat power inherent with each AV PKG.

Tables 11 through 14 show the ability to generate combat power with each respective AV PKGs. In a small scale contingency (SSC), perhaps AV PKG # 1 would be deployed. In this case, Table 11 shows that AV PKG # 1 can generate 95 daily sorties on a sustained basis, 47 of these sorties are direct combat missions. In a "surge" situation, (any) AV PKG # 1 can generate 160 sorties per day with 95 sorties being direct combat missions. Progressing increasingly up the scale of combat, IAW Table 12, (any) AV PKG # 2 can generate 111 daily sorties on a sustained basis with 59 combat missions. AV PKG # 2 can "surge" to 190 total sorties with 119 combat missions. Table 13 shows that (any) AV PKG # 3 can generate 151 sustained daily sorties of which 99 are combat missions and "surge" to 270 daily sorties of which 178 are combat missions. Table 14 shows AV PKG # 4 is very similar to AV PKG # 3 (the difference is the deployment location - an "established base" versus a "bare base") with 151 sustained daily sorties including 88 combat missions and a "surge" capability of 271 sorties including 178 combat missions. In a MTW, it can be assumed that both paired Combat AEF AV PKGs # 3 or # 4 may be deployed. Together, these AV PKGs could generate 302 sustained daily sorties

including 176 combat missions and “surge” to 542 sorties of which 356 are combat missions. The regional CINCs have these “force packages” to choose from.

Whether a SSC or MTW, all or some of the deployed AV PKG(s) would remain in-place until U.S. and allied ground troops could firmly establish control of the situation and de-mobilize the enemy’s forces.

SCENARIO 2: If U.S. ground troops are physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation, e.g., not an ally, then logic would say the United States is engaged in some sort of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) situation. These operations could include any of the following: Combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, ensuring freedom of navigation, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, recovery operations, arms control support, domestic support operations, foreign humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, show of force, and support to insurgency.¹⁰⁷ Logic would suggest that the decision to deploy Combat AEF AV PKG(s) or keep them “on call” would center on the assessed threat. This leads to two “spin-offs” of Scenario 2.

SCENARIO 2A: If U.S. troops are physically located within the borders of the potentially hostile nation and the threat is assessed as moderate or higher, logic would dictate that one of the Combat AEF AV PKGs should be deployed. Each AV PKG # 1 was designed specifically for this “peaceful” mission in potentially hostile territory scenario.

It is entirely conceivable for Scenario 2A to develop along the following lines: U.S. and allied troops are conducting peacekeeping operations. The threat is moderate. AV PKG # 1, with CAS, INT, Air Superiority, SEAD, and combat support assets are deployed in support. Occasional rioting against the ground troops by the differing indigenous factions is quelled by A-10s and F-16s performing “deterrent” missions overhead. Some unpredictable “incident” occurs. One faction threatens armed action against the other faction and/or the allied ground troops. Within hours, allied intelligence reports that the “rogue” faction is mobilizing the remnants of its military for action against the indigenous population and/or U.S. troops.

In order to provide a realistic assessment of the Combat AEF’s ability to negate and destroy this threat, it is imperative to first attempt to provide a reasonable description of what a credible threat would be and what its capabilities are. For planning purposes, a basic assumption made is that security considerations dictate the minimum size of the U.S. and/or allied ground troops deployed within potentially hostile territory is at least Battalion-sized, no

matter what MOOTW mission they are performing. An additional assumption is that these allied ground forces have some mechanized capability. Using the Napoleonic adage of needing a three to one offensive advantage to have a reasonable chance for success, the conclusion can be drawn that the “rogue” would attack with at least a Brigade-size force. Along these same lines, to increase chances for success against a mechanized foe, the “rogue’s” Brigade would be a heavy unit (mix of armor and mechanized vehicles). IAW U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade,¹⁰⁸ a Brigade-size unit has approximately 500 vehicles. This is the Scenario 2A threat.

The next issue that must be addressed while analyzing the threat is the status of this heavy Brigade. If the potentially hostile nation’s government did not request U.S. ground troop presence, e.g., a United Nations decree, and that nation had a partially or fully mobilized heavy brigade, logic would tend to suggest that the United States just completed a SSC or MTW, e.g., Scenario 1. As stated above, some or all of the AV PKG(s) that participated in the SSC or MTW would remain in-place until the enemy’s heavy Brigade is de-mobilized. Once de-mobilized, forward deployed Combat AEF forces could be reduced to one AV PKG # 1. In this case, even with the enemy’s heavy brigade de-mobilized, security considerations would dictate that U.S. ground troops are not stationed too close to the potential foe’s main forces. While U.S. ground troop patrols would be expected to cover the entire region, it can be assumed that the main allied forces would be ideally billeted about 100-300 miles away from the enemy’s heavy Brigade mobilization/assembly area. For planning purposes, an assumption is made that our ground force’s main location is approximately 200 miles from the potential enemy’s mobilization/assembly area.

If the potentially hostile nation’s government requested U.S. ground troop presence, e.g., nation assistance or humanitarian assistance, then logic would suggest the assessed threat level is low. In this case, the potentially hostile nation’s heavy brigade could be partially or fully mobilized. However, because U.S. ground troops were deployed at that nation’s request and because the threat level is assessed to be low, logic would dictate that the need for deployment of an AV PKG is not required. Taking the above rationale into consideration, the conclusion can be made that the potential enemy’s heavy Brigade in Scenario 2A would be de-mobilized.

To complete the assessment of the Scenario 2A threat – a de-mobilized heavy brigade that is 200 miles from the main U.S./allied ground forces – an analysis of the time it would take

for that brigade to mobilize and deploy 200 miles in order to engage U.S. or allied ground troops must be made.

Specific timelines for U.S. ground troop mobilization were not found in the U.S. Army publications researched. However, U.S. Army FM 55-10, Movement Control, Chapter 1, Section II, Paragraph 1-5, provides two pieces of unclassified strategic planning that allow a reasonable assumption of our potential enemy's mobilization timeline to be formed. First, the FM states a light brigade-size force must arrive in-theater within four days (96 hours). Table 21 shows that a C-141 would take 80 hours to deploy a squadron 6,700 NM from the CONUS. Therefore, under "ideal" circumstances, it can be assumed that a light brigade-sized force could mobilize in 16 hours (96 minus 80). Secondly, the FM states that two heavy divisions (can be a mix of armor and mechanized units) sealifted from CONUS would arrive in the theater within 30 days. Assuming 15 days for sea transportation and 3 days for travel from their CONUS base to a port, the conclusion can be drawn that a heavy division can mobilize in 12 days (288 hours). Since the FM suggests that a light brigade can mobilize in 16 hours and a heavy division can mobilize in 288 hours, it would be a reasonable assumption to split the difference between the two and say a heavy brigade could mobilize in 152 hours.

Having determined the time for mobilization, the next step in analyzing the threat is to determine how long it would be before the enemy force could engage U.S. and/or allied troops. The assumption has already been made that the U.S. and/or allied main forces would be based 200 miles from the enemy's mobilization/assembly area. U.S. Army FM 55-30, Army Motor Transport Units and Operation, Tables 5-1 and 5-2, 27 Jun 97, provide generic travel rates. Under Close Column (vehicles are spaced approximately 75 feet apart), travel speed is approximately 15 miles per hour. Using Open Columns (vehicles are spaced approximately 150 to 300 feet apart. Normally used during daylight), travel speed is approximately 25 miles per hour. Taking the average of these two formations, the assumption is made that the enemy's heavy brigade travel speed is 20 miles per hour. With the estimated 200 miles distance from enemy mobilization area to U.S./allied main force, the enemy's brigade – if unimpeded – will engage U.S. and/or allied ground troops 10 hours after deployment.

Summing up the Scenario 2A threat: It is a heavy brigade located 200 miles from the main U.S. and/or allied ground forces. The brigade will take 152 hours to fully mobilize and 10 hours to engage U.S./allied forces for a total of 162 hours from start of mobilization to

engagement of allied ground troops. The time it takes the “rogue” to mobilize will be labeled “M,” and the time it takes to engage allied troops will be labeled “E.” Now it is possible to continue analyzing Scenario 2A.

After receiving the “intelligence estimate” above at M-152 hours/E-162 hours, the regional CINC assesses this to be a limited threat but feels compelled to request additional combat power from the NCA to protect the in-place allied troops. At M-152/E-162, the NCA immediately issues a WO for possible deployment of the Combat AEF bombers and the non-deployed portions of AV PKG # 2. Forty hours later, at M-112/E-122, the rogue faction decides to “surprise” the U.S. troops and sends a company of tanks and armored vehicles to attack them. The regional CINC reacts by authorizing the in-place AV PKG # 1 A-10s and F-16s to engage and destroy the “surprise” company of tanks and armored vehicles and simultaneously informs the NCA. Under the watchful eye of the F-15Cs and SEAD aircraft, the A-10s and F-16A-Cs easily negate this initial threat. The NCA immediately issues an EO to launch the Combat AEF bombers with the mission of destroying the main mobilization area(s). Additionally, the EO directs the remaining portion of AV PKG # 2 to deploy.

Table 19 shows the bomber alert contingency response times based on a nominal 24 hour alert time (from EO). IAW Table 19, the first bomber(s) could hit a target 6,700 NM from their CONUS location 39 to 46 hours after EO (depends on bomber type – an average of 43 hours will be used from here on). Therefore, in this scenario, at M-69/E-79, the initial wave of Combat AEF bombers strike the mobilization area. Because tanker squadrons are dedicated to support bomber operations, the bombers are able to strike the mobilization area 3 to 5 times between M-69/E-79 and M-04/E-14 (average). After M-04/E-14 the bombers will either continue the strikes from their CONUS location or will have deployed to a forward operating base and can begin “surge” operations. Continuing the scenario, and in order to completely demonstrate the Combat AEF’s combat capability, an extremely pessimistic battle damage report from the bombers will be assumed. Intelligence reports that the bomber attacks did destroy a portion of the “rogue” forces but have only delayed the main body 12 hours. The “new” estimated time for engagement of U.S. ground troops is E+12 hours.

Since AV PKG # 1 is already deployed and able to conduct continuous strike missions, completion of the AV PKG # 2 deployment involves only one INT (F-16A-C BLK 15-40) squadron (See Tables 11 and 12). Table 20 shows the response times for AV PKG # 1 and # 2

TABLE 19
BOMBER ALERT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME

BOMBER CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME (WITH TANKERS) TO EMPLOY 6700 NM (NO-NOTICE)																	
TYPE	#	SPEED	LBS/HR	ALERT TIME	DEPLOYMENT				REDEPLOYMENT				TOTAL KC-135R'S REQ'D	TIME TO TARGET	TOTAL MISSION TIME	REGEN TIME	2ND MISSION TIME TO TARGET
					DISTANCE	TIME	FUEL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	DISTANCE	TIME	FUEL	KC-135R'S REQ'D					
B-1	1	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	381549	5.0	6700 NM	15.26	381549	5.0	10.0	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-1	2	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	763098	10.0	6700 NM	15.26	763098	10.0	20.0	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-1	3	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	1144647	15.0	6700 NM	15.26	1144647	15.0	30.0	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-1	4	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	1526196	20.0	6700 NM	15.26	1526196	20.0	40.0	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-1	5	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	1907745	25.0	6700 NM	15.26	1907745	25.0	49.9	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-1	6	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	2289294	30.0	6700 NM	15.26	2289294	30.0	59.9	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-2	1	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	381549	5.0	6700 NM	15.26	381549	5.0	10.0	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-2	2	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	763098	10.0	6700 NM	15.26	763098	10.0	20.0	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-2	3	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	1144647	15.0	6700 NM	15.26	1144647	15.0	30.0	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-2	4	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	1526196	20.0	6700 NM	15.26	1526196	20.0	40.0	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-2	5	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	1907745	25.0	6700 NM	15.26	1907745	25.0	49.9	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-2	6	439	25000	24.00	6700 NM	15.26	2289294	30.0	6700 NM	15.26	2289294	30.0	59.9	39.3	54.5	4.0	97.8
B-52	1	300	25000	24.00	6700 NM	22.33	558333	7.3	6700 NM	22.33	558333	7.3	14.6	46.3	68.7	4.0	119.0
B-52	2	300	25000	24.00	6700 NM	22.33	1116667	14.6	6700 NM	22.33	1116667	14.6	29.2	46.3	68.7	4.0	119.0
B-52	3	300	25000	24.00	6700 NM	22.33	1675000	21.9	6700 NM	22.33	1675000	21.9	43.8	46.3	68.7	4.0	119.0
B-52	4	300	25000	24.00	6700 NM	22.33	2233333	29.2	6700 NM	22.33	2233333	29.2	58.5	46.3	68.7	4.0	119.0
B-52	5	300	25000	24.00	6700 NM	22.33	2791667	36.5	6700 NM	22.33	2791667	36.5	73.1	46.3	68.7	4.0	119.0
B-52	6	300	25000	24.00	6700 NM	22.33	3350000	43.8	6700 NM	22.33	3350000	43.8	87.7	46.3	68.7	4.0	119.0
NOTE 1: 24-hour Alert Time, 25000 lbs/hour, and the individual aircraft speeds are the author's assumptions.																	
NOTE 2: Tanker capabilities are based on data from AFPAM 10-403, Table 10, 1 Mar 98. Calculations used are: KC-135Rs have a 76,400 lbs offload every 1500 NMs.																	
NOTE 3: Cross-referencing this table with the Fighter and Airlift Contingency Response Time Tables, it should be noted that the "2ND MISSION TIME TO TARGET" roughly corresponds to the deployment, regeneration, and subsequent employment times of the various AEFs. Therefore, it is assumed that recovery from the second mission will be to a deployed location where the assigned bombers can join in the normal flow of the deployed AEF package.																	
NOTE 4: Based on the assumptions stated above, if all six bombers employed at the same time they would only be able to strike the target twice prior to the main body of the AEF arriving and beginning employment. Therefore, in order to keep up a "constant attack flow," it is the author's assumption that single-ship or two-ship attacks, irregularly spaced out, would be the attacks of choice. Using the "worst case" fuel scenario (i.e., B-52s), these attack options require 14.6 and 29.2 KC-135R equivalents, respectively, in order to complete the total missions. Taking the average of these two attacks, there should be 21.9 KC-135R equivalents available to successfully meet the bomber alert requirements. The author makes one more assumption: not all tankers are required at the same time. Those tankers that initially refuel the bombers should be able within the 30.6 to 44.6 round-trip to land, refuel, take-off again, and meet the bombers on the return trip. Therefore, the author assumes that only 70% of the 21.9 KC-135R equivalents are required to be on alert status at any one time. This means a minimum of 15.3 KC-135R equivalents need to be assigned to bomber alert duty.																	

fighters and combat support aircraft. IAW Table 20, the remaining INT squadron arrives in-theater at M-31.7/E-41.7 hours. Given a nominal 8 hours for total regeneration, this additional INT squadron can “join the fight” with the AV PKG # 1 aircraft at M-23.7/E-33.7 hours. With 45.7 hours remaining before the “rogue” main body can engage allied troops (E-33.7 + the 12 hour delay), the entire AV PKG # 2 combat power (190 sorties with 119 combat missions) is “on target.” This is the EAF vision the regional CINCs want to see.

SCENARIO 2B: If U.S. ground troops are physically located within the physical borders of a potentially hostile nation, e.g., not an ally, but either the potentially hostile nation’s government requested the U.S. presence, the threat is assessed to be minimal, and/or the threat

TABLE 20
AVIATION PACKAGES # 1 AND # 2 FIGHTER AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME (WITH TANKERS)

AVIATION PACKAGES # 1 AND # 2 FIGHTER AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME (WITH TANKERS) TO DEPLOY 6700 NM (NO-NOTICE)																						
TYPE	TOT #	TOT PER TNK	SPEED	LBS/HR	RESP TIME	LEG ONE				CREW REST	LEG TWO				CREW REST	LEG THREE				TOTAL KC-135R'S REQ'D	REGEN TIME	TOTAL TIME
						DIST NM	TIME	FUEL	KC-135R REQ'D		DIST NM	TIME	FUEL	KC-135R REQ'D		DIST NM	TIME	FUEL	KC-135R REQ'D			
F-15C	12	6	439	7500	48.0	3800	8.7	389522	5.1	17.0	2900	6.6	297267	3.9	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	18.0	8.0	88.3
F-16	12	6	439	5360	48.0	3800	8.7	278378	3.6	17.0	2900	6.6	212446	2.8	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	12.8	8.0	88.3
A-10	12	6	300	4121	48.0	2500	8.3	206050	2.7	17.0	2500	8.3	206050	2.7	17.0	1700	5.7	140114	1.8	14.5	8.0	112.3
E-3	2	1	439	13916	48.0	3800	8.7	120457	1.6	17.0	2900	6.6	91928	1.2	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	5.6	1.5	81.8
NOTE 1: 48 hours tanker response time is IAW AMCI 10-403.																						
NOTE 2: Crew rest time is based on the "worst case" tanker requirement of 17 hours.																						
NOTE 3: Tanker capabilities are based on data from AMCI 10-403, Chapter 2. Calculations used are: KC-135Rs have a 76,400 lbs offload every 1500 NMs.																						
NOTE 4: IAW AMCI 10-403, Chapter 2, para. 2.8, p. 14, Active Duty tanker units tasked to deploy from home station to provide theater support will have a response time of 48 hours from notification. AFRC/ANG units ordered to active duty to support AMC mobility missions will be ready to deploy within 72 hours from unit notification of mobilization. The response time includes 24 hours for mobilization.																						
NOTE 5: ASSUMPTION: AFRC/ANG tanker units "on-call" for AEF duty have a 48 hour response time IAW active duty unit requirements.																						

would take at least a week to ten days to materialize, then logic dictates that the Combat AEFs should remain “on call” instead of being forward deployed.

These “on call” forces will suffice primarily for two reasons. First, as shown in Scenario 2A, under the Combat AEF concept of operations, the response time to supply more than enough combat power to the regional CINCs should be well within the timeframe required. Second, while each Combat AEF can supply a significant amount of combat power anywhere in the world, there will be only two Combat AEFs available to support “rapid reaction” combat and combat support operations on a global basis. Portions (AV PKGs) of at least one of the “on call” Combat AEFs are all but guaranteed to be already deployed supporting SCENARIO 2A situations. If the remaining Combat AEF forces are piecemealed to support operations where U.S. ground forces are not in immediate and/or imminent danger (e.g., threat assessed to be minimal and/or long lead-time developing) the Air Force’s ability to rapidly support combat operations in other, potentially “pop up” crises is drastically reduced.

SCENARIO 3: This scenario assumes U.S. ground troops are not physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation but are stationed in a neighboring country with some sort of nation-to-nation agreement with the U.S. The assumption will be made that there are no Air Force squadrons/groups/wings stationed in the neighboring country on a “permanent”

basis, and there are currently no Combat AEF AV PKGs forward deployed. There are two “spin-offs” of this scenario.

SCENARIO 3A. With U.S./allied troops located in the “neighboring” country, the rogue nation decides to initiate small-scale combat or a large scale raid. For purposes of analysis, if the rogue nation is willing to invade a neighboring country, the assumption is made that they would have to commit at least a division-sized force for the operation. Based on the methodology of analysis for the Scenario 2 threat, the Army FM’s suggest that a heavy division can mobilize in 288 hours (M-288). The same distance and travel times of 10 hours used in Scenario 2 will be used when analyzing this threat (E-298). In this scenario, the regional CINC would probably want to rapidly deploy a Combat AEF PKG as a deterrent/fighting force well before the “rogue” has time to complete mobilization and commit the mistake of crossing the border. Based on the CINC’s desires, the NCA decides to deploy either AV PKG # 1 or # 2. Given the same 40 hours from WO to EO, the NCA issues the EO at M-248/E-258.

Table 11 shows that the average AV PKG # 1 requires 65.0 C-141 equivalents and 63.2 KC-135R equivalents to deploy the entire package. It also shows that the average AV PKG # 1 has 76.3 C-141 equivalents and 74.3 KC-135R equivalents readily available. Table 21 shows the maximum time for close-out of the C-141 equivalents, e.g., all cargo requirements for AV PKG # 1, is 94.3 hours (M-153.7/E-163.7). Table 20 shows the maximum time for close-out of the KC-135R equivalents, e.g., all combat and combat support aircraft for AV PKG # 1, is 112.3 hours (M-135.7/E-145.7).

Table 12 shows that the average AV PKG # 2 requires 74.4 C-141 equivalents and 72.2 KC-135R equivalents to deploy the entire package. It also shows that the average AV PKG # 2 has 77.9 C-141 equivalents and 73.3 KC-135R equivalents readily available. Times for close-out are included in Tables 20 and 21 and are the same close-out times for AV PKG # 1. The bottom line is either AV PKG # 1 or # 2 can be in-place, conducting “deterrent” missions nearly six days prior to a potential enemy’s mobilization and deployment!

SCENARIO 3B. In this scenario the “rogue” nation is mobilizing to attack in force (several divisions or a corps). Times for mobilization (288 hours), engagement (298 hours), and WO to EO (40 hours) will remain the same. The NCA/regional CINC decide to deploy a full Combat AEF.

If the Combat AEF is to be deployed to an “established” base, e.g., pre-positioned

TABLE 21
AVIATION PACKAGES # 1 AND # 2 AIRLIFT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME
(WITHOUT TANKERS)

AVIATION PACKAGES # 1 AND # 2 AIRLIFT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME (WITHOUT TANKERS) TO DEPLOY 6700 NM (NO-NOTICE)																	
TYPE	SPEED	MAX ONE- LEG DISTANCE	RESPONSE TIME	BASE # 1 ON-LOAD TIME	DEPLOYMENT BASE # 2		BASE # 2 ON-LOAD TIME	LEG ONE		CREW REST	LEG TWO		CREW REST	LEG THREE		OFF-LOAD TIME	TOTAL TIME (6700 NM)
					DISTANCE	TIME		DISTANCE	TIME		DISTANCE	TIME		DISTANCE	TIME		
C-5	429	5000 NM	36.0	4.3	2000	4.7	4.3	3000	7.0	17.0	3700	8.6	0.0	0	0.0	3.3	85.0
C-17	430	4000 NM	36.0	2.3	2000	4.7	2.3	3000	7.0	16.0	3700	8.6	0.0	0	0.0	2.3	79.0
C-130	270	2500 NM	36.0	1.5	0	0.0	0.0	2500	9.3	15.3	2500	9.3	15.3	1700	6.3	1.5	94.3
C-141	414	4000 NM	36.0	2.3	2000	4.8	2.3	3000	7.2	16.0	3700	8.9	0.0	0	0.0	2.3	79.8
NOTE 1: IAW AMC1 10-403, Chapter 2, para. 2.7, p.13, Active Duty airlift units will have a response time of 36 hours from notification; AFRC/ANG units that support AMC mobility missions will be ready to deploy within 72 hours from unit notification of mobilization (response time includes 24 hours for mobilization).																	
NOTE 2: ASSUMPTION - AFRC/ANG units "on call" for AEF have 36 hour response time, IAW active duty units. Additionally, assume one crew per aircraft. Two crews would cut the crew rest times by approximately one-third.																	
NOTE 3: Since there are an average of 23 squadrons assigned to each AEF, it is assumed that mission planners will task all, or some portion, of the C-5s, C-17s, and C-141s to pick up cargo at two deployment bases. A nominal 2000 NM distance between the initial deployment base and second deployment base has been assumed by the author. The author assumes C-130s will be tasked for cargo at only one location.																	

supplies and munitions, the NCA would elect to deploy AV PKG # 3. Table 13 shows that the average AV PKG # 3 requires 110.0 C-141 equivalents and 117.3 KC-135R equivalents to deploy. It also shows that there are 142.4 C-141 equivalents and 66.4 KC-135R equivalents readily available. This necessitates two “trips” by the assigned “equivalents” to bring the deployment to closure. Table 22 shows that it takes a maximum of 198.6 hours (M-89.4/E-99.4) to complete deployment of AV PKG # 3 combat and combat support aircraft. Table 23 shows that it takes a maximum of 200.1 hours (M-87.9/E-97.9) to complete deployment of AV PKG # 3 airlift requirements.

If the Combat AEF is to be deployed to a “bare base,” e.g., no pre-positioned supplies and munitions, the NCA would elect to deploy AV PKG # 4. Table 14 shows that the average AV PKG # 4 requires 239.9 C-141 equivalents and 117.3 KC-135R equivalents to deploy. It also shows that each AV PKG # 4 has 186.0 C-141 equivalents and 66.4 KC-135R equivalents readily available. This also necessitates two “trips” by the assigned “equivalents.” Table 22 and 23 deployment times apply to AV PKG # 4 deployment as well as AV PKG # 3 deployment. The bottom line is either AV PKG # 3 or # 4 could be deployed, in-place, and conducting “deterrent” operations nearly 4 days prior to the potential enemy’s mobilization and engagement.

Given the above description of the three basic scenarios, conclusions can be drawn for deployment and employment of Combat AEF AV PKGs. First, if the U.S. is currently involved in a SSC or MTW, or is involved in the immediate post-conflict period of a SSC or MTW, IAW

TABLE 22
AVIATION PACKAGES # 3 AND # 4 FIGHTER AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT
CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME (WITH TANKERS)

AVIATION PACKAGES # 3 AND # 4 FIGHTER AND SUPPORT AIRCRAFT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME (WITH TANKERS) TO DEPLOY 6700 NM (NO-NOTICE)																		
TYPE	TOT #	TOT PER TNK	SPEED	LBS/HR	1ST TRIP TANKER TURN-AROUND PLUS CREW REST	LEG ONE				CREW REST	LEG TWO				CREW REST	TOTAL KC-135R'S REQ'D	REGEN TIME	TOTAL TIME
						DIST NM	TIME	FUEL	KC-135R REQ'D		DIST NM	TIME	FUEL	KC-135R REQ'D				
F-117	12	2	375	9380	155.7	3350	8.9	167589	2.2	17.0	3350	8.9	167589	2.2	0.0	26.3	8.0	198.6
F-15C	12	6	439	7500	155.7	3800	8.7	389522	5.1	17.0	2900	6.6	297267	3.9	0.0	18.0	8.0	196.0
F-15E	12	6	439	10586	155.7	3800	8.7	549797	7.2	17.0	2900	6.6	419582	5.5	0.0	25.4	8.0	196.0
F-16	12	6	439	5360	155.7	3800	8.7	278378	3.6	17.0	2900	6.6	212446	2.8	0.0	12.8	8.0	196.0
A-10	12	6	300	4121	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	112.3
HC-130	2	1	270	5360	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	108.3
E-3	2	1	439	13916	155.7	3800	8.7	120457	1.6	17.0	2900	6.6	91928	1.2	0.0	5.6	1.5	189.5

NOTE 1: Tanker, fighter, and support aircraft parameters are based on AMCI 10-403 and AFPAM 10-1403 and are exactly the same as in the Aviation Packages # 1 and # 2 Fighter and Support Aircraft Contingency Response Time (With Tankers) table. "1ST TRIP TANKER TURN-AROUND PLUS CREW REST" is the average time for packages # 1 and # 2 to arrive at the deployed location, plus tanker regen time, plus crew rest, plus two return trip legs (crew rest inbetween), and one final crew rest period.

NOTE 2: The author assumes that since the A-10s and HC-130s have three deployment legs, mission planners will ensure these units deploy on the first trip. At least one squadron of tankers can remain in-place with the A-10s, HC-130s, and other aircraft who deployed on the first trip and begin combat operations.

TABLE 23
AVIATION PACKAGES # 3 AND # 4 AIRLIFT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME
(WITHOUT TANKERS)

AVIATION PACKAGES # 3 AND # 4 AIRLIFT CONTINGENCY RESPONSE TIME (WITHOUT TANKERS) TO DEPLOY 6700 NM (NO-NOTICE)														
TYPE	SPEED	DEPLOY TRIP # 1	RETURN TO CONUS/ CREW REST	BASE # 3 ON-LOAD TIME	DEPLOYMENT BASE # 4		BASE # 2 ON-LOAD TIME	LEG ONE		CREW REST	LEG TWO		OFF-LOAD TIME	TOTAL TIME (6700 NM)
					DISTANCE	TIME		DISTANCE	TIME		DISTANCE	TIME		
C-5	429	85.0	66.1	4.3	2000	4.7	4.3	3000	7.0	17.0	3700	8.6	3.3	200.1
C-17	430	79.0	63.6	2.3	2000	4.7	2.3	3000	7.0	16.0	3700	8.6	2.3	185.6
C-130	270	94.3	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0	0.0	94.3
C-141	414	79.8	64.2	2.3	2000	4.8	2.3	3000	7.2	16.0	3700	8.9	2.3	187.8

NOTE 1: Airlift parameters are based on AMCI 10-403 and are exactly the same as in the Aviation Packages # 1 and # 2 Airlift Contingency Response Time (Without Tankers) table. "DEPLOY TRIP # 1" is the time taken from the Av Pkg # 1 and # 2 table. "RETURN TO CONUS/CREW REST" is an initial crew rest, leg one flight time, crew rest, leg two flight time, and a final crew rest.

NOTE 2: Since there are an average of 23 squadrons assigned to each AEF, it is assumed that mission planners will task all, or some portion, of the C-5s, C-17s, and C-141s to pick up cargo at two deployment bases on each of their trips. A nominal 2000 NM distance between the initial deployment base and second deployment base has been assumed by the author. The author assumes the C-130s will remain in-place at the deployed location after their first trip and support combat operations.

Scenario 1, at least one Combat AEF AV PKG should be deployed. This was the case during ALLIED FORCE, and is pretty "cut and dried."

Whether or not Combat AEF AV PKGs are forward deploy for Scenario 2 or 3 situations contains a lot more variables, all of which revolve around the location of U.S. and/or allied ground troops and the assessment of the threat. Based on the detailed analysis of the Combat AEF ability to successfully complete Scenarios 2 and 3, it is a reasonable conclusion that Combat AEF AV PKGs should only be forward deployed for Scenario 2A situations. In this case, because U.S./allied forces are physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation (possible immediate threat) and the potentially hostile nation did not request U.S. presence (possible imminent threat), prudence would dictate that an AV PKG # 1 be forward deployed.

Taking a look at the current world situation, this course of action would fit perfectly into what is going on today in the Balkans region. One Combat AEF AV PKG # 1 could fulfill this mission if they were assigned to a centrally located operating base. For example, negotiated use of a base in Hungary would be ideal. The deployed AV PKG # 1 assets would be centrally located between Kosovo and Bosnia and be able to support both operations.

Combat AEF AV PKGs should remain “on call” to support Scenario 2B situations. If a potentially hostile nation’s government requested U.S. presence and/or the threat is such that the Combat AEFs can react well within the time required for that nation to establish a credible threat, forward deploying AV PKGs is a waste of precious resources. One can envision “on call” forces supporting current Scenario 2B situations in the Middle East, East Timor, and Asia, with potential Scenario 2B situations developing in the Congo and Mozambique. This type of “on call” support would easily fit humanitarian assistance missions, recovery operations, nation assistance missions, domestic support operations, counterdrug operations, most ensuring freedom of navigation missions, and most arms control support missions. “On call” support will also work for the remaining MOOTW missions (combating terrorism, noncombatant evacuation operations, peace operations, show of force, and support to insurgency) when the Scenario 2B assumptions are in-place.

Based on the analysis of Scenario 3 situations and the Combat AEF ability to successfully support any combat mission when U.S./allied troops are not physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation, it would be reasonable to conclude that Combat AEF forces should remain “on call” for all Scenario 3 situations. Taking a look at the current world situation, the one glaring exception to this conclusion is in the Middle East – the number one

reason the Air Force OPSTEMPO is so high and retention rate so low. Here, U.S./allied troops are not physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation. While the assessed threat from that neighboring potentially hostile nation may be high, given the timelines analyzed in Scenario 3, Combat AEF “on call” forces can respond well before the threat develops into reality. Additionally, it is difficult to fathom how the Middle East rotations could still be perceived as a post-conflict Scenario 1 situation – it has been 9 years since the Gulf War!

Skirting any political rationale for the forward deployment of U.S. Air Forces to the Middle East (not within the scope of this paper), it seems that the only military reason Combat AEF package(s) are deployed to the Middle East where no U.S. ground troops are in immediate or imminent danger is to provide day-to-day support of the “no fly/no drive zones.” Given that these “zones” are a current political reality the U.S. military has no option but to support, the only military option available lies in how the military leadership recommends these political realities are supported to the NCA. In order to fulfill the EAF vision and work within the “system,” the Air Force senior leadership has the right and obligation to propose “alternative” methods to support the “no fly/no drive zones” that are acceptable to the NCA. There are four basic “options” that seem to provide a reasonable solution.

Just as the current Middle East operations involve the political risk of an aircraft being shot down while conducting normal “peacekeeping” missions, any “option” that involves withdrawing the Combat AEF forces comes with political risk. The first, and admittedly the most politically risky, option is to withdraw the Combat AEF presence and issue a warning that violations will result in Combat AEF deployment, and, if a Combat AEF AV PKG is deployed, it will be with the understanding that combat operations will ensue.

A second option, somewhat less politically risky and roughly along the rules we currently operate under (engage violators), would be to withdraw Combat AEF forces, move the Patriot batteries to a more forward location and let them engage “no fly zone” violators. The political risk involves firing missiles into Iraq. The military risk is negligible. No U.S. airmen would be exposed to the daily threat of the “golden BB” from erratic Iraqi gunfire and the Patriot batteries would provide a forward defense against a provocative raid by a handful of Iraqi fighters. One would think that if a raid of this sort did occur, the NCA would immediately deploy an AV PKG and conduct retaliatory combat operations. In support of this option is the SCENARIO 3 description that clearly shows that AV PKGs could deploy and deter or destroy enemy troops

prior to engaging U.S. ground forces should the Iraqi's decide to launch ground combat operations.

A third option would be to withdraw Combat AEF forces and have the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) provide forces to enforce the “no fly/no drive zones.” This “political” option is beyond the scope of this paper.

A fourth option assumes it is politically unfeasible to convince the GCC to provide the forces and politically unfeasible to not have some in-place forces patrolling the “no fly/no drive zones.” This option would be to reduce the overall amount of forces patrolling these “zones” to the equivalent of an AV PKG # 1 (one A-10 squadron, one F-16 INT squadron, one F-15C squadron, one F-16C SEAD squadron, one HH-60G squadron, one E-3 squadron, one-two tanker squadron(s), and one-two C-130 squadron(s)) and rotate the duties of performing the actual missions between the U.S. Air Force, the Royal Air Force (RAF), and the U.S. Navy. This would entail one Combat AEF AV PKG # 1 deploying for one 90 day cycle. They would be relieved by a similar RAF force for 90 days. The RAF force would subsequently be relieved by a U.S. Navy force. The Navy would be replaced by the next Combat AEF AV PKG. While this option does not totally adhere to the EAF vision and the demonstrated capabilities of the AV PKGs, it would be a reasonable compromise that would still support the political direction to keep forces overhead patrolling the “zones” (if the NCA deems it necessary), and would provide a 6 month per year OPSTEMPO reduction for all Services involved. It has already been proven that additional forces can be rapidly deployed if a “crisis” develops. This option has the potential to directly affect the OPSTEMPO for 8 of the 12 Combat AEFs!

Assuming this “3-Service” rotation begins with Combat AEFs 1/2, only Combat AEFs 1/2 and 7/8 would fall into the “Desert” rotation. Combat AEFs 3/4, 5/6, 9/10, and 11/12 would not be tasked for Middle East duty and would remain “on call” since these deployments would be covered by the RAF and Navy. Even within Combat AEFs 1/2 and 7/8, the OPSTEMPO could be reduced by tasking Combat AEFs 1 and 7 to provide the forces one “cycle” and Combat AEFs 2 and 8 to provide the forces the next “cycle.” The bottom line is: Since the Air Force will have organized and committed its forces to operate under the full EAF vision and can fully support regional CINC requirements under a SCENARIO 3 situation, the Air Force senior leadership has the luxury of exploring “alternative” ways to support the political realities that make up a significant portion of Air Force tasking.

Summing up the Combat AEF and Bomber Alert practical applications, it is easy to envision the following overall deployment of Combat AEF forces: (1) One Combat AEF AV PKG # 1 deployed to a centrally located base somewhere in or near the Balkan region. This AV PKG would be dedicated to support of Bosnia and Kosovo peacekeeping operations. (2) Either all other Combat AEF AV PKGs remaining “on call” to support contingency operations around the world, or, worst case, the “sister” AV PKG # 1 would be deployed to Kuwait and/or Turkey once every six-months on a rotating basis with the RAF and Navy in support of Operations SOUTHERN/NORTHERN WATCH.

B. MOBILITY AEFs

This paper’s “Big Picture” Strategy section highlighted the fact that the U.S. is committed to world-wide humanitarian assistance, nation assistance, etc., for at least the first part of the 21st Century. The EAF vision takes this into account by tasking five Mobility AEFs to support these sorts of operations. Unfortunately, there is no hard and fast “requirement” for worldwide non-combatant mobility operations that would enable a definitive and quantifiable force structure to be developed. Additionally, whatever force structure is assigned will not have a predictable, stable schedule. No one can predict when natural disasters will occur and no one can predict which natural disasters that do occur will prompt the NCA to involve U.S. military forces. It is simple fact that this vague requirement does exist. When a natural disaster does occur, it is easy to see that there will be two “phases” of mobility operations. The first “phase” would entail “emergency” support immediately after the disaster occurs. The second “phase” would entail short or long-term sustained day-to-day support that would begin when the initial “emergency” is somewhat stabilized.

Couple this overall “fuzziness” with the facts that there are only a finite amount of mobility assets and that the combat mission(s) must come first, the ideal structure and capabilities of the Mobility AEFs can be quickly narrowed down to fit within the present (and future) force structure.

First, and foremost, the assumption must be made that Mobility AEFs will be used for non-combatant operations. Secondly, the reality of a limited tanker force dictates that these mobility assets conduct mobility operations without the support of dedicated aerial refueling assets. This does not mean Mobility AEF forces will never conduct aerial refueling, it simply means that whatever aerial refueling occurs must come out of the tankers assigned Normal Daily

Tasking missions. Each Mobility AEF will need a certain amount of long-haul (Inter-theater airlift) capability to move the bulk of supplies from CONUS or other supporting nation(s) to the country affected. From there, these supplies must be able to reach a potentially disaster-ravaged area or an area with no established infra-structure. This requires C-130 operations. The proposed Mobility AEFs fulfill these requirements and remain within the ability of the current force structure to support.

Table 17 shows that there are an average of 8 C-5 Inter-theater airlift aircraft (1 squadron) and 29 C-130 Intra-theater airlift aircraft (6 squadrons) assigned to each Mobility AEF. In an “emergency” situation, e.g., providing immediate disaster relief, each Mobility AEF can generate 43.6 C-141 equivalents per day in support of these mobility operations. Once the situation is stabilized and has transitioned to sustained day-to-day support, each Mobility AEF can generate 25.4 C-141 equivalents per day. Statistically speaking, it must be pointed out that in an “emergency” situation each Mobility AEF can generate 57 percent of the airlift available for each Combat AEF AV PKG # 1. This seems like a fair apportionment of the Air Force’s precious airlift assets given the fact combat missions must come first.

Here is the envisioned concept of operations for each Mobility AEF: A nation 6,700 NM from CONUS suffers a tremendous natural disaster. The NCA orders immediate “emergency” humanitarian support. Within 36 hours of the NCA order (Table 21 and 23 “response” times used), all C-5s and one and a half squadrons of the C-130s are enroute to the CONUS location(s) that will provide the required supplies. IAW Table 3, these forces will provide approximately 30.1 C-141 equivalents of initial “bulk” supplies pick-up from the CONUS location. At the same time, the remaining four and a half squadrons of C-130s (approximately 13.5 C-141 equivalent “end-game” distribution) are deploying to the nation and establishing a main operating base at a C-5 capable airfield somewhere near the disaster area. Eighty-five hours later (see Table 21), and a total of 121 hours from the NCA order, the first C-5 arrives with supplies. The C-130s load the supplies in one and a half hours (Table 21) and deliver the first batch of supplies directly to the disaster area approximately 125 hours (about 5 days) after the initial NCA order.

When the one and a half squadrons of C-130s that picked up the initial “bulk” supplies from CONUS arrive in-theater 130.3 hours after the NCA order, they remain in-place and support the “emergency” operations. From this point on and continuing until the “emergency” is

down graded to “normal” disaster relief, the C-5s will be providing approximately 25.6 C-141 equivalents of “bulk” supplies from CONUS and the C-130s will be providing approximately 18.0 C-141 equivalents of end-game distribution per day. It is assumed that some supplies will have to be trucked into the disaster areas and will be handled by this nation or its immediate neighbors.

Approximately a week to ten days after the disaster has been declared an “emergency,” the NCA will more than likely down grade the situation to “normal” disaster relief operations. At this point, the C-5s reduce their daily missions to the “sustainment” threshold level and provide approximately 12.8 C-141 equivalents worth of “bulk” supplies per day. Additionally, four of the six C-130 squadrons are re-deployed back to their CONUS location. The remaining two squadrons continue to provide approximately 6.0 to 9.0 C-141 equivalents of end-game distribution per day. If the disaster relief operation continues for another two-weeks after being downgraded to “normal” status, two of the re-deployed C-130 squadrons deploy back to the nation and relieve the in-place squadrons. This two-week rotation continues as long as the situation remains in a “normal” status. Under this concept of operations, all mobility obligations should be met while remaining within confines of the current force structure.

C. NORMAL DAILY TASKING

The capabilities and potential of the Combat AEFs, Bomber Alerts, and Mobility AEFs have been clearly demonstrated. The only question that remains is whether or not the Air Force can still perform its Normal Daily Tasking, e.g., those missions AMC conducts on a normal daily basis (tasking, training, and JA/AAT) that are not related to AEF operations.

First, it must be determined exactly what AMC/TRANSCOM has historically performed. Table 4 shows that AMC has flown an average of 237.6 C-141 and 123.5 KC-135R equivalents on a daily basis. These totals include all AMC missions – AEF support, tasking, JA/AAT, and training. Appendices 13-18 contain the breakout of these daily missions by C-5s, C-17s, C-130s, C-141s, KC-10s, and KC-135s, respectively. Averaging the “tasked,” “JA/AAT,” and “training” percentages for the airlift and tankers, it is evident that 53.6 percent of all airlift missions were “tasked,” 6.7 percent were “JA/AAT,” and 39.7 percent “training,” while 50.5 percent of all tanker missions were “tasked,” 0.9 percent were “JA/AAT,” and 48.6 percent were “training.” Converting these percentages into quantifiable daily “equivalents,” it becomes apparent that AMC/TRANSCOM airlift assets historically performed 127.4 C-141 equivalent “tasked”

missions, 15.9 “JA/AAT” missions, and 94.3 “training” missions each day. AMC/TRANSCOM tanker assets historically performed 62.4 KC-135R equivalent “tasked” missions, 1.1 “JA/AAT” missions, and 60.0 “training” missions each day.

Second, the exact amount of airlift and tanker “equivalents” available on a day-to-day basis, e.g., “sustained” rate, under the proposed AEF plan must be determined. Table 15 shows there are 48.5 C-141 equivalents and 26.7 KC-135R equivalents available on a daily basis from each Combat AEF. Table 16 shows there are 15.0 KC-135R equivalents available on a daily basis from the Bomber Alert. Table 17 shows there are 25.4 C-141 equivalents available on a daily basis from the Mobility AEF. Table 18 shows there are 129.3 C-141 equivalents and 108.1 KC-135R equivalents available on a daily basis from the aircraft assigned Normal Daily Tasking. Adding these “equivalents” together, there are 251.7 C-141 equivalents and 176.5 KC-135R equivalents available on a daily basis.

Third, it is possible to use the “type” mission percentages from Appendices 13-18 to get a specific breakout of what is available on a day-to-day basis. Of the 251.7 C-141 equivalents available on a daily basis under the proposed plan, there are 134.9 C-141 equivalents available for “tasking,” 16.9 C-141 equivalents available for “JA/AAT,” and 99.9 C-141 equivalents available for “training.” Of the 176.5 KC-135R equivalents available on a day-to-day basis, there are 89.1 KC-135R equivalents available for “tasking,” 1.6 KC-135R equivalents available for “JA/AAT,” and 85.8 KC-135R equivalents available for “training.”

Fourth, in order to see exactly what is available for “normal” operations under the proposed AEF plan, those missions that can be theorized as being “tasked” to support sustainment (not deployment/redeployment) of the Combat and Mobility AEFs must be factored out. Table 17 shows 25.4 C-141 equivalents available from the Mobility AEF. An assumption will be made that these equivalents are continually “tasked” for mobility operations. Whether deployed or at home-base, sustainment of the Combat AEFs will “task” an average of 13.9 C-141 equivalents and 8.2 KC-135R equivalents.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, there are a total of 39.3 C-141 equivalents and 8.2 KC-135R equivalents “tasked” for day-to-day sustainment of the Combat and Mobility AEFs. Subtracting these AEF support “equivalents” from the total “equivalents” available under the proposed AEF plan, there are 95.6 C-141 equivalents available for “tasking,” 16.9 C-141 equivalents available for “JA/AAT,” and 99.9 C-141 equivalents available for

“training.” There are 80.9 KC-135R equivalents available for “tasking,” 1.6 KC-135R equivalents available for “JA/AAT,” and 85.8 KC-135R equivalents available for “training.”

Fifth, the AEF sustainment assets must be subtracted from the AMC/TRANSCOM historical data in order to be able to compare current missions with the proposed plan. When these missions are factored out, it becomes clear that AMC historically performed 88.1 “non-AEF” C-141 equivalent “tasked” missions, 15.9 “JA/AAT” missions, and 94.3 “training” missions. The tanker force performed 54.2 “non-AEF” KC-135R equivalent “tasked” missions, 1.1 “JA/AAT” missions, and 60.0 “training” missions.

Sixth, the historical AMC missions must be compared with those available under the proposed plan. Table 24 depicts this comparison. Based on the active participation of the Total Force and after factoring out AEF support (from dedicated AEF assets), the result is a net gain in all areas involved with conducting Normal Daily Taskings.

TABLE 24
HISTORICAL VERSUS PROPOSED “NORMAL DAILY MISSIONS”
COMPARISON

HISTORICAL VERSUS PROPOSED "NORMAL DAILY MISSIONS" COMPARISON				
AIRCRAFT	MISSION	HISTORICAL	PROPOSED	DELTA
C-141	"TASKED"	88.1	95.6	7.5
C-141	"JA/AAT"	15.9	16.9	1.0
C-141	"TRAINING"	94.3	99.9	5.6
KC-135R	"TASKED"	54.2	80.9	26.7
KC-135R	"JA/AAT"	1.1	1.6	0.5
KC-135R	"TRAINING"	60.0	85.8	25.8

Finally, several points concerning day-to-day operations must be highlighted. First, the proposed AEF plan for conducting Normal Daily Tasking is based on the following concept of operations: Those airlift and tanker forces assigned to Combat AEFs, Bomber Alert, and Mobility AEFs, when tasked for deployment, redeployment, or support of bomber operations from CONUS, will perform AEF missions exclusively. However, if the AEFs/Bombers are either not deployed or are deployed but in the “sustainment” phase, these airlift and tanker forces will, first, fulfill all required “tasking” to support AEF/Bomber “sustainment” operations (estimated to be an average of 39.3 C-141 equivalents and 8.2 KC-135R equivalents on a daily basis), then, any “additional equivalents” beyond those required to support AEF/Bomber

“sustainment” operations on a day-to-day basis will be used in the historical AMC percentages of “tasked,” “JA/AAT”, and “training.” The “training” missions are self-explanatory. Due to the nature of the rapid-response requirement, the “tasked” and “JA/AAT” missions performed by these forces must be accomplished under the following restrictions: Only overseas out-and-back missions, CONUS overnight missions, or local missions. The airlift and tanker aircraft specifically assigned to Normal Daily Tasking, e.g., are not currently tasked for AEF/Bomber support, are responsible for the overseas “long-haul” missions.

Secondly, while comparison of AMC historical missions to those missions available under the proposed plan shows a net increase in every mission “type,” inclusion of the ANG and AFRC in these figures breaks “new ground” and must be thoroughly examined on a routine basis after implementation. The assumption can be made that research has arrived at an accurate account of the Total Force’s ability to conduct AMC/TRANSCOM “tasked” and “JA/AAT” missions. This meets the primary “requirement.” However, what needs to be closely monitored is the ability to conduct overall Total Force training. Active duty AMC historically performed 94.3 C-141 equivalents and 60.0 KC-135R equivalents of “training” per day. The proposed plan increases the Total Force “training” C-141 and KC-135R equivalents available each day to 99.9 and 85.8, respectively. This is an increase of 7.5 C-141 equivalents and 25.8 KC-135R equivalents. However, “training” must be monitored closely, especially the C-141 equivalent “training,” because it can be deduced that inclusion of the ANG and AFRC in the overall “training” category will increase the required daily missions but it is unknown as to how much. Theoretically, an estimate can be made.

The ANG and AFRC make up approximately of 60.7 percent of the airlift and tanker forces assigned to the AEFs, Bomber Alert, and Normal Daily Tasking. Therefore, the active duty airlift and tanker forces make up 39.3 percent of the total. The historical active duty C-141 equivalent “training” requirement is 94.3 C-141 equivalents per day. If the ANG and AFRC flew at the same “threshold” rates the active duty does on a day-to-day basis, the ANG and AFRC would require 145.7 C-141 equivalents per day for “training.” However, in the proposed plan the ANG/AFRC is only tasked for approximately one-half the active duty “threshold” rates on a day-to-day basis. Therefore, theoretically, the ANG/AFRC would require approximately 72.9 C-141 equivalents for “training” on a daily basis. The Total Force C-141 equivalent “training” requirement would be 167.2 C-141 equivalents per day. There are only 99.9 C-141

equivalents available for “training” under the proposed plan. While the proposed plan’s 8.5 additional “tasked” and “JA/AAT” C-141 equivalents (above the historical data) could be “converted” to “training” missions, this would still only increase the total “training” C-141 equivalents available to 108.4. Theoretically, there would be a 58.8 Total Force C-141 equivalent “training” shortfall per day.

Following the same logic for the Total Force KC-135R equivalent “training,” theoretically the ANG and AFRC should require 46.4 KC-135R equivalents for “training” each day. Adding this to the known active duty requirement of 60.0 KC-135R “training” equivalents required each day. The total would be 106.4 KC-135R equivalents required each day for Total Force “training.” There are 85.8 KC-135R equivalents available for “training” under the proposed plan. If the 26.3 additional “tasked” and “JA/AAT” equivalents available under the proposed plan are “converted” to “training” missions, the new “training” total would be 112.1 KC-135R equivalents. Theoretically, there would be a surplus of 5.7 KC-135R equivalent “training” missions each day.

While the potential “training” shortage for C-141 equivalents is hypothetical and can not be verified until ANG and AFRC training requirements are quantified, real-time AEF “sustainment” support is known, and local unit aircraft/pilot availability during Normal Daily Tasking assignments is realistically looked at by each squadron (ANG and AFRC squadrons are tasked for a minimum number of aircraft during these periods, they may or may not be able to generate “additional” sorties), the main point is that this has the potential to be an issue during implementation and should be monitored closely by all parties. If adjustments need to be made to accommodate “training,” there is significant “maneuver room” within the plan itself to provide flexibility.

One last factor must be mentioned. While the AMC/TRANSCOM “tasking” for the Total Force is known, it can not be precisely determined what, if any, the ANG and AFRC Headquarters “tasks” directly to their own forces. If they do “task” their own units, the assumption must be made that this “tasking” would continue under this proposed plan and the Total Force “tasking” requirement would increase. However, because this whole issue is an “unknown,” no estimates were added into the proposed plan.

X. NET RESULTS FOR “ON CALL” AND OPSTEMPO

Appendices 1 – 11 show the by-squadron AEF and Bomber Alert taskings and provide a unit-by-unit run down of “on call” averages. Table 1 summarizes the Appendices by aircraft and unit status (active duty, ANG, AFRC). The average “on call” for all Total Force tasked units is 83 days per year. The average “on call” for tasked active duty units is 93 days, for tasked ANG units is 77 days and for tasked AFRC units is 74 days. The lowest “on call” average is 60 days per year. There are five “categories” that have 60 days “on call”: (1) ANG Air Superiority squadrons, (2) active duty B-52H squadrons, (3) AFRC B-52H squadrons, (4) ANG F-16C BLK 50 squadrons, and (5) AFRC E-3 squadrons. There are an additional 14 “categories” that average between 60 – 70 “on call” days per year. The highest “on call” average of 124 days per year is attributed to active duty KC-135 squadrons. There are 11 “categories” that have over a 100 “on call” days a year: (1) active duty HH-60G squadrons with 101, (2) active duty HC-130 squadrons with 122, (3) AFRC HC-130 squadrons with 121, (4) active duty E-3 squadrons with 112, (5) active duty KC-10 squadrons with 122, (6) active duty KC-135 squadrons with 124, (7) active duty C-5 squadrons with 122, (7) active duty C-17 units with 121, (8) active duty C-141 squadrons with 122, (9) ANG C-141 squadrons with 122, (10) active duty C-130 squadrons with 109, and (11) ANG C-130 units with 111 days. Given these “on call” averages, it is possible to quantify actual OPSTEMPO within the confines of this proposed plan’s concept of operations.

Section VII contains a recommended proposal for Total Force Combat AEF deployment and the associated concept of operations. This recommendation had one Combat AEF AV PKG # 1 deployed to the Balkans region supporting Kosovo and Bosnia peacekeeping missions and one Combat AEF AV PKG # 1 deployed to the Middle East on a rotating basis with the RAF and Navy supporting Operations SOUTHERN and NORTHERN WATCH. The concept of operations for the Bomber Alert forces is to support deployment, redeployment, and CONUS-based strike missions only. Additionally, the “emergency” and “normal” concept of operations for Mobility AEFs is proposed as a full deployment of all C-130s during “emergency” operations and a two-week rotational schedule for two C-130 squadrons during “normal” operations. For purposes of analyzing OPSTEMPO with relationship to this proposal, these concepts of operation are adopted.

AEF-related deployments are only part of the picture when attempting to determine overall squadron OPSTEMPO. It is a given that the vast majority of squadrons will incur

additional Temporary Duty (TDY) to attend training exercises, inspections, etc. Only by adding the predicted AEF-related deployments to the estimated TDYs can a true forecast of the average squadron's OPSTEMPO be made. Unfortunately, the average TDY for the various squadrons is extremely difficult to predict and can fluctuate dramatically from year to year. However, if an attempt to quantify OPSTEMPO is to be made, some predictions for TDY rates must be made. Therefore, for the sake of adding realism, the following assumptions are made: (1) All active duty combat and combat support aircraft have two 2-week "exercise/training" deployments (28 days) that are non-AEF related¹¹⁰; (2) All ANG and AFRC combat and combat support aircraft have one two-week "exercise/training" deployment (14 days) that is non-AEF related¹¹¹; (3) All F-16A-C BLK 15-40 squadrons will actually deploy 25 percent of their "on call" average in support of Combat AEF tasking¹¹²; (4) All active duty Inter-theater airlift will have 7.5-weeks (53 days) worth of temporary duty (TDY), e.g., overseas "long-haul" missions, when assigned Normal Daily Tasking and all ANG/AFRC Inter-theater airlift squadrons will have 3.9 weeks (27 days) worth of TDY when assigned Normal Daily Tasking¹¹³; (5) All active duty Intra-theater airlift squadrons will have 5.7 weeks (40 days) worth of TDY when assigned Normal Daily Tasking and all ANG/AFRC Intra-theater airlift squadrons will have 2.9 weeks (20 days) worth of TDY when assigned Normal Daily Tasking;¹¹⁴ (6) All active duty tanker squadrons have 5.9-weeks (41 days) worth of TDY when assigned Normal Daily Tasking and all ANG/AFRC squadrons will have 3 weeks (21 days) worth of TDY when assigned Normal Daily Tasking¹¹⁵; (7) All C-5, C-17, and C-141 squadrons will average 5.1 weeks worth (36 days) of "deployment" supporting Combat AEF deployment, redeployment, and sustainment operations¹¹⁶; (8) All KC-10 squadrons will average 2-weeks worth (14 days) of "deployment" supporting Combat AEF deployment and redeployment operations¹¹⁷; (9) All C-5 squadrons will average 1.4-weeks worth (10 days) of "deployment" supporting Mobility AEF operations¹¹⁸; (10) All KC-135 squadrons will "deploy" an average of 42 days (6 weeks) supporting AEF operations¹¹⁹; and (11) All C-130s squadrons will "deploy" an average of 56 days (8 weeks) supporting AEF operations.¹²⁰ Applying these assumptions, a realistic look at the Total Force's OPSTEMPO can be undertaken.

First, the combat and combat support squadrons will be analyzed. It must be noted that the analysis is of squadrons only. Most squadrons are tasked to provide only a portion of their PAA, personnel, and equipment. How the individual units "spread the wealth" amongst themselves is beyond the scope of this paper. IAW Table 11, each AV PKG # 1 consists of one

F-15A-C squadron, one F-16C BLK 50 squadron, one A-10 squadron, one HH-60G squadron, one E-3 squadron, and one F-16A-C BLK 15-40 squadron. The remaining combat and combat support aircraft are assigned to AV PKGs # 2 - # 4 and would remain “on call.” Table 25 summarizes the combat and combat support squadron’s OPSTEMPO.

TABLE 25
PROJECTED OPSTEMPO FOR COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT SQUADRONS

PROJECTED OPSTEMPO FOR COMBAT AND COMBAT SUPPORT AIRCRAFT					
"CATEGORY"	STATUS	"ON CALL"	DEPLOYED	TDY	OPSTEMPO (PER YEAR)
F-15A-C	ACTIVE	61	46	28	74
F-15A-C	ANG	60	45	14	59
F-16C BLK 50	ACTIVE	67	50	28	78
F-16C BLK 50	ANG	60	45	14	59
A-10	ACTIVE	61	46	28	74
A-10	ANG	61	46	14	60
A-10	AFRC	61	46	14	60
HH-60G	ACTIVE	101	76	28	104
HH-60G	ANG	81	61	14	75
HH-60G	AFRC	61	46	14	60
E-3	ACTIVE	112	84	28	112
E-3	AFRC	60	45	14	59
F-16A-C BLK 15-40	ACTIVE	61	15	28	43
F-16A-C BLK 15-40	ANG	61	15	14	29
F-16A-C BLK 15-40	AFRC	61	15	14	29
B-1B	ACTIVE	61	0	28	28
B-1B	ANG	61	0	14	14
B-2A	ACTIVE	62	0	28	28
B-52H	ACTIVE	60	0	28	28
B-52H	AFRC	60	0	14	14
F-15E	ACTIVE	91	0	28	28
F-117	ACTIVE	92	0	28	28
HC-130	ACTIVE	122	0	28	28
HC-130	ANG	81	0	14	14
HC-130	AFRC	121	0	14	14
		OVERALL AVERAGE:			48
		ACTIVE DUTY AVERAGE:			54
		ANG AVERAGE:			44
		AFRC AVERAGE:			39

As Table 25 shows, an average of 39 to 54 days per year of predicted deployment/TDY for combat and combat support squadrons is well worth exploring. Again, it must be emphasized that this OPSTEMPO is predictable for squadrons as a whole. Individual Personnel Tempo

(PERSTEMPO) within those squadrons can vary dramatically. The assumption has to be made that squadron commanders will monitor and control each individual's PERSTEMPO. Since there are very few squadrons that are tasked to deploy their entire PAA, there is plenty of room to incorporate professional military education, technical schools, etc., into the overall squadron's OPSTEMPO.

Attempting to predict the OPSTEMPO for airlift and tanker units is much more of an art than a science. A large percentage of these squadrons are tasked to be "on call" for more than one AEF. However, a significant number of these squadrons are not tasked to physically deploy and/or if they are tasked for deployment, not all squadrons assigned to the AEF are tasked to "go." As mentioned earlier in the paper, this leaves plenty of room for the Air Force leadership to rotate squadrons, replace squadrons, etc. The assumptions made previously in this section attempted to factor in some of this flexibility. Given this "disclaimer," Table 26 depicts the predicted OPSTEMPO for airlift and tanker squadrons.

As Table 26 shows, a predicted average of 62 to 85 days per year deployed/TDY for airlift and tanker squadrons seems like an OPSTEMPO that should be strived towards. To be sure, some of the predictions could easily be higher or lower than actual deployment/TDY rates. However, enough "unpredictables" have been factored into the assumptions that the end-result calculations should be well within a reasonable margin of error.

XI. SUMMARY

The EAF vision, as proposed by the current Air Force leadership, is perfectly designed for the Air Force's present and future world-wide commitments and adeptly organized for the current force structure. Within the EAF vision, the AEF concept of operations has the potential to meet all global military missions and reduce predicted OPSTEMPO to a very reasonable level. The Air Force senior leadership is fully committed to the EAF vision and, it seems, the vast majority of the NCA would support full EAF implementation. Beginning EAF/AEF operations in October 1999 was a great first-step towards fulfilling the vision. Still, progress towards full EAF implementation is at a pace that is predicted to take four to five years.

Four to five years is simply too long to wait for full EAF implementation. There have not been any publicly announced force structure changes for the next four to five years that would make full EAF implementation any easier to accomplish. In the meantime, the "after glow" of ALLIED FORCE and the AEF "advertising campaign" will have long worn off. Predictability

TABLE 26
PROJECTED OPSTEMPO FOR AIRLIFT AND TANKER SQUADRONS

PROJECTED OPSTEMPO FOR AIRLIFT AND TANKER SQUADRONS					
CATEGORY	STATUS	"ON CALL"	DEPLOYED	TDY	OPSTEMPO (PER YEAR)
KC-10	ACTIVE	122	14	41	55
KC-10	AFRC	61	14	21	35
KC-135	ACTIVE	124	42	41	83
KC-135	ANG	74	42	21	63
KC-135	AFRC	67	42	21	63
C-5	ACTIVE	122	46	53	99
C-5	ANG	75	46	27	73
C-5	AFRC	89	46	27	73
C-17	ACTIVE	121	36	53	89
C-17	AFRC	61	36	27	63
C-141	ACTIVE	122	36	53	89
C-141	ANG	122	36	27	63
C-141	AFRC	99	36	27	63
C-130	ACTIVE	109	56	40	96
C-130	ANG	111	56	20	76
C-130	AFRC	86	56	20	76
		OVERALL AVERAGE:			72
		ACTIVE DUTY AVERAGE:			85
		ANG AVERAGE:			69
		AFRC AVERAGE:			62

and stability will not make up for continued unacceptably high OPSTEMPO and the resulting low retention rates will continue their downward trends. The Air Force will be left with a half full glass when it could easily be filled to the top. The Air Force must act now!

It seems that the only things standing in the Air Force's way to full EAF implementation are a concrete plan based on the current force structure and disposition, and convincing the CINCs that the plan and AEF concept of operations can, and will, meet and exceed all their military requirements. The CINCs appear to be reasonably willing to at least entertain the proposition of the EAF vision. That narrows the obstacles to full implementation down to a concrete, workable plan that can be implemented now.

This paper has proposed one version of just such a plan. A plan based on the EAF vision, on the current force structure and disposition, and is capable of being implemented now. To make this, or any AEF proposal work requires a major contribution from the ANG and AFRC. While these reserve forces can, on occasion, match active duty response times and commitment

rates, it would be unwise to build a plan that does not at least take into consideration the additional constraints and restrictions the reserve forces face when dealing with part-time personnel and civilian employers. These constraints and restrictions must be weighed against the pure military requirements of providing “rapid response” forces that will enable the AEFs to remain “on call” as opposed to being forward deployed. Compromises must be made primarily when assigning response times and the level of forces committed.

While the specifics of the compromises that this plan is based upon are detailed within the paper, the generalities can be summarized as follows: All forces, active or reserve, tasked to be “on call” must be willing to provide a certain amount of aircraft, equipment, and personnel for initial deployment and/or under “emergency” conditions. For fighters, that number of aircraft comes to 12 aircraft per squadron, bombers – 6, HH-60Gs – 4, HC-130s – 2, E-3s – 2, and for airlift and tankers - the AMC-mandated active duty “threshold” limit. Once the AEFs are deployed, or during periods when the AEFs are “on call,” or when squadrons are not assigned AEF tasking, the commitment rate for reserve forces is dramatically reduced. For fighter and combat support aircraft, 30 percent of PAA is projected, for airlift and tankers, the reserve forces are projected to have one half the active duty “threshold” rates available.

Along the same lines, response times must be acceptable to all “players,” especially regional CINCs. A 12 or 24 hours response time for all ANG and AFRC squadrons would seem an unrealistic goal for the reserve forces to meet all the time. Likewise, a 72 hour response time stretches the “rapid-response” requirement beyond what is probably acceptable to the regional CINCs. This proposed plan incorporates the following compromise: All Combat AEF-assigned bombers and direct-support tanker forces serving Bomber Alert are on a 24 hour response time; combat, combat support, and airlift squadrons tasked for Combat or Mobility AEFs are on a 36 hour response time; and tanker squadrons tasked for Combat AEFs are on a 48 hour response time. In order to ensure the ability to meet these response times with Total Force packages, all response times are assumed to begin at EO, no matter how much earlier a WO is issued. This provides just that much more time for the reserve forces to make any necessary arrangements with their civilian employers. While there are several other key assumptions and planning factors outlined in the proposal, these are the main “foundation” of the plan.

The combat and combat support part of the plan centers around 12 Combat AEFs and 5 Bomber Alerts. Two “paired” Combat AEFs would be “on call” for 90 days at a time fulfilling

an overall 18 month Combat AEF “cycle.” In support of the “on call” Combat AEFs, one Bomber Alert assignment will be “on call” for 108 days at a time in order to match the overall 18 month AEF “cycle.”

Each Combat AEF averages 23 operational squadrons with 182 aircraft tasked for combat and combat support missions. Each Combat AEF is further divided into four “presentable,” rapid-reaction force packages called AV PKGs # 1 - # 4. Between the AV PKGs and Bomber Alert assignments, the full spectrum of combat power is readily available to the CINCs. The Bomber Alert assignments average 3 squadrons with 18 KC-135R equivalents available to support immediate response of the 1 squadron of 6 B-1, B-2, or B-52 bombers assigned to each Combat AEF.

Using the Bomber Alert tanker squadrons, the Combat AEF-assigned bombers can strike a target 6,700 NM from the CONUS 39 hours after the NCA issues an EO. Three to 5 bomber “strikes” can occur over the next 59 hours. After that, the bombers would either repeat their missions or deploy to a forward location and begin “surge” operations.

While the bomber strikes are going on, one of the four AV PKGs within each Combat AEF would be enroute to the CINC’s theater. Each AV PKG # 1 averages 9 squadrons and 74 aircraft. This package can generate 160 “surge” sorties per day, 95 of which are combat missions. Each AV PKG # 2 averages 11 squadrons and 90 aircraft. AV PKG # 2 can generate 190 “surge” sorties (119 combat missions) each day. Both AV PKG # 1 and # 2 can begin in-place combat operations 6,700 NM from CONUS 88 hours after EO issuance and will have completed deployment of the entire force 112 hours after the EO.

If the contingency is large and the CINC requires more combat power, AV PKG # 3 or # 4 might be deployed. AV PKG # 3 is designed to deploy to an “established” base(s) and consists of 17 squadrons and 132 aircraft. AV PKG # 3 can generate 270 “surge” sorties (178 combat missions) each day. AV PKG # 4 is designed to deploy to a “bare” base(s) and consists of 17 squadrons and 133 aircraft. AV PKG # 4 can generate 271 “surge” sorties (178 combat missions) each day. Both AV PKG # 3 and # 4 can begin in-place combat operations 6,700 NM from CONUS 112 hours after EO issuance, can bring full combat power to bear 198 hours after the EO, and will close-out the deployment 200 hours after the EO. This Combat AEF concept of operations is “doable” now and provides the CINCs with a variety of force packages that should meet all their combat and combat support requirements.

Three separate scenarios for employment of the Combat AEFs and Bomber Alerts were analyzed. The differences between the scenarios centered around the physical location of U.S. and/or allied ground troops and the assessed level of threat. Scenario 1 analyzed U.S./allied troops physically located within the borders of an actually hostile nation. This would have to be a SSC, MTW, or the immediate post-conflict period of either. It was assumed that at least one AV PKG, if not one AV PKG from each “paired” Combat AEF would be forward deployed. Once the immediate post-conflict period was over, the situation would develop into one of the other two scenarios.

Scenario 2 analyzed U.S./allied troops physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation. There were two “spin-offs” of this scenario that resulted from the assessed level of threat. Basically, if the potentially hostile government requested U.S./allied ground troop presence, e.g., nation assistance, humanitarian assistance, etc., the assumption is made that the assessed threat would be low and Combat AEF forces would remain “on call.” On the other hand, if the potentially hostile government did not request U.S./allied ground troop presence, e.g., Kosovo, it is recommended that one AV PKG # 1 be forward deployed. The forces forward deployed would be capable of immediate protection of U.S./allied troops and the response time of the remaining “on call” bombers and AV PKG(s) ensures safety from a larger threat on the horizon.

Scenario 3 analyzed U.S./allied troops physically located within the borders of a friendly nation that is adjacent to, or near a potentially hostile nation. An analysis of various hostile nation military actions against U.S./allied troops located in the neighboring country concluded that Combat AEF forces “on call” are capable of reacting to, and destroying the enemy threat well before U.S./allied ground troops are engaged. The overall conclusion was that Combat AEF forces should not be forward deployed and should remain “on call” if U.S./allied ground troops are not physically located within the borders of a potentially hostile nation. This conclusion directly contradicts the current situation in the Middle East. Without attempting to analyze the “politics” of the situation, several military “alternatives” were suggested to reconcile the Combat AEF capabilities and concept of operations with the reality of the situation. These recommendations ranged from all Combat AEF forces remaining “on call” at their CONUS location to reducing the overall allied air force presence in the Gulf region to an AV PKG # 1-

sized force and rotating forward deployment tasking between the Combat AEFs, the RAF, and the U.S. Navy on 90 day “cycles.”

Finally, analysis of how these scenarios might fit into the current world situation was performed. It was concluded that one Combat AEF AV PKG # 1 should be forward deployed to a centrally located Balkan region base to support Kosovo and Bosnia operations. Additionally, while the ideal situation would be to leave Combat AEF forces “on call” supporting Middle East operations, the conclusion drawn for the near term was that the Middle East rotation between the Combat AEFs, RAF, and Navy was probably the most politically palatable right now. Therefore, over the course of a year, the U.S. Air Force would average one and a half Combat AEF AV PKG # 1s forward deployed at any one time.

The five Mobility AEFs proposed in the plan stand “on call” for non-combat mobility missions 108 days at a time covering the overall 18 month AEF “cycle.” Each Mobility AEF has 7 squadrons (1 x C-5 and 6 x C-130) and 37 aircraft assigned to it and is capable of generating 44 C-141 equivalents of mobility missions per day during “emergency” conditions and 25 C-141 equivalents per day during “normal” mobility operations.

The concept of operations for these Mobility AEFs was based on a 10 day “emergency” being declared. Subsequent mobility support would operate under “normal” conditions. During the “emergency” condition, the C-5 squadron and one and a half C-130 squadrons would proceed direct to a CONUS location for pick-up of “bulk” mobility supplies. This will enable the first of the initial batch of approximately 31 C-141 equivalents of “bulk” supplies to be delivered to a nation 6,700 NM from CONUS 121 hours after EO. While this is occurring, the remaining four and a half squadrons of C-130s will have forward deployed to a C-5 capable base in-country and stand ready to provide “end-game” distribution immediately upon C-5 arrival. It is estimated the first supplies can be delivered to the actual “disaster area” 6,700 NM from CONUS 125 hours after EO. Once the one and a half C-130 squadrons that picked up CONUS “bulk” supplies arrive in-country, they would remain in-place to support “end-game” distribution until the “emergency” situation is declared “normal.”

Once declared “normal,” all but two of the C-130 squadrons re-deploy to their CONUS location and return to “on call” status. The C-5 squadron continues “bulk” delivery and the two in-place C-130 squadrons provide “end-game” distribution. During “normal” periods, approximately 26 C-141 equivalents of “bulk” supplies can be delivered and distributed each

day. Every two weeks after the situation has been declared “normal,” the two in-place C-130 squadrons are relieved by two “on call” squadrons. This rotation continues until the situation is over.

To make this AEF proposal a reality, the Air Force has to be able to continue Normal Daily Taskings while simultaneously conducting AEF operations. Normal Daily Taskings include “tasked” missions from AMC/TRANSCOM (and possibility ANG/AFRC headquarters), “JA/AAT,” and “training.” Those forces not currently tasked for Combat AEF, Mobility AEF, or Bomber Alert duties have been assigned Normal Daily Tasking responsibilities on 90 day “cycles.” These forces alone can generate 129 C-141 equivalents and 108 KC-135R equivalents each day. When combined with those AEF-assigned forces not directly fulfilling AEF-related missions, there are 212 C-141 equivalents and 168 KC-135R equivalents available for Normal Daily Tasking on a day-to-day basis. This compares very favorably to the 198 C-141 equivalents and 115 KC-135R equivalents AMC historically has performed each day. Since inclusion of the Total Force into all aspects of day-to-day operations has not been previously accomplished, several areas of the Normal Daily Tasking assignments must be monitored closely after implementation and adjustments made if necessary. The first, and most critical area is in Total Force “training.” The second area is in what, if any, missions are “tasked” by ANG/AFRC Headquarters. The bottom line is the Combat AEFs, Mobility AEFs, Bomber Alerts, and Normal Daily Taskings are workable within the confines of our current and future force structure.

This proposal adheres to the EAF vision for the AEFs. It also has the potential to dramatically reduce the Total Force OPSTEMPO. Reduction in OPSTEMPO will, hopefully, stem the tide of low retention rates and keep our “national treasures” in the Service, be it active or reserve. Assignment of the Total Force to the various AEFs resulted in an overall 83 days per year “on call” average for all tasked squadrons. Active duty tasked squadrons average 93 days per year “on call,” ANG tasked squadrons average 77 days per year “on call,” and AFRC tasked squadrons average 74 days per year “on call.” To truly see what impact this proposal may have on the Total Force, “on call” must be compared to predicted deployment and TDY rates in order to find a realistic idea of the resulting Total Force OPSTEMPO.

OPSTEMPO on a squadron-level basis can be predicted given certain assumptions but PERSTEMPO, the “real” reason for low retention rates, cannot be predicted. This is an important note, for within this plan we can assume that whatever the squadron-level

OPSTEMPO will be, the majority of individuals within that squadron will have a significantly lower PERSTEMPO. The vast majority of squadrons, active or reserve, assigned AEF and/or Normal Daily Tasking duties, are tasked to provide only a portion of their squadron's PAA, equipment, and personnel. For example, any C-130 squadron tasked for AEF duties must provide the AMC-mandated "threshold" level of their PAA. This "threshold" rate is 55 percent. Therefore, a 10 PAA C-130 squadron must provide only 6 C-130s for "emergency" operations. Once deployed and performing "sustainment" missions, this squadron is only tasked to provide the AMC-mandated "threshold" level for the aircraft actually deployed. In other words, on a daily "sustainment" basis, this C-130 squadron only is tasked for 3 aircraft. This leaves plenty of "maneuver room" for squadron commanders to monitor and control the PERSTEMPO of their airmen. A reasonable OPSTEMPO should mean an acceptable PERSTEMPO.

Based on the proposed concept of operations for Combat AEF employment (an average of one and a half AV PKG # 1s deployed at any given time) and assuming that the Mobility AEFs operate under the proposed guidelines on a year-round basis, a relatively accurate picture of predicted AEF-related deployment rates can be drawn. It is not nearly as much a "science" attempting to predict non-AEF related TDY rates for squadrons in an effort to arrive at overall OPSTEMPO rates. Several assumptions were made including active duty combat and combat support squadrons going TDY for four weeks a year in support of non-AEF tasking, reserve combat and combat support squadrons going TDY for two weeks a year, active duty airlift squadrons going TDY 20 percent of the time they are fulfilling Normal Daily Tasking, etc. When applying all of these assumptions to the Total Force, it is possible to arrive at a reasonably accurate (within an acceptable margin of error) non-AEF TDY prediction for all squadrons. Putting these AEF-related deployment and non-AEF TDY predictions together a realistic prediction for overall OPSTEMPO can be made.

For combat and combat support squadrons, this proposed plan results in an overall predicted OPSTEMPO of 48 days per year. Active duty combat and combat support squadrons would have a predicted OPSTEMPO of 54 days per year, ANG squadrons would have an OPSTEMPO of 44 days per year, and AFRC squadrons would have an OPSTEMPO of 39 days per year. For airlift and tanker squadrons, the proposal results in an overall predicted OPSTEMPO of 72 days per year. Active duty airlift and tanker squadrons would have a

predicted OPSTEMPO of 85 days per year, ANG squadrons would have an OPSTEMPO of 69 days per year, and AFRC squadrons would have an OPSTEMPO of 62 days per year.

This proposed AEF plan will meet regional CINC's requirements for any combat or non-combat U.S. Air Force support. If the AEFs are employed within the framework of the proposed concept of operations, this plan has the added benefit of reducing the Total Force OPSTEMPO to a very acceptable level. Couple this real-world OPSTEMPO reduction with the stability and predictability of the "on call" schedules and retention rates should begin to rise. The EAF vision is right on the mark. All the Air Force has to do is make it happen – now!

ENDNOTES

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¹⁰¹ Calculations were based on the following: I found the average number of ANG/AFRC squadrons in each Combat AEF tasking, e.g., The number of ANG and AFRC squadrons assigned for all Combat AEFs was divided by the number of Combat AEF taskings. It is assumed that 9 of the 12 Combat AEF taskings will be deployed all the time (discussed later in the paper). Nine was then multiplied by the average number of ANG/AFRC squadrons in each Combat AEF to find how many ANG/AFRC squadrons would be deployed in one 18 month AEF “cycle.” Since we are concerned with deployments per year, the resulting number of squadron(s) deployed per 18 month cycle was divided by 1.5 to give us the number of ANG/AFRC squadron(s) deployed per year. Based on the assumption that the originally tasked unit would supply 100 percent of the personnel for 30 days and 50 percent of the personnel for the remaining 60 days (broken into 2-30 day “periods”), we needed 0.5 squadrons as replacements per 30 day period. Given there are 2-30 day periods remaining, each squadron would require 1 “phantom” squadron. Therefore, the number of ANG/AFRC squadron(s) deployed per year was how many “phantom” squadrons we would need if the entire PAA of the tasked squadron was deployed. Next I went to Appendices 1-11 and found the average percentage of PAA deployed. I multiplied this percentage by the number of ANG/AFRC squadron(s) deployed per year, rounded the number and arrived at the number of squadrons stated in the paper. The only variation on this was with airlift and tankers. Inter-theater airlift squadrons are not tasked to physically deploy for AEF duties, therefore, they did not get “phantom” squadrons. While KC-10s are not tasked to deploy in this paper, one other “alternative” has them substituting for KC-135 squadrons during subsequent AEF cycles. Therefore, KC-10 requirements were calculated as above. KC-135 squadrons on Bomber Alert are not tasked to deploy, therefore, only their Combat AEF requirements were calculated. Finally, C-130 squadrons are also tasked for deployment during Mobility AEFs. The resulting “phantom” squadron requirement had to be added to the Combat AEF requirement (which is why it is so high). C-130 Mobility AEF requirements were calculated as follows: I found the average number of ANG/AFRC C-130 units per Mobility AEF (just like the first step of the Combat AEF calculations). All C-130 squadrons deploy for 10 days. The remaining 98 days of their “cycle” is divided into 2 week periods (discussed in detail later in the paper), giving 7-2 week periods. Two squadrons are deployed during each of these 2 week periods; therefore, each squadron would be tasked for 2.3 periods. However, since the tasked squadrons responded to the initial 10 day period, the entire squadron (100 percent) would only deploy for 1 of those 2.3 cycles. For the remaining 1.3 cycles, the original squadron would provide 50 percent of the manning similar to the Combat AEFs and the “phantom” squadrons would provide the remaining 50 percent manning. Next, I multiplied the average number of ANG/AFRC squadrons per Mobility AEFs by 1.3 to find the total number of “cycles” that must be filled by “phantom” squadrons per Mobility AEF. These “cycles” are 14 days each. One of the assumptions was that the average deployment would be 30 days. Therefore, I divided the total number of cycles by 2 to get the number of “phantom” squadrons required per Mobility AEF. Since there are 5 Mobility AEFs, I multiplied this number by 5 to get the total number of “phantom” squadrons to fulfill Mobility AEF requirements. Finally, IAW Appendix 11, the average C-130 squadron deploys 54 percent of their PAA. Therefore, I multiplied the total number of “phantom” squadrons by .54 to arrive at the actual number of “phantom” squadrons required for Mobility AEFs. This number was added to the resulting Combat AEF requirement to give the total C-130 “phantom” squadron requirement.

¹⁰² Telecon with Mr Bill Bush, HQ AMC/XOBA (“BARREL TASKERS”), Sep 99.

¹⁰³ TACC/XONB, “AMC Operations Summary,” http://tacc.scott.af.mil/Information/Ext_Reports/opssum, Sep – Dec 99.

¹⁰⁴ Telecon with Maj Dyer, ANG Scheduler, Sep 99.

¹⁰⁵ Based on comments Brigadier General William R. Looney, III, wrote for an article titled “The Air Expeditionary Force: Taking the Air Force into the Twenty-first Century,” published in *Airpower Journal*, Winter 1996. He stated, “...one could envision the following scenario...Wing commanders of designated CONUS AEF units receive a call from higher headquarters warning of a possible AEF execute order...When the execute order does come (usually within eight to 72 hours), three or four geographically separated wings simultaneously begin generating aircraft...” Using General Looney’s 8-72 hour “window,” I have split the difference and estimated 40-hours between warning order and execute order.

¹⁰⁶ TACC/XONB, “AMC Operations Summary,” http://tacc.scott.af.mil/Information/Ext_Reports/opssum, Sep – Dec 99.

¹⁰⁷ HQ AFDC/DR (AFDD 1), p. 8.

¹⁰⁸ U.S. Army Field Manual 71-3, The Armored and Mechanized Infantry Brigade, HQ Department of the Army, 8 Jan 96. U.S. Army FMs can be researched on-line at <http://www.adtdl.army.mil/cgi-bin/atdl.dll/fm>.

¹⁰⁹ These figures are based on the following calculations: Airlift and tanker historical missions were broken into their 3 categories, tasking, training, and JA/AAT and converted to C-141 or KC-135R equivalents. Training and JA/AAT missions were considered “non-AEF” related and, therefore, assumed to be a constant AMC requirement. However, some portion of tasking missions would encompass the proposed dedicated AEFs, whether at home-base or deployed. Based on this assumption, tasking missions were broken out. For airlift, tasking represented 56.5 percent of the total missions, or 134.1 C-141 equivalents. For tankers, tasking missions represented 50.4 percent of the total missions, or 62.3 KC-135R equivalents. The specific amount of tasking missions that were strictly Air Force related was not contained in the unclassified data researched. Therefore, in order to provide “worst case” numbers, it was assumed that 80% of all airlift “tasked” missions and 90% of all tanker “tasked” missions were Air Force related. Based on this, 107.3 of the 134.1 airlift tasking missions and 56.0 of the 62.3 tanker missions were Air Force. Based on the “USAF Almanac: The Air Force In Facts And Figures” article in the May 99 issue of Air Force Magazine (ed. By Tamar A. Mehuron) and telecons directly to each individual Wing, there are 3,839 total PAA (including training units) of the fighters, bombers, support aircraft, airlift, and tankers associated with the proposed AEFs. Making another “worst case” assumption, these 3,839 total PAA require 80% of the total Air Force airlift requirements, or 85.8 C-141 equivalents, and 90% of the total Air Force tanker requirements, or 50.4 KC-135R equivalents. Table 15 and Table 16 show that each AEF averages 293 PAA and each Bomber Alert averages 34 PAA. Therefore, 620 (both aligned Combat AEFs and Bomber Alert) of the 3,839 PAA, or 16.2%, are tasked for the dedicated AEFs. Assuming all unit’s require an equal amount of airlift and tankers on a daily basis, 16.2% of the Air Force airlift and tanker requirements supporting the 3,839 PAA (85.5 C-141s and 50.4 KC-135Rs), or 13.9 C-141 equivalents and 8.2 KC-135R equivalents, are required to support the Combat AEFs on a daily basis.

¹¹⁰ The assumption is each unit will participate in a RED FLAG/COPE THUNDER and one “other” exercise per year.

¹¹¹ The assumption is each reserve unit participates in their annual two-week field training.

¹¹² The 25 percent figure was arrived at in the following manner: 100 percent of one AV PKG # 1 will be deployed supporting Balkan operations and 50 percent of the other “paired” AV PKG # 1 will be deployed supporting Middle East operations (two 90-day AEF “cycles” per year rotated with the RAF and Navy tasking). Combining these percentages, we get an overall 75 percent deployment rate. Additionally, only 1 of 3 assigned AEF INT squadrons are physically tasked to deploy for each AV PKG # 1; therefore, 33 percent of each AEFs assigned INT squadrons

deploy. 33 percent deployment of 75 percent of the “on call” period is an overall 25 percent of the average squadron’s “on call” period.

¹¹³ The average “on call” period per year for all tasked airlift units is 101 days. Therefore, each airlift squadron is available for Normal Daily Tasking the remaining 264 days (37.7 weeks) each year. IAW the proposed concept of operations, these Normal Daily Tasking squadrons are the ones that will be assigned the non-AEF related overseas long-haul airlift missions. Therefore, it is assumed that each active duty squadron will be TDY 20 percent of their Normal Daily Tasking period supporting these type missions. This comes to 7.5 weeks or 53 days per year supporting overseas long-haul missions. These figures are based on the active duty “availability” rate, e.g., AMC “threshold” levels. This proposed plan is based on the ANG and AFRC providing approximately one-half the active duty levels during Normal Daily Tasking. Therefore, the ANG/AFRC squadrons are predicted to perform 27 days (3.9 weeks) of TDY supporting Normal Daily Tasking.

¹¹⁴ The same logic used for calculating Inter-theater airlift support of Normal Daily Tasking applies to Intra-theater airlift with the exception of the estimated TDY percentage. It is assumed that the “vehicle of choice” when doing the long-haul missions would be Inter-theater airlift. Therefore, Intra-theater airlift tasking for these long-haul missions should be somewhat less than the 20 percent used for Inter-theater airlift calculations. For purposes of our calculations, we have assumed the active duty C-130 squadron’s rate will be 15 percent and the ANG/AFRC rate will be 7.5 percent. The totals for Intra-theater airlift are: active duty – 40 days (5.7 weeks) and ANG/AFRC – 20 days (2.9 weeks).

¹¹⁵ The average “on call” period per year for all tasked tanker units is 91 days. Therefore, each tanker squadron is available for Normal Daily Tasking the remaining 274 days (39.1 weeks) each year. IAW the proposed concept of operations, these Normal Daily Tasking squadrons are the ones that will be assigned the non-AEF related overseas long-haul aerial refueling missions. Therefore, it is assumed that each active duty squadron will be TDY 15 percent of their Normal Daily Tasking period supporting these type missions. This comes to 5.9 weeks or 41 days per year supporting overseas long-haul missions. These figures are based on the active duty “availability” rate, e.g., AMC “threshold” levels. This proposed plan is based on the ANG and AFRC providing approximately one-half the active duty levels during Normal Daily Tasking. Therefore, the ANG/AFRC squadrons are predicted to perform 21 days (3 weeks) of TDY supporting Normal Daily Tasking.

¹¹⁶ C-5, C-17, and C-141 squadrons are not tasked to physically deploy with the AEFs. However, there will certainly be some amount of “deployment” associated with the AEF’s deployment, redeployment, and sustainment. We will assume one week (7 days) for deployment and one week (7 days) for redeployment. Sustainment is calculated in the same manner Normal Daily Tasking was: 90 days (12.9 weeks) per Combat AEF. At a nominal 20 percent “deployment” rate, each squadron would “deploy” for 18 days (2.6 weeks). Adding the deployment and redeployment times and the total is 32 days (4.6 weeks). The average “on call” period for all tasked C-5, C-17, and C-141 squadrons is 100 days per year. This is 111.1 percent of one 90-day AEF cycle. Therefore, we must take 111.1 percent of the 32 days (4.6 weeks) to find the overall average. This comes to 36 days (5.1 weeks).

¹¹⁷ KC-10 squadrons are not tasked to physically deploy with the Combat AEFs. They are currently only tasked for deployment and redeployment of the AV PKGs. Therefore, assuming deployment and redeployment take approximately one week each, the KC-10 squadrons will “deploy” a total of two weeks (14 days).

¹¹⁸ Calculations for “deployment” of C-5 squadrons supporting Mobility AEFs are made as follows: Each Mobility AEF is 108 days (15.4 weeks) per year. Squadrons can be predicted to be “deployed” 20 percent of the 108 days (15.4 weeks). This comes to 22 days (3.1 weeks). However, only 5 of the 11 C-5 units (45.5 percent) are tasked for Mobility AEF support. In order to apply this “across the board” to all units, we must multiple the 22 days (3.1 weeks) by .455. The result is 10 days (1.4 weeks).

¹¹⁹ Each KC-135 squadron assigned Bomber Alert tasking is predicted to “deploy” for 14 days (2 weeks) since they only support deployment, redeployment, and CONUS-based missions by the AEF-assigned bombers. Each KC-135 squadron assigned Combat AEF tasking is predicted to “deploy” for 34 days (4.9 weeks): Each Combat AEF “cycle” is 90 days. Under the proposed concept of operations, each year one AV PKG # 1 will deploy 100 percent of the time in support of the Balkans and one AV PKG # 1 will deploy 50 percent of the time in support of the Middle

East. This comes to an overall 75 percent deployment. Within each AV PKG # 1, only 2 of the 4 AEF-assigned KC-135 squadrons (50 percent) are tasked to deploy. Putting these percentages together we can assume that each KC-135 squadron will average 37.5 percent (34 days) of the 90 day Combat AEF deployment. Eight of the 47 KC-135 squadrons (17 percent) are tasked for Bomber Alert only (14 days), 12 squadrons (25.5 percent) are tasked for two Combat AEFs (34 days + 34 days = 68 days), 19 squadrons (40.4 percent) are tasked for only Combat AEF (34 days), and 8 squadrons (17 percent) are tasked for one Combat AEF and one Bomber Alert (34 days + 14 days = 48 days). In order to come up with an overall average we can apply to the entire KC-135 community, we must arrive at a common denominator for each of these “categories” of tasking. To do this, each “category’s” percentage was divided by five. This provided a “common denominator.” The “common denominator” was then multiplied by the days deployed. To arrive at the average, the “common denominators” for each “category” were summed and divided into the sum of the days deployed. The result was a “fleet-wide” average of 42 days (6 weeks) deployed supporting AEF operations.

Bomber Alert only: $17 (\text{percent})/5 = 3.4 \dots 3.4 \times 14 (\text{days}) = 47.6 \text{ days}$
 Two Combat AEFs: $25.5 (\text{percent})/5 = 5.1 \dots 5.1 \times 68 (\text{days}) = 346.8 \text{ days}$
 One Combat AEF: $40.4 (\text{percent})/5 = 8.1 \dots 8.1 \times 34 (\text{day}) = 275.4 \text{ days}$
 Combat AEF & Bomber Alert: $17 (\text{percent})/5 = 3.4 \dots 3.4 \times 48 = 163.2 \text{ days}$
 Sum of “common denominators” = 20.0
 Sum of “days” = 833.0
 “Days”/“common denominators” = 42 days (6 weeks)

¹²⁰ Each C-130 squadron assigned Mobility AEF tasking is predicted to “deploy” for 42 days (6 weeks): Mobility AEF’s are 108 days in length, IAW the proposed concept of operations and assuming a “disaster” begins at the start of each “cycle” and continues throughout the entire AEF period, each squadron would deploy for “emergency” purposes for 10 days. Once the situation is declared “normal,” actual deployment during the remaining 98 days of the “cycle” would be covered by two of the six assigned Mobility AEF squadrons. These two squadrons would “rotate” with the non-deployed squadrons every two weeks. There are 7 two-week periods in this 98 days. Therefore, each squadron would deploy for 2.3 of these two-week rotations. This comes to 32 days (4.6 weeks) during “normal” operations. Add this to the 10 days deployed during “emergency” operations and the total deployed for Mobility AEFs is predicted to be 42 days (6 weeks). Combat AEF tasking is 90 days. Under the proposed concept of operations, 75 percent of the “paired” AEF AV PKG # 1s would be deployed. Each AV PKG # 1 deploys only 2 of the 3 assigned AEF C-130 squadrons (66 percent). Therefore, the overall average would be 50 percent of the 90 day period, or 45 days (6.4 weeks). Eighteen of the 42 C-130 squadrons (42.9 percent) are assigned Mobility AEFs only, 12 squadrons (28.6 percent) are assigned Combat AEFs only, and 12 squadrons (28.5 percent) are assigned Mobility and Combat AEFs. Using a slightly different logic than used for KC-135 squadrons, we can see that a common denominator for the number of squadrons in each “category” is 6. Therefore, if we divide the number of squadrons in each “category” by 6 and multiple the resulting number by days deployed in each “category,” we will have our base number. If we add the “resulting numbers” and divide that into the sum of the “base numbers,” we arrive at our overall average deployment rate:

Mobility AEF: $18 (\text{squadrons})/6 = 3 \dots 3 \times 42 (\text{days}) = 126 \text{ days}$
 Combat AEF: $12 (\text{squadrons})/6 = 2 \dots 2 \times 45 (\text{days}) = 90 \text{ days}$
 Mobility AEF & Combat AEF: $12 (\text{squadrons})/6 = 2 \dots 2 \times (42+45) = 174$
 Sum of “resulting numbers”: $(3 + 2 + 2) = 7$
 Sum of “base numbers”: $(126 + 90 + 174) = 390$
 “Base number”/“resulting number”: $390/7 = 56 \text{ days (8 weeks)}$

APPENDICES

APPENDIX 1 AIR SUPERIORITY (F-15A-C) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

AIR SUPERIORITY AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND "ON-CALL" AVERAGE										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT(S)	AIRCRAFT REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
F-15A-D	27 FS	1 FW	9 AF	ACC	LANGLEY AFB VA	24		AEF 10	12	61
F-15A-D	94 FS	1 FW	9 AF	ACC	LANGLEY AFB VA	24		AEF 12	12	60
F-15A-D	71 FS	1 FW	9 AF	ACC	LANGLEY AFB VA	18		AEF 1	12	63
F-15A-D	19 FS	3 WG	11 AF	PACAF	ELMENDORF AFB AK	18	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 2	12	63
F-15A-D	54 FS	3 WG	11 AF	PACAF	ELMENDORF AFB AK	24	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 3	12	60
F-15A-D	12 FS	18 WG	5 AF	PACAF	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	COMPOSITE WING	RESERVE	12	0
F-15A-D	67 FS	18 WG	5 AF	PACAF	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	COMPOSITE WING	RESERVE	12	0
F-15A-D	44 FS	18 WG	5 AF	PACAF	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	COMPOSITE WING	RESERVE	12	0
F-15A-D	58 FS	33 FW	9 AF	ACC	EGLIN AFB FL	24		AEF 5	12	61
F-15A-D	60 FS	33 FW	9 AF	ACC	EGLIN AFB FL	24		AEF 6	12	61
F-15A-D	493 FS	48 FW	3 AF	USAFE	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 4	12	60
F-15A-D	101 FS	102 FW	ANG	ACC	OTIS ANGB MA	15	F-15 A/B	AEF 9	12	61
F-15A-D	159 FS	125 FW	ANG	ACC	JACKSONVILLE IAP FL	15	F-15 A/B	RESERVE	12	0
F-15A-D	110 FS	131 FW	ANG	ACC	LAMBERT-ST LOUIS MO	15	F-15 A/B	AEF 8	12	60
F-15A-D	123 FS	142 FW	ANG	ACC	PORTLAND IAP OR	15	F-15 A/B	RESERVE	12	0
F-15A-D	199 FS	154 WG	ANG	PACAF	HICKAM AFB HI	15	F-15 A/B; COMPOSITE WG	RESERVE	12	0
F-15A-D	122 FS	159 FW	ANG	ACC	JRB NEW ORLEANS LA	15	F-15 A/B; COMPOSITE WG	AEF 7	12	60
F-15A-D	390 FS	366 WG	12 AF	ACC	MT HOME AFB ID	18	"RAPID RESPONSE" AEF	AEF 11	12	60
TOTAL	18	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	342			216	
								PERCENTAGE:	63%	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
TASKED ANG UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						60				
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						N/A				
ALL TASKED AIR SUPERIORITY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						61				
OVERALL AIR SUPERIORITY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						41				

APPENDIX 2

LONG RANGE STRIKE (B-1B, B-2A, B-52) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

LONG RANGE STRIKE AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND "ON-CALL" AVERAGE										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT(S)	AIRCRAFT REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
B-1B	9 BS	7 BW	8 AF	ACC	DYESS AFB TX	15		AEF 2	6	63
B-1B	37 BS	28 BW	8 AF	ACC	ELLSWORTH AFB SD	15	16 ASSIGNED	AEF 8	6	60
B-1B	77 BS	28 BW	8 AF	ACC	ELLSWORTH AFB SD	6	7 ASSIGNED; ADDING 6 X TRAINING AIRCRAFT	AEF 3	4	60
B-1B	128 BS	116 BW	ANG	ACC	ROBINS AFB GA	8		AEF 10	6	61
B-1B	127 BS	184 BW	ANG	ACC	MCCONNEL AFB KS	8		AEF 5	6	61
B-1B	34 BS	366 WG	12 AF	ACC	MT HOME AFB ID	11	"RAPID RESPONSE" AEF	AEF 11	6	60
TOT:	6					63			34	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY B-1 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61		PERCENTAGE:	54%	
TASKED ANG B-1 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
TASKED AFRC B-1 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
ALL TASKED B-1 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
OVERALL B-1 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
B-2A	393 BS	509 BW	8 AF	ACC	WHITEMAN AFB MO	8		AEF 1	6	63
B-2A	325 BS	509 BW	8 AF	ACC	WHITEMAN AFB MO	6	509 BW WILL GET A TOTAL OF 20 OR 21 B-2A'S	AEF 6	4	61
TOT:	2					14			10	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY B-2 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						62		PERCENTAGE:	71%	
TASKED ANG B-2 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
TASKED AFRC B-2 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
ALL TASKED B-2 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						62				
OVERALL B-2 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						62				
B-52H	20 BS	2 BW	8 AF	ACC	BARKSDALE AFB LA	15	16 ASSIGNED	AEF 7	6	60
B-52H	96 BS	2 BW	8 AF	ACC	BARKSDALE AFB LA	15	17 ASSIGNED	AEF 4	6	60
B-52H	93 BS	917 WG	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	BARKSDALE AFB LA	8	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 12	6	60
B-52H	23 BS	5 BW	8 AF	ACC	MINOT AFB ND	12	36 ASSIGNED	AEF 9	6	61
TOT:	4					50			24	
TOTAL	12					127		PERCENTAGE:	48%	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY B-52 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						60				
TASKED ANG B-52 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
TASKED AFRC B-52 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						60				
ALL TASKED B-52 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						60				
OVERALL B-52 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						60				
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
TASKED ANG UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						60				
ALL TASKED LONG RANGE STRIKE UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						61				
OVERALL LONG RANGE STRIKE UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						61				

APPENDIX 3

STEALTH/DEEP INTERDICTION (F-117/F-15E) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

STEALTH/DEEP INTERDICTION AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND AVERAGE "ON CALL"										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT(S)	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
F-15E	90 FS	3 WG	11 AF	PACAF	ELMENDORF AFB AK	18	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 3	12	60
F-15E	335 FS	4 FW	9 AF	ACC	S-J AFB NC	24	"RAPID RESPONSE" AEF	AEF 6, 12	12	121
F-15E	336 FS	4 FW	9 AF	ACC	S-J AFB NC	24	"RAPID RESPONSE" AEF	AEF 2, 8	12	123
F-15E	492 FS	48 FW	3 AF	USAFE	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24		AEF 4, 10	12	121
F-15E	494 FS	48 FW	3 AF	USAFE	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24		AEF 9	12	61
F-15E	391 FS	366 WG	12 AF	ACC	MT HOME AFB ID	18	"RAPID RESPONSE" AEF	AEF 11	12	60
TOT:	6					132			72	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY F-15E UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91		PERCENTAGE:	55%	
TASKED ANG F-15E UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
TASKED AFRC F-15E UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
ALL TASKED F-15E UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
OVERALL F-15E UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
F-117	8 FS	49 FW	12 AF	ACC	HOLLOMAN AFB NM	18		AEF 5	12	61
F-117	9 FS	49 FW	12 AF	ACC	HOLLOMAN AFB NM	24		AEF 1, 7	12	123
TOT:	2	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	42			24	
TOTAL	8					174		PERCENTAGE:	57%	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY F-117 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						92				
TASKED ANG F-117 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
ALL TASKED F-117 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						92				
OVERALL F-117 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						92				
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						91				
TASKED ANG UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						N/A				
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						N/A				
ALL TASKED STEALTH/DEEP INT. UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						91				
OVERALL STEALTH/DEEP INT. UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON-CALL":						91				

APPENDIX 4

SEAD (F-16C BLK 50) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

SEAD AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND AVERAGE "ON CALL"										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
F-16	55 FS	20 FW	9 AF	ACC	SHAW AFB SC	18	F-16 C/D BLK 50	AEF 5	12	61
F-16	77 FS	20 FW	9 AF	ACC	SHAW AFB SC	18	F-16 C/D BLK 50	AEF 7	12	60
F-16	79 FS	20 FW	9 AF	ACC	SHAW AFB SC	18	F-16 C/D BLK 50	AEF 2	12	63
F-16	78 FS	20 FW	9 AF	ACC	SHAW AFB SC	24	F-16 C/D BLK 50	AEF 6, 12	12	121
F-16	428 FS	27 FW	8 AF	ACC	CANNON AFB NM	8	F-16 C/D BLK 50; GOING TO 12 PAA W/IN TWO YEARS	AEF 9	6	61
F-16	13 FS	35 FW	5 AF	PACAF	MISAWA AB JAPAN	18	F-16 C/D BLK 50	AEF 3	12	60
F-16	14 FS	35 FW	5 AF	PACAF	MISAWA AB JAPAN	18	F-16 C/D BLK 50	AEF 1	12	63
F-16	22 FS	52 FW	3 AF	USAFE	SPANGDAHLEH AB GE	18	F-16 C/D BLK 50	AEF 4	12	60
F-16	23 FS	52 FW	3 AF	USAFE	SPANGDAHLEH AB GE	24	F-16 C/D BLK 50	AEF 10	12	61
F-16	157 FS	169 FW	ANG	ACC	MCENTIRE ANGB SC	15	F-16 C/D BLK 52	AEF 8	12	60
F-16	389 FS	366 WG	12 AF	ACC	MT HOME AFB ID	22	F-16 C/D BLK 50; "RAPID RESPONSE" AEF	AEF 11	12	60
TOTAL	11	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	201			126	
								PERCENTAGE:	63%	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						67				
TASKED ANG UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						60				
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
ALL TASKED SEAD UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						66				
OVERALL SEAD UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						66				

APPENDIX 5

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A/OA-10) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

CLOSE AIR SUPPORT/COMBAT SEARCH AND RESUCE AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND "ON-CALL" AVERAGE										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT(S)	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
A-10	74 FS	23 FG	9 AF	ACC	POPE AFB NC	18		AEF 6	12	61
A-10	75 FS	23 FG	9 AF	ACC	POPE AFB NC	24		AEF 1	12	63
A-10	81 FS	52 FW	3 AF	USAFE	SPANGDAHLEH AB GE	18		AEF 4	12	60
A-10	118 FS	103 FW	ANG	ACC	BRADLEY IAP CN	15		RESERVE	12	0
A-10	131 FS	104 FW	ANG	ACC	BARNES MAP MA	15		AEF 10	12	61
A-10	172 FS	110 FW	ANG	ACC	KELLOGG ARPT MI	15		AEF 8	12	60
A-10	103 FS	111 FW	ANG	ACC	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	15		AEF 9	12	61
A-10	190 FS	124 WG	ANG	ACC	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	15	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 11	12	60
A-10	104 FS	175 WG	ANG	ACC	MARTIN STATE ARPT MD	15	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 12	12	60
A-10	355 FS	354 FW	11 AF	PACAF	EIELSON AFB AK	18	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 3	12	60
A-10	354 FS	355 WG	12 AF	ACC	D-M AFB AZ	24	COMPOSITE WING	AEF 5	12	61
A-10	303 FS	442 FW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	WHITEMAN AFB MO	15		AEF 2	12	63
A-10	706 FS	926 FW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	JRB NEW ORLEANS LA	15		AEF 7	12	60
TOTAL	13	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	222			156	
								PERCENTAGE:	70%	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
TASKED ANG UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAY'S "ON CALL":						61				
ALL TASKED CLOSE AIR SUPPORT UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						61				
OVERALL CLOSE AIR SUPPORT UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						56				

APPENDIX 6 RESCUE (HH-60G/HC-130) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

HC-130/HH-60G RESCUE AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND AVERAGE "ON-CALL"										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
-	33 RQS	18 WG	5 AF	PACAF	KADENA AB JAPAN	8	HH-60 G	RESERVE	4xHH-60G	0
-	66 RQS	57 WG	AWC	ACC	NELLIS AFB NV	8	HH-60 G	AEF 12	4xHH-60G	60
-	56 RQS	85 GP	8 AF	ACC	KEFLAVIK NAS IC	4//1	HH-60 G//HC-130	AEF 4, 9	3xHH-60G/ 1xHC-130	121
-	102 RQS	106 RW	ANG	ACC	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4//4	HH-60 G//HC-130	AEF 10	3xHH-60G/ 2xHC-130	61
-	129 RQS	129 RW	ANG	ACC	MOFFETT FIELD CA	4//3	HH-60 G//HC-130; CONVERTING TO MC-130'S	AEF 2, 8	3xHH-60G/ 2xHC-130	123
-	210 RQS	176 WG	ANG	PACAF	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	5//3	HH-60 G//HC-130	AEF 3	4xHH-60G/ 2xHC-130	60
-	71 RQS	347 WG	9 AF	ACC	MOODY AFB GA	9	HC-130	AEF 1, 7	2xHC-130	123
-	41 RQS	347 WG	9 AF	ACC	MOODY AFB GA	14	HH-60 G	AEF 1, 7	4xHH-60G	123
-	303 RQS	939 RW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	PORTLAND IAP OR	3//1	HC-130 P//C-130 E	AEF 5, 11	2xHC-130	121
-	304 RQS	939 RW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	PORTLAND IAP OR	7	HH-60 G	AEF 11	4xHH-60G	60
-	39 RQS	939 RW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	PATRICK AFB FL	3	HC-130 N	AEF 6, 12	2xHC-130	121
-	301 RQS	939 RW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	PATRICK AFB FL	9	HH-60 G	AEF 6	4xHH-60G	61
-	305 RQS	939 RW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	D-M AFB AZ	6	HH-60 G	AEF 5	4xHH-60G	61
TOTAL	13					69//27	HH-60 G//HC/C-130		37//13	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						107		PERCENTAGE:	54%//48%	
TASKED ANG UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						81				
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						85				
ALL TASKED RESCUE UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
OVERALL RESCUE UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						84				

APPENDIX 7 COMMAND AND CONTROL (E-3) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

COMMAND AND CONTROL AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND AVERAGE "ON-CALL"										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
E-3	962 AACS	3 WG	11 AF	PACAF	ELMENDORF AFB AK	2		AEF 3, 9	2	121
E-3	961 AACS	18 WG	5 AF	PACAF	KADENA AB JAPAN	2		AEF 5	2	61
E-3	963 AACS	552 ACW	12 AF	ACC	TINKER AFB OK	6	28 TOTAL A/C; 513 ACG IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 1, 7	2	123
E-3	964 AACS	552 ACW	12 AF	ACC	TINKER AFB OK	6	28 TOTAL A/C; 513 ACG IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 2, 8	2	123
E-3	965 AACS	552 ACW	12 AF	ACC	TINKER AFB OK	6	28 TOTAL A/C; 513 ACG IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 4, 10	2	121
E-3	966 AACS	552 ACW	12 AF	ACC	TINKER AFB OK	6	28 TOTAL A/C; 513 ACG IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 6, 12	2	121
E-3	970 AACS	513 ACG	AFRC	ACC	TINKER AFB OK	0	552 ACW ASSOCIATE	AEF 11	2	60
TOTAL	7					28			14	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						112		MINUS ASSOC.	12	
TASKED ANG UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A		PERCENTAGE:	43%	
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						60				
ALL TASKED COMMAND & CONTROL UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						104				
OVERALL COMMAND & CONTROL UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						104				

APPENDIX 8 **INTERDICTION (F-16A-C BLK 15-40) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"**

INTERDICTION AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND AVERAGE "ON-CALL"										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
F-16A-D	522 FS	27 FW	8 AF	ACC	CANNON AFB NM	18	F-16C/D BLK 30	AEF 9	12	61
F-16A-D	523 FS	27 FW	8 AF	ACC	CANNON AFB NM	24	F-16C/D BLK 30; GOING TO 18 PAA W/IN NEXT TWO YEARS	AEF 9	12	61
F-16A-D	524 FS	27 FW	8 AF	ACC	CANNON AFB NM	24	F-16 C/D BLK 40	AEF 9	12	61
F-16A-D	510 FS	31 FW	16 AF	USAFE	AVIANO AB IT	18	F-16 C/D BLK 40	AEF 4	12	60
F-16A-D	555 FS	31 FW	16 AF	USAFE	AVIANO AB IT	18	F-16 C/D BLK 40	AEF 4	12	60
F-16A-D	121 FS	113 WG	ANG	ACC	ANDREWS AFB DC	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 12	12	60
F-16A-D	175 FS	114 FW	ANG	ACC	JOE FOSS FIELD SD	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 8	12	60
F-16A-D	176 FS	115 FW	ANG	ACC	TRUAX FIELD WI	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 11	12	60
F-16A-D	178 FS	119 FW	ANG	ACC	HECTOR IAP ND	15	F-16 A/B-ADF (GP)	AEF 8	12	60
F-16A-D	189 FS	120 FW	ANG	ACC	GREAT FALLS IAP MT	15	F-16 A/B BLK 15	AEF 3	12	60
F-16A-D	163 FS	122 FW	ANG	ACC	FT WAYNE IAP IN	15	F-16 C/D BLK 25	AEF 10	12	61
F-16A-D	107 FS	127 FW	ANG	ACC	SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 3	12	60
F-16A-D	124 FS	132 FW	ANG	ACC	DES MOINES IAP IA	15	F-16 C/D BLK 40/42	AEF 11	12	60
F-16A-D	125 FS	138 FW	ANG	ACC	TULSA IAP OK	15	F-16 C/D BLK 42	AEF 7	12	60
F-16A-D	120 FS	140 WG	ANG	ACC	BUCKLEY ANGB CO	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 5	12	61
F-16A-D	111 FS	147 FW	ANG	ACC	ELLINGTON FIELD TX	15	F-16 C/D BLK 25	AEF 2	12	63
F-16A-D	188 FS	150 FW	ANG	ACC	KIRTLAND AFB NM	15	F-16 C/D BLK 40	AEF 2	12	63
F-16A-D	134 FS	158 FW	ANG	ACC	BURLINGTON IAP VT	15	F-16 C/D BLK 25	AEF 4	12	60
F-16A-D	138 FS	174 FW	ANG	ACC	SYRACUSE-HAN. NY	15	F-16 C/D BLK 25	AEF 6	12	61
F-16A-D	119 FS	177 FW	ANG	ACC	ATLANTIC CITY IAP NJ	15	F-16 C/D BLK 25	AEF 12	12	60
F-16A-D	112 FS	180 FW	ANG	ACC	TOLEDO EXP. ARPT OH	15	F-16 C/D BLK 42	AEF 6	12	61
F-16A-D	113 FS	181 FW	ANG	ACC	HULMAN RAP IN	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 10	12	61
F-16A-D	170 FS	183 FW	ANG	ACC	CAPTIAL MAP IL	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 12	12	60
F-16A-D	174 FS	185 FW	ANG	ACC	SIOUX GATEWAY IA	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 8	12	60
F-16A-D	160 FS	187 FW	ANG	ACC	DANNELLY FLD. AL	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 7	12	60
F-16A-D	184 FS	188 FW	ANG	ACC	FT SMITH MAP AR	15	F-16 A/B BLK 15	AEF 7	12	60
F-16A-D	149 FS	192 FW	ANG	ACC	RICHMOND IAP VA	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 10	12	61
F-16A-D	457 FS	301 FW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	CARSWELL FIELD TX	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 2	12	63
F-16A-D	68 FS	347 WG	9 AF	ACC	MOODY AFB GA	18	F-16 C/D BLK 40; DISBANDING FY01-FY02	RESERVE	12	0
F-16A-D	69 FS	347 WG	9 AF	ACC	MOODY AFB GA	18	F-16 C/D BLK 40; DISBANDING FY01-FY02	RESERVE	12	0
F-16A-D	18 FS	354 FW	11 AF	PACAF	EIELSON AFB AK	18	F-16 C/D BLK 40	AEF 3	12	60
F-16A-D	34 FS	388 FW	12 AF	ACC	HILL AFB UT	18	F-16 C/D BLK 40	AEF 1	12	63
F-16A-D	4 FS	388 FW	12 AF	ACC	HILL AFB UT	18	F-16 C/D BLK 40	AEF 1	12	63
F-16A-D	421 FS	388 FW	12 AF	ACC	HILL AFB UT	18	F-16 C/D BLK 40	AEF 1	12	63
F-16A-D	466 FS	419 FW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	HILL AFB UT	15	F-16 C/D BLK 30	AEF 11	12	60
F-16A-D	93 FS	482 FW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	HOMESTEAD ARB FL	15	F-16 C/D BLK 32	AEF 6	12	61
F-16A-D	302 FS	944 FW	10 AF (AFRC)	ACC	LUKE AFB AZ	15	F-16 C/D BLK 32	AEF 5	12	61
F-16A-D	194 FS	144 FW	ANG	ACC	FRESNO AIR TERM. CA	15	F-16 C/D BLK 25	AEF 5	12	61
F-16A-D	179 FS	148 FW	ANG	ACC	DULUTH IAP MN	15	F-16 A/B BLK 15	RESERVE	12	0
TOTAL	39					630			468	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61		PERCENTAGE:	74%	
TASKED ANG UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
TASKED AFRC UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
ALL TASKED INTERDICTION UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
OVERALL INTERDICTION UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						56				

APPENDIX 9

TANKER (KC-10/KC-135E/R) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

TANKER AIRCRAFT AEF ALIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND AVERAGE "ON-CALL"										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
KC-10	6 ARS	60 AMW	15 AF	AMC	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	349 AMW IS ASSOCIATE	AEF 2, 8	9	123
KC-10	9 ARS	60 AMW	15 AF	AMC	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	349 AMW IS ASSOCIATE	AEF 4, 10	9	121
KC-10	2 ARS	305 AMW	21 AF	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	15 TOTAL A/C; 514 AMW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 1, 7	11	123
KC-10	30 ARS	305 AMW	21 AF	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	15 TOTAL A/C; 514 AMW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 3, 9	11	121
KC-10	70 ARS	349 AMW	AFRC	AMC	TRAVIS AFB CA	0	60 AMW ASSOCIATE	AEF 6	9	61
KC-10	79 ARS	349 AMW	AFRC	AMC	TRAVIS AFB CA	0	60 AMW ASSOCIATE	AEF 11	9	60
KC-10	76 ARS	514 AMW	AFRC	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	0	305 AMW ASSOCIATE	AEF 5	11	61
KC-10	78 ARS	514 AMW	AFRC	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	0	305 AMW ASSOCIATE	AEF 12	11	60
TOTAL	8					52			80	
								MINUS ASSOC.	40	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY KC-10 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						122		PERCENTAGE:	77%	
TASKED ANG KC-10 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A				
TASKED AFRC KC-10 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
ALL TASKED KC-10 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
OVERALL KC-10 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
KC-135	91 ARS	6 ARW	21 AF	AMC	MACDILL AFB FL	11	KC-135 R	AEF 6, 12	6	121
KC-135	909 ARS	18 WG	5 AF	PACAF	KADENA AB JAPAN	15	KC-135 R	AEF 6, 11	8	121
KC-135	99 ARS	19 ARG	21 AF	AMC	ROBINS AFB GA	11	KC-135 R; 12 TOTAL A/C	AEF 2, 7	6	123
KC-135	344 ARS	22 ARW	15 AF	AMC	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	KC-135 E/R; 12 TOTAL A/C; 931 ARG IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 12, ALERT 3	6	132
KC-135	349 ARS	22 ARW	15 AF	AMC	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	KC-135 E/R; 12 TOTAL A/C; 931 ARG IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 11, ALERT 3	6	132
KC-135	350 ARS	22 ARW	15 AF	AMC	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	KC-135 E/R; 12 TOTAL A/C; 931 ARG IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	ALERT 3	6	72
KC-135	384 ARS	22 ARW	15 AF	AMC	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	KC-135 E/R; 12 TOTAL A/C; 931 ARG IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 6, 12	6	121
KC-135	18 ARS	931 ARG	AFRC	AMC	MCCONNELL AFB KS	0	22 ARW ASSOCIATE	ALERT 2	6	73
KC-135	92 ARS	92 ARW	15 AF	AMC	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	KC-135 R; 52-54 TOTAL A/C	AEF 3, ALERT 5	7	132
KC-135	93 ARS	92 ARW	15 AF	AMC	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	KC-135 R; 52-54 TOTAL A/C	AEF 3, ALERT 5	7	132
KC-135	96 ARS	92 ARW	15 AF	AMC	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	KC-135 R; 52-54 TOTAL A/C	AEF 3, ALERT 5	7	132
KC-135	97 ARS	92 ARW	15 AF	AMC	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	KC-135 R; 52-54 TOTAL A/C	AEF 4, 9	7	121
KC-135	351 ARS	100 ARW	3 AF	USAFE	RAF MILDENHALL UK	13	KC-135 R; 15 TOTAL A/C	AEF 4, 9	7	121
KC-135	132 ARS	101 ARW	ANG	AMC	BANGOR IAP MAINE	10	KC-135 E	AEF 5	6	61
KC-135	136 ARS	107 ARW	ANG	AMC	NIAGARA FALLS IAP NY	8	KC-135 R	AEF 2	4	63
KC-135	141 ARS	108 ARW	ANG	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	KC-135 E	ALERT 1	6	75
KC-135	150 ARS	108 ARW	ANG	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	KC-135 E	AEF 4, 10	6	121
KC-135	106 ARS	117 ARW	ANG	AMC	BIRMINGHAM ARPT AL	8	KC-135 R	AEF 5	4	61
KC-135	145 ARS	121 ARW	ANG	AMC	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	KC-135 R; 19 TOTAL A/C	AEF 8	4	60
KC-135	166 ARS	121 ARW	ANG	AMC	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	KC-135 R; 19 TOTAL A/C	AEF 10	4	61
KC-135	108 ARS	126 ARW	ANG	AMC	SCOTT AFB IL	10	KC-135 R	ALERT 1	6	75

APPENDIX 9 (CONTINUED)
TANKER (KC-10/KC-135E/R) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

KC-135	126 ARS	128 ARW	ANG	AMC	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	9	KC-135 R	AEF 8	5	60
KC-135	151 ARS	134 ARW	ANG	AMC	MCGHEE TYSON TN	9	KC-135 E; 10 TOTAL A/C	AEF 7	5	60
KC-135	116 ARS	141 ARW	ANG	AMC	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	10	KC-135 E	AEF 11	6	60
KC-135	191 ARS	151 ARW	ANG	AMC	SALT LAKE CITY UT	10	KC-135 E	AEF 2, 8	6	123
KC-135	203 ARS	154 WG	ANG	PACAF	HICKAM AFB HI	8	KC-135 R	AEF 4	4	60
KC-135	173 ARS	155 ARW	ANG	AMC	LINCOLN MAP NE	8	KC-135 R	AEF 5, 12	4	121
KC-135	133 ARS	157 ARW	ANG	AMC	PEASE ANGB NH	9	KC-135 R	AEF 10	5	61
KC-135	197 ARS	161 ARW	ANG	AMC	SKY HARBOR IAP AZ	10	KC-135 E; 11 TOTAL A/C	AEF 9	6	61
KC-135	196 ARS	163 ARW	ANG	AMC	MARCH ARB CA	9	KC-135 R	ALERT 2	5	73
KC-135	168 ARS	168 ARW	ANG	PACAF	EIELSON AFB AK	8	KC-135 R	AEF 3	4	60
KC-135	146 ARS	171 ARW	ANG	AMC	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	KC-135 E	AEF 6	6	61
KC-135	147 ARS	171 ARW	ANG	AMC	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	KC-135 E	AEF 2, 8	6	123
KC-135	153 ARS	186 ARW	ANG	AMC	KEY FIELD MS	9	KC-135 R	AEF 7	5	60
KC-135	117 ARS	190 ARW	ANG	AMC	FORBES FIELD KS	10	KC-135 D/E	AEF 10	6	61
KC-135	905 ARS	319 ARW	15 AF	AMC	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	KC-135 R; 48 TOTAL A/C	AEF 1, ALERT 4	6	136
KC-135	906 ARS	319 ARW	15 AF	AMC	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	KC-135 R; 48 TOTAL A/C	AEF 1, ALERT 4	6	136
KC-135	911 ARS	319 ARW	15 AF	AMC	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	KC-135 R; 48 TOTAL A/C	AEF 1, ALERT 4	6	136
KC-135	912 ARS	319 ARW	15 AF	AMC	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	KC-135 R; 48 TOTAL A/C	AEF 1, 8	6	123
KC-135	22 ARS	366 WG	12 AF	ACC	MT HOME AFB ID	11	KC-135 R; "RAPID RESPONSE" AEF	AEF 5, 11	6	121
KC-135	72 ARS	434 ARW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	KC-135 R; 22 TOTAL A/C	AEF 7	6	60
KC-135	74 ARS	434 ARW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	KC-135 R; 22 TOTAL A/C	AEF 10	6	61
KC-135	336 ARS	452 AMW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MARCH ARB CA	9	KC-135 R; 10 TOTAL A/C	ALERT 2	5	73
KC-135	465 ARS	507 ARW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	TINKER AFB OK	8	KC-135 R	AEF 2	4	63
KC-135	77 ARS	916 ARW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	S-J AFB NC	10	KC-135 R	ALERT 1	6	75
KC-135	63 ARS	927 ARW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	9	KC-135 E	AEF 5	5	61
KC-135	314 ARS	940 ARW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	BEALE AFB CA	10	KC-135 E	ALERT 2	6	73
TOT:	47	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	464			266	
TOTAL	55					516		MINUS ASSOC.	260	
								PERCENTAGE:	56%	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY KC-135 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						124				
TASKED ANG KC-135 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						74				
TASKED AFRC KC-135 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						67				
ALL TASKED KC-135 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
OVERALL KC-135 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY TANKER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						124				
TASKED ANG TANKER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						74				
TASKED AFRC TANKER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						65				
ALL TASKED TANKER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
OVERALL TANKER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				

APPENDIX 10 **INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT (C-5/C-17/C-141) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"**

INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT AEF ASSIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND AVERAGE "ON-CALL"										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
C-5	21 AS	60 AMW	15 AF	AMC	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	349 AMW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 4, 10	9	121
C-5	22 AS	60 AMW	15 AF	AMC	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	349 AMW IS ASSOCIATE	AEF 2, 8	9	123
C-5	137 AS	105 AW	ANG	AMC	STEWART IAP NY	12	13 TOTAL A/C	MOB 1	7	75
C-5	68 AS	433 AW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	KELLY AFB TX	14	16 TOTAL A/C	MOB 4	8	73
C-5	9 AS	436 AW	21 AF	AMC	DOVER AFB DE	16	18 TOTAL A/C; 512 AW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 1, 7	9	123
C-5	3 AS	436 AW	21 AF	AMC	DOVER AFB DE	16	18 TOTAL A/C; 512 AW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 3, 9	9	121
C-5	337 AS	439 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	WESTOVER ARB MA	14	16 TOTAL A/C	MOB 5	8	72
C-5	312 AS	349 AMW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	TRAVIS AFB CA	0	60 AMW ASSOCIATE	AEF 11, MOB 3	9	132
C-5	301 AS	349 AMW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	TRAVIS AFB CA	0	60 AMW ASSOCIATE	MOB 2	9	73
C-5	326 AS	512 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	DOVER AFB DE	0	436 AW ASSOCIATE	AEF 5	9	61
C-5	709 AS	512 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	DOVER AFB DE	0	436 AW ASSOCIATE	AEF 6, 12	9	121
TOTAL	11	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	104			95	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY C-5 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						122		MINUS ASSOC.	59	
TASKED ANG C-5 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						75		PERCENTAGE:	57%	
TASKED AFRC C-5 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						89				
ALL TASKED C-5 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						100				
OVERALL C-5 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						100				
C-17	7 AS	62 AW	15 AF	AMC	MCCHORD AFB WA	12	446 AW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 8, 12	9	120
C-17	14 AS	437 AW	21 AF	AMC	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	315 AW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 5, 9	9	123
C-17	15 AS	437 AW	21 AF	AMC	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	315 AW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 6, 10	9	123
C-17	17 AS	437 AW	21 AF	AMC	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	315 AW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 7, 11	9	120
C-17	728 AS	446 AW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MCCHORD AFB WA	0	62 AW ASSOCIATE	AEF 4	9	60
C-17	300 AS	315 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	CHARLESTON AFB SC	0	437 AW ASSOCIATE	AEF 1	9	63
C-17	317 AS	315 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	CHARLESTON AFB SC	0	437 AW ASSOCIATE	AEF 2	9	63
C-17	701 AS	315 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	CHARLESTON AFB SC	0	437 AW ASSOCIATE	AEF 3	9	60
TOTAL	8					48			72	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY C-17 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						121		MINUS ASSOC.	36	
TASKED ANG C-17 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						N/A		PERCENTAGE:	75%	
TASKED AFRC C-17 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						61				
ALL TASKED C-17 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				
OVERALL C-17 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						91				

APPENDIX 10 (CONTINUED)
INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT (C-5/C-17/C-141) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"

C-141	4 AS	62 AW	15 AF	AMC	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	19 TOTAL A/C; 446 AW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 1, 7	11	123
C-141	8 AS	62 AW	15 AF	AMC	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	19 TOTAL A/C; 446 AW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 3, 9	11	121
C-141	97 AS	446 AW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MCCHORD AFB WA	0	62 AW ASSOCIATE	AEF 4, 10	11	121
C-141	313 AS	446 AW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MCCHORD AFB WA	0	62 AW ASSOCIATE	AEF 5, 11	11	121
C-141	155 AS	164 AW	ANG	AMC	MEMPHIS IAP TN	9		AEF 6, 12	6	121
C-141	183 AS	172 AW	ANG	AMC	JACKSON IAP MS	9		AEF 2, 8	6	123
C-141	6 AS	305 AMW	21 AF	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	11 TOTAL A/C; 514 AMW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 2, 8	7	123
C-141	13 AS	305 AMW	21 AF	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	11 TOTAL A/C; 514 AMW IS ASSOCIATE UNIT	AEF 4, 10	7	121
C-141	732 AS	514 AMW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	0	305 AMW ASSOCIATE	AEF 6, 12	7	121
C-141	16 AS	437 AW	21 AF	AMC	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	DRAW DOWN ONE/MO - DISBANDED SEP 00. 315 AW IS ASSOCIATE	RESERVE	0	0
C-141	707 AS	315 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	CHARLESTON AFB SC	0	437 AW ASSOCIATE	RESERVE	0	0
C-141	89 AS	445 AW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	9 TOTAL A/C	AEF 11	5	60
C-141	356 AS	445 AW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	9 TOTAL A/C	AEF 6, 12	5	121
C-141	729 AS	452 AW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MARCH ARB CA	7	8 TOTAL A/C	AEF 1, 7	5	123
C-141	730 AS	452 AW	4 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MARCH ARB CA	7	8 TOTAL A/C	AEF 10	5	61
C-141	756 AS	459 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	ANDREWS AFB MD	8	9 TOTAL A/C	AEF 5	5	61
TOT:	16					122			102	
TOTAL	35					274		MINUS ASSOC.	73	
TASKED ACTIVE DUTY C-141 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						122		PERCENTAGE:	60%	
TASKED ANG C-141 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						122				
TASKED AFRC C-141 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						99				
ALL TASKED C-141 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						109				
OVERALL C-141 UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						95				
TASKED A.D. INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVE. "ON CALL":						122				
TASKED ANG INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVE. "ON CALL"						106				
TASKED AFRC INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						87				
ALL TASKED INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						101				
OVERALL INTER-THEATER AIRLIFT UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE "ON CALL":						96				

APPENDIX 11 **INTRA-THEATER AIRLIFT (C-130) AIRCRAFT "ON CALL"**

INTRA-THEATER AIRLIFT AIRCRAFT AEF ASSIGNMENT, A/C REQUIRED, AND AVERAGE "ON-CALL"										
TYPE A/C	SQUADRON	WING	NUMBERED AIR FORCE	COMMAND	BASE	PAA	REMARKS	AEF ALIGNMENT	A/C REQUIRED	3-YR "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
C-130	517 AS	3 WG	11 AF	PACAF	ELMENDORF AFB AK	16	C-130H	AEF 3, 9	9	121
C-130	2 AS	43 AW	21 AF	AMC	POPE AFB NC	14	C-130 E	MOB 1	8	75
C-130	41 AS	43 AW	21 AF	AMC	POPE AFB NC	14	C-130 E	MOB 1	8	75
C-130	37 AS	86 AW	3 AF	USAFE	RAMSTEIN AB GE	17	C-130E	AEF 4, 10	9	121
C-130	139 AS	109 AW	ANG	AMC	SCHENECTADY NY	9	C-130 H; 11 TOTAL A/C	AEF 4, 10	5	121
C-130	105 AS	118 AW	ANG	AMC	NASHVILLE MET. TN	10	C-130 H; 12 TOTAL A/C	AEF 1, 7	6	123
C-130	165 AS	123 AW	ANG	AMC	LOUISVILLE IAP KY	10	C-130 H; 12 TOTAL A/C	AEF 1, 7	6	123
C-130	189 AS	124 WG	ANG	AMC	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	4	C-130 E	AEF 11, MOB 3	2	132
C-130	171 AS	127 WG	ANG	AMC	SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	8	C-130 E	MOB 4	4	73
C-130	130 AS	130 AW	ANG	AMC	YEAGER ARPT WV	8	C-130 H	MOB 1	4	75
C-130	109 AS	133 AW	ANG	AMC	MINN-ST PAUL IAP MN	6	C-130 H; 8 TOTAL A/C	MOB 4	3	73
C-130	181 AS	136 AW	ANG	AMC	NAS DALLAS TX	8	C-130 H	AEF 1, 7	4	123
C-130	185 AS	137 AW	ANG	AMC	ROGER WORLD ARPT OK	8	C-130 H; 9 TOTAL A/C	AEF 12, MOB 3	4	132
C-130	180 AS	139 AW	ANG	AMC	ROSECRANS MEM. MO	8	C-130 H	AEF 5, MOB 5	4	133
C-130	143 AS	143 AW	ANG	AMC	QUONSET ST. ARPT RI	6	C-130 E; 8 TOTAL A/C	AEF 4, 10	3	121
C-130	156 AS	145 AW	ANG	AMC	CHARLOTTE/DOUG. NC	12	C-130 H	AEF 12, MOB 3	7	132
C-130	115 AS	146 AW	ANG	AMC	CHANNEL IS ANGB CA	12	C-130 E	MOB 2	7	73
C-130	192 AS	152 AW	ANG	AMC	RENO/TAHOE IAP NV	6	C-130 E; 8 TOTAL A/C	AEF 6, MOB 5	3	133
C-130	187 AS	153 AW	ANG	AMC	CHEYENNE MAP WY	8	C-130 H	AEF 3, 9	4	121
C-130	204 AS	154 WG	ANG	PACAF	HICKAM AFB HI	4	C-130E/H	MOB 2	2	73
C-130	198 AS	156 AW	ANG	AMC	MARIN IAP PUERTO RICO	6	C-130 E; WILL HAVE 8 TOTAL W/IN ONE YEAR	AEF 2, 8	3	123
C-130	158 AS	165 AW	ANG	AMC	SAVANNAH IAP GA	8	C-130 H	AEF 5, MOB 5	4	133
C-130	142 AS	166 AW	ANG	AMC	NEW CASTLE CO. DL	8	C-130 H	AEF 12, MOB 3	4	132
C-130	167 AS	167 AW	ANG	AMC	SHEPHERD FIELD WV	10	C-130H; 12 TOTAL A/C	AEF 11, MOB 3	6	132
C-130	144 AS	176 WG	ANG	PACAF	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	8	C-130E	AEF 3, 9	4	121
C-130	164 AS	179 AW	ANG	AMC	MANSFIELD LAHM OH	8	C-130 H	MOB 4	4	73
C-130	169 AS	182 AW	ANG	AMC	GREATER PEORIA IL	8	C-130 E	MOB 2	4	73
C-130	731 AS	302 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	PETERSON AFB CO	14	C-130 H; 16 TOTAL A/C	AEF 11, MOB 3	8	132
C-130	39 AS	317 AG	15 AF	AMC	DYESS AFB TX	14	C-130 H	AEF 2, 8	8	123
C-130	40 AS	317 AG	15 AF	AMC	DYESS AFB TX	14	C-130 H	AEF 2, 8	8	123
C-130	36 AS	374 AW	5 AF	PACAF	YOKOTA AB JAPAN	10	C-130E/H	MOB 2	6	73
C-130	815 AS	403 WG	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	KEESLER AFB MS	8	C-130 E	MOB 1	4	75
C-130	95 AS	440 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	12	C-130 H	AEF 5, MOB 5	7	133
C-130	50 AS	463 AG	21 AF	AMC	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	14	C-130 H	AEF 6, MOB 5	8	133
C-130	61 AS	463 AG	21 AF	AMC	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	12	C-130 E	AEF 6, MOB 5	7	133
C-130	357 AS	908 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MAXWELL AFB AL	8	C-130 H	MOB 1	4	75
C-130	757 AS	910 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	C-130 H	MOB 1	4	75
C-130	773 AS	910 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	C-130 H	MOB 4	4	73
C-130	758 AS	911 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	8	C-130 H	MOB 4	4	73
C-130	327 AS	913 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	8	C-130 E	MOB 4	4	73
C-130	328 AS	914 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	NIAGARA FALLS NY	6	C-130 H; 8 TOTAL A/C	MOB 2	3	73
C-130	96 AS	934 AW	22 AF (AFRC)	AMC	MINN-ST PAUL IAP MN	8	C-130 E	MOB 2	4	73
TOTAL	42					396			214	
								PERCENTAGE:	54%	
TASKED A.D. INTRA-THEATER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						109				
TASKED ANG INTRA-THEATER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						111				
TASKED AFRC INTRA-THEATER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						86				
ALL TASKED INTRA-THEATER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						104				
OVERALL INTRA-THEATER UNIT'S THREE YEAR AVERAGE DAYS "ON CALL":						104				

APPENDIX 12

AMC OPERATIONS DAILY SUMMARY

AMC OPERATIONS DAILY SUMMARY							
#	DATE '99	CURRENT MISSIONS	AIRLIFT	REFUELING	TRAINING	OTHER	EX/CONT.
1	13-Sep	245	82	50	55	58	20
2	17-Sep	271	113	46	24	88	25
3	20-Sep	229	102	36	44	47	33
4	21-Sep	268	116	45	46	61	37
5	22-Sep	276	112	50	66	48	33
6	23-Sep	266	100	54	59	53	27
7	24-Sep	250	108	40	42	60	27
8	27-Sep	265	96	68	49	52	34
9	28-Sep	258	100	63	41	54	37
10	29-Sep	258	103	67	36	52	37
11	30-Sep	255	110	53	51	41	39
12	1-Oct	266	110	54	50	52	49
13	5-Oct	289	98	66	65	60	35
14	6-Oct	262	98	60	51	53	31
15	7-Oct	279	106	56	65	52	35
16	8-Oct	246	101	50	52	43	30
17	12-Oct	283	107	63	64	49	41
18	13-Oct	278	98	70	59	51	39
19	14-Oct	284	98	75	61	50	30
20	15-Oct	250	101	52	53	44	28
21	18-Oct	275	101	49	66	59	21
22	19-Oct	285	99	60	68	58	21
23	21-Oct	303	111	71	67	54	24
24	22-Oct	256	112	47	45	52	28
25	26-Oct	298	109	63	67	59	29
26	27-Oct	288	99	70	67	52	27
27	28-Oct	281	105	67	57	52	29
28	1-Nov	236	92	46	44	54	25
29	3-Nov	291	110	70	61	50	29
30	8-Nov	272	97	63	64	48	25
31	10-Nov	284	101	67	61	55	29
32	16-Nov	310	107	69	79	55	17
33	22-Nov	301	110	73	54	64	20
34	29-Nov	280	91	62	69	58	22
35	30-Nov	320	107	69	77	67	30
36	1-Dec	308	123	62	57	66	44
37	2-Dec	313	121	56	66	70	39
AVE	N/A	275	104	59	57	55	30
%	N/A	N/A	37.9%	21.4%	20.7%	20.1%	11.1%
NOTE 1: EX/CONT: "EX" portion includes exercise support such as RED FLAG, etc. "CONT" includes only those missions that are in-place supporting on-going contingencies. "CONT" does not include normal daily resupply or delivery missions to contingency operations.							
NOTE 2: The data contained in the EX/CONT column is included with the AIRLIFT, REFUELING, TRAINING, and OTHER columns but has been "broken out" to note what percentage of the total CURRENT MISSIONS is dedicated specifically to EX/CONTs.							
NOTE 3: Data compiled from the AMC Operations Daily Summaries, 13 Sep - 5 Dec 99, http://tacc.scott.af.mil/Information/Ext_Reports/opssum . TACC/XONB is the OPR.							

APPENDIX 13
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-5'S

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-5's									
#	DATE '99	OWNED	POSSESSED	MISSION- CAPABLE	THRESHOLD- (55%)	TOTAL- MSNS	TASK	JA/AAT	TRAIN
1	13-16 Sep	73	59	38	32	32	20	0	12
2	17-19 Sep	73	61	43	34	33	21	0	12
3	20-Sep	73	59	43	32	30	18	1	11
4	21-Sep	73	59	36	32	35	23	1	11
5	22-Sep	73	60	38	33	37	25	1	11
6	23-Sep	73	59	36	32	31	19	0	12
7	24-26 Sep	73	59	35	32	32	20	0	12
8	27-Sep	73	59	37	32	33	21	0	12
9	28-Sep	73	58	40	32	33	21	0	12
10	29-Sep	73	58	35	32	34	22	0	12
11	30-Sep	73	57	31	31	34	22	0	12
12	1-Oct	73	57	33	31	35	23	0	12
13	2-Oct	73	57	33	31	36	24	0	12
14	3-Oct	73	57	33	31	35	23	0	12
15	4-Oct	73	57	33	31	37	25	0	12
16	5-Oct	73	58	36	32	34	22	0	12
17	6-Oct	73	56	30	31	31	19	0	12
18	7-Oct	73	56	33	31	32	20	0	12
19	8-11 OCT	73	56	30	31	31	19	0	12
20	12-Oct	73	56	39	31	31	20	2	9
21	13-Oct	73	60	39	33	32	21	2	9
22	14-Oct	73	58	31	32	29	18	2	9
23	15-17 OCT	73	58	33	32	32	20	0	12
24	18-Oct	73	58	38	32	28	16	0	12
25	19-Oct	73	58	38	32	34	22	0	12
26	20-Oct	-	-	-	-	32	20	0	12
27	21-Oct	73	59	34	32	30	18	0	12
28	22-Oct	73	59	36	32	35	23	0	12
29	23-Oct	-	-	-	-	32	20	0	12
30	24-Oct	-	-	-	-	32	20	0	12
31	25-Oct	-	-	-	-	31	19	0	12
32	26-Oct	73	60	32	32	33	21	0	12
33	27-Oct	73	59	34	32	33	21	0	12
34	28-Oct	73	60	34	32	34	22	0	12
35	29-Oct	-	-	-	-	33	21	0	12
36	30-Oct	-	-	-	-	34	22	0	12
37	31-Oct	-	-	-	-	29	17	0	12
38	1-Nov	73	60	36	32	25	13	0	12

APPENDIX 13 (CONTINUED)
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-5'S

39	2-Nov	-	-	-	-	26	14	0	12
40	3-Nov	73	60	40	32	31	19	0	12
41	4-Nov	-	-	-	-	32	20	0	12
42	5-Nov	-	-	-	-	31	19	0	12
43	6-Nov	-	-	-	-	32	20	0	12
44	7-Nov	-	-	-	-	33	21	0	12
45	8-Nov	73	59	32	32	33	21	0	12
46	9-Nov	-	-	-	-	34	22	0	12
47	10-Nov	73	59	36	32	32	21	0	12
48	11-Nov	-	-	-	-	34	22	0	12
49	12-Nov	-	-	-	-	35	23	0	12
50	13-Nov	-	-	-	-	37	25	0	12
51	14-Nov	-	-	-	-	30	18	0	12
52	15-Nov	-	-	-	-	33	21	0	12
53	16-Nov	73	59	31	32	34	22	0	12
54	22-Nov	73	60	33	32	37	25	0	12
55	23-Nov	-	-	-	-	28	16	0	12
56	24-Nov	-	-	-	-	28	16	0	12
57	25-Nov	-	-	-	-	22	10	0	12
58	26-Nov	-	-	-	-	21	9	1	11
59	27-Nov	-	-	-	-	20	8	1	11
60	28-Nov	-	-	-	-	24	12	1	11
61	29-Nov	73	59	40	32	30	18	0	12
62	30-Nov	73	59	37	32	41	29	0	12
63	1-Dec	73	59	36	32	38	26	1	11
64	2-Dec	73	59	37	32	37	25	1	11
65	3-Dec	-	-	-	-	35	23	1	11
66	4-Dec	-	-	-	-	32	20	0	12
67	5-Dec	-	-	-	-	28	16	0	12
AVE	N/A	73	59	35	32	32	20	0	12
%	N/A	N/A	80.1%	60.6%	54.5%	100.3%	62.6%	0.7%	36.7%

NOTE 1: POSSESSED aircraft are those aircraft AMC physically has control over, I.e., not in Depot Status, Loaners, or Chopped.

NOTE 2: The 55% THRESHOLD is the AMC mandated percentage of POSSESSED aircraft that can be tasked for any operation.

NOTE 3: JA/AAT is joint training with the Army.

APPENDIX 14
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-17'S

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-17's									
#	DATE '99	OWNED	POSSESSED	MISSION CAPABLE	THRESHOLD (75%)	TOTAL MSNS	TASKED	JA/AAT	TRAINING
1	13-16 Sep	45	36	29	27	26	14	3	10
2	17-19 Sep	45	37	32	28	26	14	0	12
3	20-Sep	45	38	32	29	28	16	1	11
4	21-Sep	45	38	32	29	27	15	1	11
5	22-Sep	45	38	32	29	28	16	1	11
6	23-Sep	45	38	31	29	27	15	1	11
7	24-26 Sep	45	37	30	28	28	16	0	12
8	27-Sep	45	37	35	28	29	17	1	11
9	28-Sep	45	37	31	28	26	14	2	10
10	29-Sep	45	37	30	28	30	18	2	10
11	30-Sep	45	37	32	28	26	14	0	12
12	1-Oct	45	37	34	28	28	17	3	8
13	2-Oct	45	37	34	28	27	16	3	8
14	3-Oct	45	37	34	28	26	15	3	8
15	4-Oct	45	37	34	28	24	13	3	8
16	5-Oct	46	38	35	29	26	15	3	8
17	6-Oct	46	38	32	29	27	16	3	8
18	7-Oct	46	37	31	28	26	15	3	8
19	8-11 OCT	46	36	29	27	26	14	0	12
20	12-Oct	46	36	28	27	26	14	1	11
21	13-Oct	46	37	32	28	27	15	3	9
22	14-Oct	46	37	29	28	28	16	3	9
23	15-17 OCT	46	38	30	28	27	14	1	12
24	18-Oct	46	38	35	28	25	12	3	10
25	19-Oct	46	38	32	28	26	14	3	9
26	20-Oct	-	-	-	-	26	14	3	9
27	21-Oct	46	38	34	28	28	16	3	9
28	22-Oct	46	38	34	28	27	15	4	8
29	23-Oct	-	-	-	-	28	16	4	8
30	24-Oct	-	-	-	-	28	16	0	12
31	25-Oct	-	-	-	-	29	17	2	9
32	26-Oct	46	37	29	28	28	16	3	9
33	27-Oct	46	37	31	28	29	17	2	10
34	28-Oct	46	36	32	27	28	16	3	9
35	29-Oct	-	-	-	-	29	17	2	10
36	30-Oct	-	-	-	-	29	17	2	10
37	31-Oct	-	-	-	-	27	15	0	12
38	1-Nov	46	37	33	28	29	16	0	13
39	2-Nov	-	-	-	-	30	17	0	13
40	3-Nov	46	34	28	26	30	17	0	13
41	4-Nov	-	-	-	-	27	14	0	13
42	5-Nov	-	-	-	-	26	13	0	13
43	6-Nov	-	-	-	-	25	12	0	13
44	7-Nov	-	-	-	-	26	13	0	13

APPENDIX 14 (CONTINUED)
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-17'S

45	8-Nov	47	37	30	28	31	18	0	13
46	9-Nov	-	-	-	-	31	18	0	13
47	10-Nov	47	39	34	29	30	17	0	13
48	11-Nov	-	-	-	-	31	18	0	13
49	12-Nov	-	-	-	-	28	15	0	13
50	13-Nov	-	-	-	-	27	14	0	13
51	14-Nov	-	-	-	-	25	12	0	13
52	15-Nov	-	-	-	-	26	13	0	13
53	16-Nov	47	39	34	29	30	17	0	13
54	22-Nov	47	37	33	28	31	18	0	13
55	23-Nov	-	-	-	-	28	15	1	12
56	24-Nov	-	-	-	-	22	9	2	11
57	25-Nov	-	-	-	-	21	8	4	9
58	26-Nov	-	-	-	-	17	4	3	10
59	27-Nov	-	-	-	-	18	5	1	12
60	28-Nov	-	-	-	-	19	6	1	12
61	29-Nov	47	36	36	27	27	13	3	11
62	30-Nov	47	37	31	28	28	15	3	10
63	1-Dec	47	37	28	28	31	18	4	9
64	2-Dec	48	40	34	30	30	17	4	9
65	3-Dec	-	-	-	-	30	17	4	9
66	4-Dec	-	-	-	-	30	17	4	9
67	5-Dec	-	-	-	-	30	17	0	9
AVE	N/A	46	37	32	28	27	15	2	11
%	N/A	N/A	81.2%	85.6%	75.4%	96.7%	54.4%	6.0%	39.4%
NOTE 1: POSSESSED aircraft are those aircraft AMC physically has control over, I.e., not in Depot Status, Loaners, or Chopped.									
NOTE 2: The 75% THRESHOLD is the AMC mandated percentage of POSSESSED aircraft that can be tasked for any operation.									
NOTE 3: JA/AAT is joint training with the Army.									

APPENDIX 15
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-130'S

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-130's									
#	DATE	OWNED	POSSESSED	MISSION CAPABLE	THRESHOLD (55%)	TOTAL MSNS	TASKED	JA/AAT	TRAINING
1	13-16 Sep	92	82	58	45	36	16	4	16
2	17-19 Sep	92	82	63	45	37	19	2	16
3	20-Sep	92	82	63	45	38	20	2	16
4	21-Sep	92	84	61	46	37	19	3	15
5	22-Sep	92	84	61	46	38	21	2	15
6	23-Sep	92	84	57	46	39	20	3	16
7	24-26 Sep	92	84	57	46	39	22	2	15
8	27-Sep	92	84	60	46	37	21	2	14
9	28-Sep	92	84	62	46	39	20	3	16
10	29-Sep	92	84	63	46	38	19	3	16
11	30-Sep	92	82	61	45	38	19	3	16
12	1-Oct	92	84	61	46	36	20	1	15
13	2-Oct	92	84	61	46	34	18	1	15
14	3-Oct	92	84	61	46	36	20	1	15
15	4-Oct	92	84	61	46	37	20	2	15
16	5-Oct	92	83	56	46	35	18	3	14
17	6-Oct	92	83	50	46	34	17	3	14
18	7-Oct	92	83	51	46	36	19	2	15
19	8-11 OCT	92	84	58	46	38	21	2	15
20	12-Oct	92	83	61	46	37	20	3	14
21	13-Oct	92	84	57	46	32	15	8	9
22	14-Oct	92	84	56	46	34	16	4	14
23	15-17 OCT	92	83	53	46	36	18	6	12
24	18-Oct	92	83	60	46	34	17	3	14
25	19-Oct	92	83	59	46	36	15	7	14
26	20-Oct	-	-	-	-	40	18	8	14
27	21-Oct	92	83	58	46	40	17	8	15
28	22-Oct	92	83	51	46	35	15	5	15
29	23-Oct	-	-	-	-	34	16	3	15
30	24-Oct	-	-	-	-	36	16	5	15
31	25-Oct	-	-	-	-	40	19	5	16
32	26-Oct	92	83	46	46	38	16	6	16
33	27-Oct	92	82	52	45	45	17	10	18
34	28-Oct	92	82	53	45	46	21	10	15
35	29-Oct	-	-	-	-	39	18	7	14
36	30-Oct	-	-	-	-	40	21	6	13
37	31-Oct	-	-	-	-	40	21	6	13
38	1-Nov	92	82	61	45	38	21	2	15
39	2-Nov	-	-	-	-	31	12	3	16
40	3-Nov	92	82	53	45	35	13	6	16
41	4-Nov	-	-	-	-	41	20	5	16
42	5-Nov	-	-	-	-	46	25	4	17
43	6-Nov	-	-	-	-	34	17	0	17
44	7-Nov	-	-	-	-	35	14	4	17
45	8-Nov	92	83	53	46	41	14	10	17

APPENDIX 15 (CONTINUED)
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-130'S

46	9-Nov	-	-	-	-	41	14	10	17
47	10-Nov	92	85	54	47	43	16	13	14
48	11-Nov	-	-	-	-	38	14	7	17
49	12-Nov	-	-	-	-	33	14	2	17
50	13-Nov	-	-	-	-	33	12	4	17
51	14-Nov	-	-	-	-	30	11	2	17
52	15-Nov	-	-	-	-	39	10	14	15
53	16-Nov	92	85	55	47	45	15	15	15
54	22-Nov	92	85	64	47	44	21	6	17
55	23-Nov	-	-	-	-	45	22	6	17
56	24-Nov	-	-	-	-	42	19	6	17
57	25-Nov	-	-	-	-	38	20	0	18
58	26-Nov	-	-	-	-	38	20	0	18
59	27-Nov	-	-	-	-	41	23	0	18
60	28-Nov	-	-	-	-	42	23	3	16
61	29-Nov	92	87	55	48	50	22	15	13
62	30-Nov	92	87	57	48	50	21	19	10
63	1-Dec	92	87	52	48	48	22	15	11
64	2-Dec	92	86	60	47	48	22	16	10
65	3-Dec	-	-	-	-	48	22	16	10
66	4-Dec	-	-	-	-	48	23	18	7
67	5-Dec	-	-	-	-	48	26	8	14
AVG	N/A	92	84	57	46	39	18	6	15
%	N/A	N/A	91.0%	68.6%	55.0%	84.8%	47.1%	14.6%	38.3%
NOTE 1: POSSESSED aircraft are those aircraft AMC physically has control over, i.e., not in Depot Status, Loaners, or Chopped.									
NOTE 2: The 55% THRESHOLD is the AMC mandated percentage of POSSESSED aircraft that can be tasked for any operations.									
NOTE 3: JA/AAT is joint training with the Army.									

APPENDIX 16
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-141'S

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-141's									
#	DATE	OWNED	POSSESSED	MISSION CAPABLE	THRESHOLD (65%)	TOTAL MSNS	TASKED	JA/AAT	TRAINING
1	13-16 Sep	92	74	46	48	43	20	3	20
2	17-19 Sep	91	73	55	47	46	22	1	23
3	20-Sep	91	73	55	47	42	20	2	20
4	21-Sep	91	74	56	48	45	22	1	22
5	22-Sep	91	74	55	48	44	21	1	22
6	23-Sep	90	73	52	47	43	20	2	21
7	24-26 Sep	90	72	45	47	44	22	2	21
8	27-Sep	90	72	49	47	47	24	2	21
9	28-Sep	90	72	47	47	45	22	2	21
10	29-Sep	90	72	47	47	45	22	1	22
11	30-Sep	90	72	50	47	47	24	2	21
12	1-Oct	90	72	50	47	47	26	2	19
13	2-Oct	90	72	50	47	44	23	2	19
14	3-Oct	90	72	50	47	43	19	1	23
15	4-Oct	90	72	50	47	39	20	3	16
16	5-Oct	90	73	50	47	42	24	3	15
17	6-Oct	90	74	46	48	41	23	3	15
18	7-Oct	89	74	49	48	45	27	3	15
19	8-11 OCT	89	74	46	48	46	25	2	20
20	12-Oct	89	74	48	48	44	20	1	23
21	13-Oct	89	74	46	48	49	25	1	23
22	14-Oct	89	74	45	48	47	23	1	23
23	15-17 OCT	89	74	44	48	46	23	1	22
24	18-Oct	89	74	50	48	43	22	2	19
25	19-Oct	89	74	47	48	43	22	3	18
26	20-Oct	-	-	-	-	46	22	6	18
27	21-Oct	88	72	46	47	48	24	5	19
28	22-Oct	88	72	48	47	50	26	5	19
29	23-Oct	-	-	-	-	54	30	5	19
30	24-Oct	-	-	-	-	52	28	5	19
31	25-Oct	-	-	-	-	51	27	3	21
32	26-Oct	88	72	53	47	50	26	3	21
33	27-Oct	88	72	49	47	48	24	3	21
34	28-Oct	88	72	42	47	48	24	3	21
35	29-Oct	-	-	-	-	48	24	2	22
36	30-Oct	-	-	-	-	50	25	3	22
37	31-Oct	-	-	-	-	49	24	2	23
38	1-Nov	88	72	45	47	47	23	0	24
39	2-Nov	-	-	-	-	44	20	0	24
40	3-Nov	88	71	45	46	48	24	0	24
41	4-Nov	-	-	-	-	46	22	4	20
42	5-Nov	-	-	-	-	48	24	2	22
43	6-Nov	-	-	-	-	46	22	1	23
44	7-Nov	-	-	-	-	47	23	0	24
45	8-Nov	88	71	50	46	46	22	0	24

APPENDIX 16 (CONTINUED)
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) C-141'S

46	9-Nov	-	-	-	-	46	22	0	24
47	10-Nov	88	71	47	46	46	22	4	20
48	11-Nov	-	-	-	-	50	26	4	20
49	12-Nov	-	-	-	-	49	25	5	19
50	13-Nov	-	-	-	-	47	23	7	17
51	14-Nov	-	-	-	-	48	24	5	19
52	15-Nov	-	-	-	-	48	23	6	19
53	16-Nov	87	72	49	47	52	28	0	24
54	22-Nov	87	72	42	47	51	27	0	24
55	23-Nov	-	-	-	-	50	26	0	24
56	24-Nov	-	-	-	-	48	24	0	24
57	25-Nov	-	-	-	-	41	17	1	23
58	26-Nov	-	-	-	-	42	18	1	23
59	27-Nov	-	-	-	-	41	17	0	24
60	28-Nov	-	-	-	-	47	23	0	24
61	29-Nov	87	72	49	47	47	23	0	24
62	30-Nov	87	72	49	47	51	27	5	19
63	1-Dec	87	72	49	47	53	29	6	18
64	2-Dec	87	71	49	46	54	30	6	18
65	3-Dec	-	-	-	-	56	32	7	17
66	4-Dec	-	-	-	-	54	29	7	18
67	5-Dec	-	-	-	-	51	27	4	20
AVG	N/A	89	73	49	47	47	24	2	21
%	N/A	N/A	81.5%	66.8%	65%	99.6%	50.4%	5.3%	44.3%
NOTE 1: POSSESSED aircraft are those aircraft AMC physically has control over, i.e., not in Depot Status, Loaners, of Chopped.									
NOTE 2: The 65% THRESHOLD is the AMC mandated percentage of POSSESSED aircraft that can be tasked for any operation.									
NOTE 3: JA/AAT is joint training with the Army.									

APPENDIX 17
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) KC-10'S

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) KC-10's									
#	DATE '99	OWNED	POSSESSED	MISSION CAPABLE	THRESHOLD (75%)	TOTAL MSNS	TASKED	JA/AAT	TRAINING
1	13-16 Sep	59	47	41	35	32	16	1	16
2	17-19 Sep	59	46	37	35	28	12	0	16
3	20-Sep	59	46	37	35	27	11	1	15
4	21-Sep	59	46	36	35	27	11	1	15
5	22-Sep	59	46	39	35	29	13	1	15
6	23-Sep	59	46	34	35	27	11	1	15
7	24-26 Sep	59	45	40	34	32	16	1	15
8	27-Sep	59	44	41	33	31	15	0	16
9	28-Sep	59	46	38	35	33	17	0	16
10	29-Sep	59	44	35	33	33	17	0	16
11	30-Sep	59	44	37	33	35	19	0	16
12	1-Oct	59	44	37	33	36	20	0	16
13	2-Oct	59	44	37	33	35	19	0	16
14	3-Oct	59	44	37	33	32	16	0	16
15	4-Oct	59	44	37	33	33	17	0	16
16	5-Oct	59	47	36	35	34	18	0	16
17	6-Oct	59	47	37	35	34	18	0	16
18	7-Oct	59	47	38	35	36	20	0	16
19	8-11 OCT	59	47	34	35	30	14	1	15
20	12-Oct	59	47	39	35	33	17	0	16
21	13-Oct	59	48	37	36	34	18	0	16
22	14-Oct	59	48	37	36	32	16	0	16
23	15-17 OCT	59	48	38	36	33	17	1	14
24	18-Oct	59	48	43	36	33	18	1	14
25	19-Oct	59	47	36	35	33	17	0	16
26	20-Oct	-	-	-	-	37	21	0	16
27	21-Oct	59	47	39	35	37	21	0	16
28	22-Oct	59	47	40	35	32	16	0	16
29	23-Oct	-	-	-	-	31	15	0	16
30	24-Oct	-	-	-	-	33	17	0	16
31	25-Oct	-	-	-	-	30	14	0	16
32	26-Oct	59	47	40	35	35	19	2	14
33	27-Oct	59	47	38	35	35	19	2	14
34	28-Oct	59	47	40	35	35	19	0	16
35	29-Oct	-	-	-	-	34	18	0	16
36	30-Oct	-	-	-	-	33	17	2	14
37	31-Oct	-	-	-	-	31	15	2	14
38	1-Nov	59	47	43	35	34	18	0	16
39	2-Nov	-	-	-	-	30	14	0	16
40	3-Nov	-	-	-	-	33	17	0	16
41	4-Nov	-	-	-	-	34	18	2	14
42	5-Nov	-	-	-	-	34	18	2	14
43	6-Nov	-	-	-	-	31	15	2	14
44	7-Nov	-	-	-	-	28	12	0	16
45	8-Nov	59	48	40	36	29	13	2	14

APPENDIX 17 (CONTINUED)
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) KC-10'S

46	9-Nov	-	-	-	-	34	18	2	14
47	10-Nov	59	48	36	36	35	19	1	15
48	11-Nov	-	-	-	-	33	17	2	14
49	12-Nov	-	-	-	-	32	16	2	14
50	13-Nov	-	-	-	-	32	16	1	15
51	14-Nov	-	-	-	-	30	14	0	16
52	15-Nov	-	-	-	-	30	14	0	16
53	16-Nov	59	48	39	36	34	18	0	16
54	22-Nov	59	49	5	37	34	18	0	16
55	23-Nov	-	-	-	-	36	20	0	16
56	24-Nov	-	-	-	-	30	14	0	16
57	25-Nov	-	-	-	-	22	6	0	16
58	26-Nov	-	-	-	-	24	8	0	16
59	27-Nov	-	-	-	-	27	11	0	16
60	28-Nov	-	-	-	-	26	10	0	16
61	29-Nov	59	50	48	38	30	14	0	16
62	30-Nov	59	48	38	36	27	11	0	16
63	1-Dec	59	48	40	36	38	22	0	16
64	2-Dec	59	48	36	36	35	19	0	16
65	3-Dec	-	-	-	-	33	17	0	16
66	4-Dec	-	-	-	-	32	16	4	12
67	5-Dec	-	-	-	-	34	18	4	12
AVG	N/A	59	47	37	35	32	16	1	15
%	N/A	N/A	79.1%	80.3%	75%	91.4%	50.1%	1.9%	48.0%

NOTE 1: POSSESSED aircraft are those aircraft AMC physically has control over, I.e., not in Depot Status, Loaners, or Chopped.

NOTE 2: The 75% THRESHOLD is the AMC mandated percentage of POSSESSED aircraft that can be tasked for any operation.

NOTE 3: JA/AAT is joint training with the Army.

APPENDIX 18
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) KC-135'S

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) KC-135's									
#	DATE '99	OWNED	POSSESSED	MISSION CAPABLE	THRESHOLD (56%)	TOTAL MSNS	TASK	JA/AAT	TRAINING
1	13-16 Sep	192	118	86	66	55	23	0	32
2	17-19 Sep	192	117	72	66	53	21	0	32
3	20-Sep	192	117	83	66	60	28	0	32
4	21-Sep	192	115	86	64	61	29	0	32
5	22-Sep	192	115	81	64	60	28	0	32
6	23-Sep	192	115	81	64	61	29	0	32
7	24-26 Sep	192	114	84	64	59	27	0	32
8	27-Sep	192	114	85	64	61	29	0	32
9	28-Sep	192	114	81	64	66	34	0	32
10	29-Sep	192	114	76	64	64	32	0	32
11	30-Sep	192	114	76	64	66	34	0	32
12	1-Oct	192	114	76	64	66	34	0	32
13	2-Oct	192	114	76	64	64	32	0	32
14	3-Oct	192	114	76	64	60	28	0	32
15	4-Oct	192	114	76	64	63	31	0	32
16	5-Oct	192	115	84	64	67	35	0	32
17	6-Oct	192	115	86	64	68	36	0	32
18	7-Oct	192	115	86	64	65	33	0	32
19	8-11 OCT	192	119	95	67	64	32	0	32
20	12-Oct	192	117	98	66	69	37	0	32
21	13-Oct	192	117	91	66	65	33	0	32
22	14-Oct	192	117	92	66	67	35	0	32
23	15-17 OCT	192	117	93	66	65	30	0	35
24	18-Oct	192	117	98	66	66	31	0	35
25	19-Oct	192	117	94	66	70	33	0	37
26	20-Oct	-	-	-	-	68	33	0	35
27	21-Oct	192	117	90	66	67	32	0	35
28	22-Oct	192	111	86	62	66	31	0	35
29	23-Oct	-	-	-	-	60	25	0	35
30	24-Oct	-	-	-	-	61	26	0	35
31	25-Oct	-	-	-	-	64	29	0	35
32	26-Oct	192	114	91	64	67	35	0	32
33	27-Oct	192	114	86	64	65	33	0	32
34	28-Oct	192	113	86	63	67	35	0	32
35	29-Oct	-	-	-	-	70	38	0	32
36	30-Oct	-	-	-	-	67	35	0	32
37	31-Oct	-	-	-	-	66	34	0	32
38	1-Nov	192	112	91	63	71	39	0	32
39	2-Nov	-	-	-	-	70	38	0	32
40	3-Nov	192	111	88	62	69	37	0	32
41	4-Nov	-	-	-	-	70	38	0	32
42	5-Nov	-	-	-	-	70	38	0	32
43	6-Nov	-	-	-	-	71	39	0	32
44	7-Nov	-	-	-	-	73	41	0	32
45	8-Nov	192	112	91	63	72	40	0	32
46	9-Nov	-	-	-	-	72	40	0	32

APPENDIX 18 (CONTINUED)
AIR MOBILITY COMMAND (ACTIVE) KC-135'S

47	10-Nov	192	115	84	64	67	35	0	32
48	11-Nov	-	-	-	-	67	35	0	32
49	12-Nov	-	-	-	-	66	34	0	32
50	13-Nov	-	-	-	-	67	35	0	32
51	14-Nov	-	-	-	-	67	35	0	32
52	15-Nov	-	-	-	-	68	36	0	32
53	16-Nov	192	117	88	66	72	40	0	32
54	22-Nov	192	119	94	67	78	46	0	32
55	23-Nov	-	-	-	-	78	46	0	32
56	24-Nov	-	-	-	-	76	44	0	32
57	25-Nov	-	-	-	-	64	32	0	32
58	26-Nov	-	-	-	-	59	27	0	32
59	27-Nov	-	-	-	-	59	27	0	32
60	28-Nov	-	-	-	-	58	26	0	32
61	29-Nov	192	120	100	67	71	39	0	32
62	30-Nov	192	120	95	67	73	41	0	32
63	1-Dec	192	120	90	67	66	34	0	32
64	2-Dec	192	120	94	67	65	33	0	32
65	3-Dec	-	-	-	-	62	30	0	32
66	4-Dec	-	-	-	-	63	31	0	32
67	5-Dec	-	-	-	-	64	32	0	32
AVE	N/A	192	116	87	65	66	34	0	32
%	N/A	N/A	60.2%	75.0%	56%	101.8%	50.8%	0.0%	49.2%

NOTE 1: POSSESSED aircraft are those aircraft AMC physically has control over, i.e., not in Depot Status, Loaners, or Chopped.

NOTE 2: The 56% THRESHOLD is the AMC mandated percentage of POSSESSED aircraft that can be tasked for any operation.

NOTE 3: JA/AAT is joint training with the Army.

APPENDIX 19
AF RESERVE (AMC) AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE (NOTIONAL)

AF RESERVE (AMC) A/C AVAILABLE @ NOTIONAL 25% UE							
		C-5	C-17	C-130	C-141	KC-10	KC-135
#	DATE	(40 TOTAL)	(0 TOTAL)	(271 TOTAL)	(56 TOTAL)	(0 TOTAL)	(267 TOTAL)
1	13-Sep	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	48
2	17-Sep	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
3	20-Sep	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
4	21-Sep	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	46
5	22-Sep	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
6	23-Sep	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
7	24-Sep	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
8	27-Sep	7	N/A	74	11	N/A	47
9	28-Sep	7	N/A	74	11	N/A	47
10	29-Sep	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	48
11	30-Sep	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	48
12	1-Oct	7	N/A	74	11	N/A	47
13	5-Oct	7	N/A	73	10	N/A	46
14	6-Oct	7	N/A	73	10	N/A	46
15	7-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	46
16	8-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	46
17	12-Oct	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	45
18	13-Oct	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	45
19	14-Oct	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
20	15-Oct	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
21	18-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
22	19-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
23	21-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
24	22-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
25	26-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	48
26	27-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	46
27	28-Oct	7	N/A	73	11	N/A	46
28	1-Nov	6	N/A	72	11	N/A	47
29	3-Nov	6	N/A	72	11	N/A	47
30	8-Nov	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
31	10-Nov	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	46
32	16-Nov	6	N/A	72	11	N/A	46
33	22-Nov	6	N/A	72	12	N/A	47
34	29-Nov	6	N/A	72	12	N/A	49
35	30-Nov	6	N/A	72	12	N/A	47
36	1-Dec	6	N/A	72	12	N/A	47
37	2-Dec	6	N/A	72	12	N/A	49
AVG	N/A	6	N/A	73	11	N/A	47
NOTE 1: The total number of each type of aircraft is based on Primary Aircraft Assigned for only operational (deployable) units.							

APPENDIX 20

COMBAT AEF # 1 (HILL AFB UT)

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 1 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	1-90	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		23//183		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	176-265	ACTIVE DUTY:		18//153	AV PKG 1	78	66.5	76.0	63.7	76.2	97	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	351-365	ANG:		3//16	AV PKG 2	90	74.7	76.0	73.7	76.2	109	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	1-75	AFRC:		2//14	AV PKG 3	128	107.7	139.4	119.1	68.2	147	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	161-250	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		14//8	AV PKG 4	132	238.4	183.0	119.1	68.2	149	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	336-365	3-YR "ON-CALL":		102		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	63				DAY-DAY	106	N/A	47.6	N/A	28.0	N/A	
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	388 FW	HILL AFB UT	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	63
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	71 FS/1 FW (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	LANGLEY AFB VA	18	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	393 BS/509 BW (B-2) [ACTIVE DUTY]	WHITEMAN AFB MO	8	6	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	63
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	9 FS/49 FW (F-117) [ACTIVE DUTY]	HOLLOMAN AFB NM	24	12	14.9	0.0	26.3	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 7	123
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	14 FS/35 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MISAWA AB JAPAN	18	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	75 FS/23 FG [ACTIVE DUTY]	POPE AFB NC	24	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	41 RQS/347 WG (HH-60G) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MOODY AFB GA	14	4	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 7	123
	71 RQS/347 WG (HC-130) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MOODY AFB GA	9	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 7	123
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	963 AACs/ 552 ACW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 7	123
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	34 FS/388 FW (F-16C BLK 40) [ACTIVE DUTY]	HILL AFB UT	18	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
	4 FS/388 FW (F-16C BLK 40) [ACTIVE DUTY]	HILL AFB UT	18	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
	421 FS/388 FW (F-16C BLK 40) [ACTIVE DUTY]	HILL AFB UT	18	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	2 ARS/305 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	11	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	8	0.0	16.0	AEF 7	123
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	905 ARS/319 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	6	4.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	ALERT 4	136
	906 ARS/319 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	6	3.4	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	ALERT 4	136
	911 ARS/319 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	6	2.8	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	ALERT 4	136
	912 ARS/319 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	6	0.0	121 0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	AEF 8	123

APPENDIX 20 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 1 (HILL AFB UT)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	9 AS/436 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	DOVER AFB DE	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 7	123
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	300 AS/315 AW [AFRC-437 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	0	63
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	4 AS/62 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	11	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	7	7.0	0.0	AEF 7	123
	729 AS/452 AW [AFRC]	MARCH ARB CA	7	5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	3	3.0	0.0	AEF 7	123
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	105 AS/118 AW [ANG]	NASHVILLE MET. TN	10	6	1.8	3.6	0.0	0.0	3	1.8	0.0	AEF 7	123
	165 AS/123 AW [ANG]	LOUISVILLE IAP KY	10	6	1.5	3.6	0.0	0.0	3	1.8	0.0	AEF 7	123
	181 AS/136 AW [ANG]	NAS DALLAS TX	8	4	1.0	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 7	123
		TOTAL:	313	183	106.3	76.0	119.1	46.0	106	47.6	28.0	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	14	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	102
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	18	12	7	HC-130	1	9	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	0	0	0	0	E-3	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	1	8	6	3	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	54	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	0	0	0	0									
F-15E	0	0	0	0	KC-10	1	14	11	8	0.0	16.0		
F-117	1	24	12	7	KC-135E/R	4	44	24	12	0.0	12.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	18	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	24	12	7	C-141	2	24	16	10	10.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	14	4	2	C-130	3	28	16	8	4.8	0.0		
					TOTAL:	23	313	183	106	47.6	28.0		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	12	7.4	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	19.2		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	2	12	3.3	0.0	7	12	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	10	78	66.5	63.7	66	97	50.0	6.3	12.4	10.0	19.2		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	76.0	46.0				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 2 TANKERS:	0.0	30.2			COMBAT MISSIONS:	48	96				
							SUPPORT MISSIONS:	49	70				
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	76.0	76.2			TOTAL:	97	166				

APPENDIX 20 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 1 (HILL AFB UT)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	2.8	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	12	7.4	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	19.2
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	12	3.3	0.0	7	12	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	90	74.7	73.7	73	109	50.0	7.5	14.7	10.0	19.2
		AVAIL "AS IS":	76.0	46.0							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 2 TANKERS:	0.0	30.2							
											DAY-DAY
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	76.0	76.2	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO ARLIFT:		0.0	COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120	
								SUPPORT MISSIONS:	49	70	
									TOTAL:	109	190
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	1	6	5.6	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-117	1	12	14.9	26.3	7	12	0.0	2.6	5.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	18	10.2	0.0	10	17	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	12	3.3	0.0	7	12	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	17	128	107.7	119.1	95	147	50.0	13.5	27.6	17.0	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	76.0	46.0				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 2	63.4	22.2		COMBAT MISSIONS:	89	180			
					SUPPORT MISSIONS:	58	83				
		TOTAL AVAIL:	139.4	68.2			TOTAL:	147	263		

APPENDIX 20 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 1 (HILL AFB UT)

[illegible]

NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 905 ARS/319 ARW, 906 ARS/319 ARW, 105 AS/118 AW, and 165 AS/123 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 905 ARS/319 ARW, 906 ARS/319 ARW, 105 AS/118 AW, and 165 AS/123 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, one of the two E-3 aircraft must deploy without tanker support.

NOTE 4: If Aviation Package # 3 is deployed, only the 905 ARS/319 ARW, 906 ARS/319 ARW, 911 ARS/319 ARW, 105 AS/118 AW, and 165 AS/123 AW will remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 5: If Aviation Package # 4 is deployed, only the 905 ARS/319 ARW, 906 ARS/319 ARW, 911 ARS/319 ARW, 105 AS/118 AW, 165 AS/123 AW, and 181 AS/136 AW will remain in place to support combat operations.

NOTE 6: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations

NOTE 7: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.

NOTE 8: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.

NOTE 9: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, combat support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.

NOTE 10: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, 1 Mar 98, Tables 9 and 10. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for bombers and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for HH-60Gs.

NOTE 11: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the third squadron had 70%.

APPENDIX 21

COMBAT AEF # 2 (DYESS AFB TX)

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 2 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	1-90	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		23/182	DEPLOYED A/C		C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	176-265	ACTIVE DUTY:		11/91	AV PKG 1		81	66.1	74.8	63.7	74.4	102
	YR 3 (DAYS)	351-365	ANG:		8/54	AV PKG 2		93	74.3	74.8	73.7	74.4	114
	YR 4 (DAYS)	1-75	AFRC:		4/37	AV PKG 3		133	110.7	141.2	118.2	68.4	152
	YR 5 (DAYS)	161-250	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		13/8	AV PKG 4		136	241.4	184.8	118.2	68.4	153
	YR 6 (DAYS)	336-365	3-YR "ON-CALL":		95			A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY
	3-YR AVERAGE:	63				DAY-DAY		107	N/A	47.8	N/A	25.2	N/A
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	7 BW	DYESS AFB TX	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	63
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	19 FS/3 WG (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELMENDORF AFB AK	18	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	9 BS/7 BW (B-1) [ACTIVE DUTY]	DYESS AFB TX	15	6	12.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	63
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	336 FS/4 FW (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB NC	24	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 8	123
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	79 FS/20 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	SHAW AFB SC	18	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	303 FS/442 FW [AFRC]	WHITEMAN AFB MO	15	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	129 RQS/129 RW (HH-60G) [ANG]	MOFFETT FIELD CA	4	3	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 8	123
	129 RQS/129 RW (HC-130) [ANG]	MOFFETT FIELD CA	3	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	N/A	0
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	964 AACs/ 552 ACW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 8	123
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	457 FS/301 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [AFRC]	CARSWELL FIELD TX	15	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
	188 FS/150 FW (F-16C BLK 40) [ANG]	KIRTLAND AFB NM	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
	111 FS/147 FW (F-16C BLK 25) [ANG]	ELLINGTON FIELD TX	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	63
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	6 ARS/60 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	7	0.0	14.0	AEF 8	123
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	99 ARS/19 ARG (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	ROBINS AFB GA	11	6	4.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	AEF 7	123
	147 ARS/171 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	6	3.4	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	AEF 8	123
	465 ARS/507 ARW (KC-135R) [AFRC]	TINKER AFB OK	8	4	2.5	0.0	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	2.0	0	63
	136 ARS/107 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	NIAGARA FALLS IAP NY	8	4	2.5	0.0	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	2.0	0	63
	191 ARS/151 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	SALT LAKE CITY UT	10	6	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	AEF 8	123

APPENDIX 21 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 2 (DYESS AFB TX)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	22 AS/60 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 8	123
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	317 AS/315 AW [AFRC-437 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	0	63
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	183 AS/172 AW [ANG]	JACKSON IAP MS	9	6	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	4	4.0	0.0	AEF 8	123
	6 AS/305 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	7	0.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	5	5.0	0.0	AEF 8	123
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	39 AS/317 AG [ACTIVE DUTY]	DYESS AFB TX	14	8	2.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	AEF 8	123
	40 AS/317 AG [ACTIVE DUTY]	DYESS AFB TX	14	8	1.7	4.8	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	AEF 8	123
	198 AS/156 AW [ANG]	MARIN IAP PUERTO RICO	6	3	1.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 8	123
		TOTAL:	288	182	109.3	74.8	118.2	40.4	107	47.8	25.2	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	13	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	95
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY		C-141	KC-135R
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY				
F-15A/C	1	18	12	7	HC-130	0	3	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	1	15	6	3	E-3	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	45	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	0	0	0	0									
F-15E	1	24	12	7	KC-10	1	12	9	7	0.0	14.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	5	47	26	13	0.0	11.2		
F-16C BLK 50	1	18	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	15	12	7	C-141	2	19	13	9	9.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	3	2	C-130	3	34	19	10	6.0	0.0		
					TOTAL:	23	288	182	107	47.8	25.2		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL		DAY	SURGE
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	12	7.4	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.8	17.3		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	9	9	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	2	16	3.7	0.0	9	16	9.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	10	81	66.1	63.7	68	102	51.4	6.3	12.2	10.8	17.3		
		AVAILABLE:	74.8	40.4									
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 1 TANKERS:	0.0	34.0				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	74.8	74.4			COMBAT MISSIONS:	48	96				
							SUPPORT MISSIONS:	54	74				
							TOTAL:	102	170				

APPENDIX 21 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 2 (DYESS AFB TX)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	2.8	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	12	7.4	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.8	17.3
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	9	9	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	16	3.7	0.0	9	16	9.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	93	74.3	73.7	75	114	51.4	7.5	14.5	10.8	17.3
		AVAIL "AS IS":	74.8	40.4							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF #									
		1 TANKERS:	0.0	34.0							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	74.8	74.4	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO ARLIFT:		0.0				
			DAY-DAY	SURGE							
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120							
		SUPPORT MSNS:	54	74							
		TOTAL:	114	194							
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	20	12.4	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.6	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	9	9	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	16	3.7	0.0	9	16	9.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	17	133	110.7	118.2	97	152	51.4	13.3	26.9	17.6	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	74.8	40.4				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF #									
		1	66.4	28.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:	89	180			
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:	63	90			
		TOTAL AVAIL:	141.2	68.4			TOTAL:	152	270		

APPENDIX 21 (CONTINUED)

COMBAT AEF # 2 (DYESS AFB TX)

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	20	12.4	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.6	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	9	9	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	19	4.7	0.0	10	17	10.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	136	241.4	118.2	98	153	52.0	13.3	26.9	17.6	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	74.8	40.4				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 1	66.4	28.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		64	95		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0			TOTAL:	153	275		
		READILY AVAIL	184.8	68.4							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	184.8	68.4	"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	0.0					

NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 99ARS/19 ARG, 147 ARS/171 ARW, 39 AS/317 AG, and 40 AS/317 AG would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 99ARS/19 ARG, 147 ARS/171 ARW, 39 AS/317 AG, and 40 AS/317 AG would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed simultaneously, one of the two E-3 aircraft must deploy without tankers.

NOTE 4: If Aviation Package # 3 is deployed, only the 99 ARS/19 ARG, 147 ARS/171 ARW, 465 ARS/507 ARW, 136 ARS/107 ARW, 39 AS/317 AG, and 40 AS/317 AG will remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 5: If Aviation Package # 4 is deployed, only the 99 ARS/19 ARG, 147 ARS/171 ARW, 465 ARS/507 ARW, 136 ARS/107 ARW, 39 AS/317 AG, 40 AS/317 AG, and 198 AS/156 AW will remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 6: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations.

NOTE 7: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation/Peacekeeping Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.

NOTE 8: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.

NOTE 9: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, combat support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.

NOTE 10: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Tables 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for bombers and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for HH-60Gs.

NOTE 11: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the remaining squadron(s) had 70%.

APPENDIX 22 **COMBAT AEF # 3 (ELMENDORF AFB AK)**

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 3 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	91-180	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		21//178		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	266-355	ACTIVE DUTY:		14//127		AV PKG 1	74	64.7	71.6	63.7	76.0	90
	YR 3 (DAYS)	0	ANG:		6//42		AV PKG 2	90	74.2	89.6	73.7	76.0	106
	YR 4 (DAYS)	76-165	AFRC:		1//9		AV PKG 3	131	108.2	140.0	118.2	69.0	145
	YR 5 (DAYS)	251-340	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		13//8		AV PKG 4	131	237.9	183.6	118.2	69.0	145
	YR 6 (DAYS)	0	3-YR "ON-CALL":		89		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	60					DAY-DAY	105	N/A	45.2	N/A	30.0	N/A
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	3 WG	ELMENDORF AFB AK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	54 FS/3 WG (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELMENDORF AFB AK	24	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	77 BS/28 BW (B-1) [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELLSWORTH AFB SD	6	4	10.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0	60
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	90 FS/3 WG (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELMENDORF AFB AK	18	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	13 FS/35 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MISAWA AB JAPAN	18	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	355 FS/354 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	EIELSON AFB AK	18	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	210 RQS/176 WG (HH-60G) [ANG]	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	5	4	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0	60
	210 RQS/176 WG (HC-130) [ANG]	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	3	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	N/A	0
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	962 AACS/ 3 WG [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELMENDORF AFB AK	2	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 9	121
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	18 FS/354 FW (F-16C BLK 40) [ACTIVE DUTY]	EIELSON AFB AK	18	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	107 FS/127 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	SELFREDGE ANGB MI	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	189 FS/120 FW (F-16A BLK 15) [ANG]	GREAT FALLS IAP MT	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	30 ARS/305 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	11	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	8	0.0	16.0	AEF 9	121
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	168 ARS/168 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	EIELSON AFB AK	8	4	3.2	0.0	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	2.0	0	60
	92 ARS/92 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	7	3.6	0.0	0.0	7.0	4	0.0	4.0	ALERT 5	132
	93 ARS/92 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	7	3.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	4	0.0	4.0	ALERT 5	132
	96 ARS/92 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	7	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	4	0.0	4.0	ALERT 5	132

APPENDIX 22 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 3 (ELMENDORF AFB AK)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	3 AS/436 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	DOVER AFB DE	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 9	121
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	701 AS/315 AW [AFRC-437 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	0	60
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	8 AS/62 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	11	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	7	7.0	0.0	AEF 9	121
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	517 AS/3 WG [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELMENDORF AFB AK	16	9	2.1	5.4	0.0	0.0	5	3.0	0.0	AEF 9	121
	144 AS/176 WG [ANG]	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	8	4	1.3	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 9	121
	187 AS/153 AW [ANG]	CHEYENNE MAP WY	8	4	1.1	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 9	121
		TOTAL:	277	178	105.8	71.6	118.2	47.0	105	45.2	30.0	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	13	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	89
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY		C-141	KC-135R
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY				
F-15A/C	1	24	12	7	HC-130	0	3	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	1	6	4	2	E-3	1	2	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	48	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	0	0	0	0									
F-15E	1	18	12	7	KC-10	1	14	11	8	0.0	16.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	4	44	25	14	0.0	14.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	18	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	18	12	7	C-141	1	17	11	7	7.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	5	4	2	C-130	3	32	17	9	5.4	0.0		
					TOTAL:	21	277	178	105	45.2	30.0		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL		DAY	SURGE
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	11	6.8	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	17.6		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	1	9	2.1	0.0	5	8	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	9	74	64.7	63.7	61	90	44.6	6.3	12.4	10.0	17.6		
		AVAILABLE:	71.6	47.0				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 4 TANKERS:	0.0	29.0			COMBAT MISSIONS:	48	96				
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	71.6	76.0			SUPPORT MISSIONS:	42	61				
							TOTAL:	90	157				

APPENDIX 22 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 3 (ELMENDORF AFB AK)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	2.8	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	11	6.8	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	17.6
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	13	3.4	0.0	7	12	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	90	74.2	73.7	70	106	47.0	7.5	14.7	10.0	17.6
		AVAIL "AS IS":	71.6	47.0							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 4 TANKERS:	0.0	29.0							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 4 C-141'S:	18.0	0.0							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	89.6	76.0	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:		0.0				
			DAY-DAY	SURGE							
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120							
		SUPPORT MSNS:	46	67							
		TOTAL:	106	187							
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	4	10.8	0.0	2	3	0.0	1.2	3.3	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	18	9.8	0.0	10	17	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	17	4.5	0.0	9	15	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	17	131	108.2	118.2	93	145	48.8	12.5	25.4	17.0	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	71.6	47.0				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 4	68.4	22.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:	87	176			
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:	58	88			
		TOTAL AVAIL:	140.0	69.0			TOTAL:	145	264		

APPENDIX 22 (CONTINUED)

COMBAT AEF # 3 (ELMENDORF AFB AK)

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	4	10.8	0.0	2	3	0.0	1.2	3.3	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	18	9.8	0.0	10	17	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	17	4.5	0.0	9	15	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	17	131	237.9	118.2	93	145	48.8	12.5	25.4	17.0	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	71.6	47.0				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 4	68.4	22.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:		87	176		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		58	88		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0		TOTAL:		145	264		
		READILY AVAIL	183.6	69.0							
		AVAIL W/ "EXCESS" TANKERS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	183.6	69.0	"EXCESS" TANKERS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT		0.0				
NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 168 ARS/168 ARW, 92 ARS/92 ARW and 517 AS/3 WG would remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 168 ARS/168 ARW, 92 ARS/92 ARW, 517 AS/3 WG, and 144 AS/176 WG would remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, the 13 AS/305 AMW and/or the 97 AS/446 AW assigned to AEF # 4 must be tasked to support deployment operations (only). Additionally, one of the two E-3 aircraft must deploy without tanker support.											
NOTE 4: If Aviation Packages # 3 or # 4 are deployed, only the 168 ARS/168 ARW, 92 ARS/92 ARW, and 93 ARS/92 ARW will remain in-place to support refueling operations.											
NOTE 5: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations											
NOTE 6: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.											
NOTE 7: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.											
NOTE 8: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighter/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, combat support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.											
NOTE 9: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.											
NOTE 10: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the remaining squadron(s) had 70%.											

APPENDIX 23 **COMBAT AEF # 4 (RAF LAKENHEATH UK)**

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 4 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	91-180	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		22//182		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	266-355	ACTIVE DUTY:		15//132	AV PKG 1	75	64.8	78.6	63.7	74.2	97	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	0	ANG:		5//30	AV PKG 2	92	74.4	78.6	73.7	74.2	115	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	76-165	AFRC:		2//20	AV PKG 3	130	106.6	140.0	116.5	69.2	153	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	251-340	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		14//8	AV PKG 4	133	237.3	183.6	116.5	69.2	156	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	0	3-YR "ON-CALL":		95		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	60				DAY-DAY	110	N/A	50.8	N/A	26.1	N/A	
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	48 FW	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	493 FS/48 FW (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	96 BS/2 BW (B-52) [ACTIVE DUTY]	BARKSDALE AFB LA	15	6	10.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	60
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	492 FS/48 FW (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 10	121
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	22 FS/52 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	SPANGDAHLEM AB GE	18	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	81 FS/52 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	SPANGDAHLEM AB GE	18	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	56 RQS/85 GP (HH-60G) [ACTIVE DUTY]	KEFLAVIK NAS IC	4	3	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 9	121
	56 RQS/85 GP (HC-130) [ACTIVE DUTY]	KEFLAVIK NAS IC	1	1	2.3	0.0	1.8	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	N/A	0
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	965 AACs/ 552 ACW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 10	121
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	510 FS/31 FW (F-16C BLK 40) [ACTIVE DUTY]	AVIANO AB IT	18	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	555 FS/31 FW (F-16C BLK 40) [ACTIVE DUTY]	AVIANO AB IT	18	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	134 FS/158 FW (F-16C BLK 25) [ANG]	BURLINGTON IAP VT	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	9 ARS/60 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	7	0.0	14.0	AEF 10	121
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	351 ARS/100 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	RAF MILDENHALL UK	13	7	4.3	0.0	0.0	7.0	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 9	121
	150 ARS/108 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	6	3.4	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	AEF 10	121
	97 ARS/92 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	7	3.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 9	121
	203 ARS/154 WG (KC-135R) [ANG]	HICKAM AFB HI	8	4	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	2.0	0	60

APPENDIX 23 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 4 (RAF LAKENHEATH UK)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	21 AS/60 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 10	121
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	728 AS/446 AW (AFRC-62 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT)	MCCHORD AFB WA	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	0	60
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	13 AS/305 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	7	0.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	5	5.0	0.0	AEF 10	121
	97 AS/446 AW [AFRC-62 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	11	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	7	7.0	0.0	AEF 10	121
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	37 AS/86 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	RAMSTEIN AB GE	17	9	2.1	5.4	0.0	0.0	5	3.0	0.0	AEF 10	121
	139 AS/109 AW [ANG]	SCHENECTADY NY	9	5	1.4	3.0	0.0	0.0	3	1.8	0.0	AEF 10	121
	143 AS/143 AW [ANG]	QUONSET ST. ARPT RI	6	3	1.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 10	121
		TOTAL:	303	182	105.2	78.6	116.5	40.2	110	50.8	26.1	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	14	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	95
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	24	12	7	HC-130	0	1	1	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0									
B-52H	1	15	6	3		3	51	36	21	0.0	0.0		
F-15E	1	24	12	7	KC-10	1	12	9	7	0.0	14.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	4	43	24	13	0.0	12.1		
F-16C BLK 50	1	18	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	18	12	7	C-141	2	27	18	12	12.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	3	2	C-130	3	32	17	10	6.0	0.0		
					TOTAL:	22	303	182	110	50.8	26.1		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	#EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	13	7.7	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.2	17.7		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	1	9	2.1	0.0	5	8	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	9	75	64.8	63.7	67	97	49.6	6.3	12.2	10.2	17.7		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	78.6	40.2				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 3 TANKERS:	0.0	34.0			COMBAT MISSIONS:	48	96				
							SUPPORT MISSIONS:	49	67				
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	78.6	74.2			TOTAL:	97	163				

APPENDIX 23 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 4 (RAF LAKENHEATH UK)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	2.8	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	13	7.7	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.2	17.7
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	14	3.5	0.0	8	14	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	92	74.4	73.7	77	115	53.2	7.5	14.5	10.2	17.7
		AVAIL "AS IS":	78.6	40.2							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF #3 TANKERS:	0.0	34.0							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	78.6	74.2	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO ARLIFT:		0.0				
			DAY-DAY	SURGE							
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120							
		SUPPORT MSNS:	55	75							
		TOTAL:	115	195							
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	1	6	10.8	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	1	2.3	1.8	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	20	10.7	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.1	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	14	3.5	0.0	8	14	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	16	130	106.6	116.5	99	153	53.2	13.3	26.7	17.1	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	78.6	40.2				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF #3	61.4	29.0	COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180			
		TOTAL AVAIL:	140.0	69.2	SUPPORT MISSIONS:		64	88			
						TOTAL:	153	268			

APPENDIX 23 (CONINUED)

COMBAT AEF # 4 (RAF LAKENHEATH UK)

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	1	6	10.8	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	1	2.3	1.8	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	20	10.7	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.1	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	17	4.5	0.0	10	17	10.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	17	133	237.3	116.5	101	156	55.0	13.3	26.7	17.1	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	78.6	40.2				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 3	61.4	29.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		67	93		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0		TOTAL:		156	273		
		READILY AVAIL	183.6	69.2							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TANKERS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	183.6	69.2	"EXCESS" TANKERS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	0.0					

NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 351 ARS/100 ARW, 150 ARS/108 ARW and 37 AS/86 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 351 ARS/100 ARW, 150 ARS/108 ARW, 37 AS/86 AW, and 139 AS/109 AW, would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, one of the two E-3 aircraft must deploy without tankers.

NOTE 4: If Aviation Package # 3 is deployed, only the 351 ARS/100 ARW, 150 ARS/108 ARW, 97 ARS/92 ARW, 37 AS/86 AW, and 139 AS/109 AW will remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 5: If Aviation Package # 4 is deployed, only the 351 ARS/100 ARW, 150 ARS/108 ARW, 97 ARS/92 ARW, 37 AS/86 AW, 139 AS/109 AW, and 143 AS/143 AW will remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 6: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations

NOTE 7: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.

NOTE 8: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.

NOTE 9: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, combat support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.

NOTE 10: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.

NOTE 11: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the remaining squadron(s) had 70 %.

APPENDIX 24

COMBAT AEF # 5 (DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ)

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 5 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	181-270	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		24//183		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	356-365	ACTIVE DUTY:		7//65	AV PKG 1	72	65.6	75.4	63.7	75.1	92	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	1-80	ANG:		8//52	AV PKG 2	90	76.6	76.6	70.9	73.4	110	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	166-255	AFRC:		9//66	AV PKG 3	134	117.4	143.8	119.1	67.1	152	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	341-365	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		12//8	AV PKG 4	134	247.1	187.4	119.1	67.1	152	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	1-65	3-YR *ON-CALL*:		82		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	61					DAY-DAY	107	N/A	47.6	N/A	27.2	N/A
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNITS "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	355 WG	D-M AFB AZ	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	58 FS/33 FW (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	EGLIN AFB FL	24	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	127 BS/184 BW (B-1) [ANG]	MCCONNELL AFB KS	8	6	12.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	61
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	8 FS/49 FW (F-117) [ACTIVE DUTY]	HOLLOMAN AFB NM	18	12	14.9	0.0	26.3	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	55 FS/20 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	SHAW AFB SC	18	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	354 FS/355 WG [ACTIVE DUTY]	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	24	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	305 RQS/939 RW (HH-60G) [AFRC]	DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ	6	4	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0	61
	303 RQS/939 RW (HC-130) [AFRC]	PORTLAND IAP OR	3	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 11	121
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	961 AACS/ 18 WG [ACTIVE DUTY]	KADENA AB JAPAN	2	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0	61
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	302 FS/944 FW (F-16C BLK 32) [AFRC]	LUKE AFB AZ	15	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
	120 FS/140 WG (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	BUCKLEY ANGB CO	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
	194 FS/144 FW (F-16C BLK 25) [ANG]	FRESNO AIR TERM CA	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	76 ARS/514 AMW [AFRC-305 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	11	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	8	0.0	16.0	0	61
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	132 ARS/101 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	BANGOR IAP MAINE	10	6	4.0	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	0	61
	173 ARS/155 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	LINCOLN MAP NE	8	4	3.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	2.0	AEF 12	121
	22 ARS/366 WG (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MT HOME AFB ID	11	6	2.8	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	AEF 11	121
	63 ARS/927 ARW (KC-135E) [AFRC]	SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	9	5	2.6	0.0	0.0	3.5	3	0.0	2.1	0	61
	106 ARS/117 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	BIRMINGHAM ARPT AL	8	4	0.0	137	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	2.0	0	61

APPENDIX 24 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 5 (DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	326 AS/512 AW [AFRC-436 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	DOVER AFB DE	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	0	61
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	14 AS/437 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	AEF 9	123
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	313 AS/446 AW [AFRC-62 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	11	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	7	7.0	0.0	AEF 11	121
	756 AS/459 AW [AFRC]	ANDREWS AFB MD	8	5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	3	3.0	0.0	0	61
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	158 AS/165 AW [ANG]	SAVANNAH IAP GA	8	4	1.5	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 5	133
	180 AS/139 AW [ANG]	ROSECRANS MEM. MO	8	4	1.3	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 5	133
	95 AS/440 AW [AFRC]	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	12	7	1.3	4.2	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	MOB 5	133
		TOTAL:	289	183	115.0	75.4	119.1	43.7	107	47.6	27.2	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	12	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	82
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	24	12	7	HC-130	1	3	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	1	8	6	3	E-3	1	2	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	45	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	0	0	0	0									
F-15E	0	0	0	0	KC-10	1	14	11	8	0.0	16.0		
F-117	1	18	12	7	KC-135E/R	5	46	25	13	0.0	11.2		
F-16C BLK 50	1	18	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	24	12	7	C-141	2	25	16	10	10.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	6	4	2	C-130	3	28	15	8	4.8	0.0		
					TOTAL:	24	289	183	107	47.6	27.2		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	# EQUIV'S REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
													0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	10	7.0	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.5	13.6		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	2	8	2.8	0.0	4	7	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	10	72	65.6	63.7	63	92	47.0	6.3	12.4	8.5	13.6		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	75.4	43.7				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 6 TANKERS:	0.0	31.4				COMBAT MISSIONS:	48	96			
								SUPPORT MISSIONS:	44	60			
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	75.4	75.1			TOTAL:	92	156				

APPENDIX 24 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 5 (DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	0.0	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	16	9.8	0.0	9	16	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.4	23.1
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	8	2.8	0.0	4	7	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	13	90	76.6	70.9	73	110	47.0	7.5	14.7	14.4	23.1
		AVAIL "AS IS":	75.4	43.7							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 6 TANKERS:	0.0	31.4						DAY-DAY	SURGE
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	76.6	73.4	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	1.8		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120	
								SUPPORT MISSIONS:	50	70	
								TOTAL:	110	190	
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-117	1	12	14.9	26.3	7	12	0.0	2.6	5.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	21	12.4	0.0	12	20	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.0	28.6
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	15	4.1	0.0	8	14	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	19	134	117.4	119.1	98	152	51.2	13.5	27.6	17.0	28.6
		AVAIL "AS IS":	75.4	43.7				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 6	68.4	23.4		COMBAT MISSIONS:	89	180			
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:	63	92			
		TOTAL AVAIL:	143.8	67.1		TOTAL:	152	272			

APPENDIX 24 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 5 (DAVIS-MONTHAN AFB AZ)

[illegible]

APPENDIX 25

COMBAT AEF # 6 (SHAW AFB SC)

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 6 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	181-270	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		24//185		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	356-365	ACTIVE DUTY:		12//98	AV PKG 1	74	65.2	79.2	63.7	77.1	96	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	1-80	ANG:		5//39	AV PKG 2	93	75.0	79.2	70.9	71.1	115	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	166-255	AFRC:		7//48	AV PKG 3	134	103.9	145.6	118.2	67.6	154	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	341-365	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		13//8	AV PKG 4	134	233.6	189.2	118.2	67.6	154	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	1-65	3-YR "ON-CALL":		99		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	61				DAY-DAY	109	N/A	50.8	N/A	26.2	N/A	
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	20 FW	SHAW AFB SC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	60 FS/33 FW (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	EGLIN AFB FL	24	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	325 BS/509 BW (B-2) [ACTIVE DUTY]	WHITEMAN AFB MO	6	4	5.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0	61
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	335 FS/4 FW (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB NC	24	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 12	121
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	78 FS/20 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	SHAW AFB SC	24	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 12	121
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	74 FS/23 FG [ACTIVE DUTY]	POPE AFB NC	18	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	301 RQS/939 RW (HH-60G) [AFRC]	PATRICK AFB FL	9	4	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0	61
	39 RQS/939 RW (HC-130) [AFRC]	PATRICK AFB FL	3	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 12	121
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	966 AACS/ 552 ACW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 12	121
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	93 FS/482 FW (F-16C BLK 32) [AFRC]	HOMESTEAD ARB FL	15	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
	112 FS/180 FW (F-16C BLK 42) [ANG]	TOLEDO EXP. ARPT OH	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
	138 FS/174 FW (F-16C BLK 25) [ANG]	SYRACUSE-HANCOCK NY	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	70 ARS/349 AMW [AFRC-60 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	7	0.0	14.0	0	61
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	91 ARS/6 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MACDILL AFB FL	11	6	4.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	AEF 12	121
	146 ARS/171 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	6	3.4	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	0	61
	909 ARS/18 WG (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	KADENA AB JAPAN	15	8	3.2	0.0	0.0	8.0	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 11	121
	384 ARS/22 ARW (KC-135E/R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	6	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.4	3	0.0	2.7	AEF 12	121

APPENDIX 25 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 6 (SHAW AFB SC)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	709 AS/512 AW [AFRC-436 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	DOVER AFB DE	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 12	121
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	15 AS/437 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	AEF 10	123
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	155 AS/164 AW [ANG]	MEMPHIS IAP TN	9	6	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	4	4.0	0.0	AEF 12	121
	356 AS/445 AW [AFRC]	WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH	8	5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	3	3.0	0.0	AEF 12	121
	732 AS/514 AMW [AFRC-305 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	7	0.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	5	5.0	0.0	AEF 12	121
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	50 AS/463 AG [ACTIVE DUTY]	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	14	8	2.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	MOB 5	133
	61 AS/463 AG [ACTIVE DUTY]	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	12	7	1.6	4.2	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	MOB 5	133
	192 AS/152 AW [ANG]	RENO/TAHOE IAP NV	6	3	1.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 5	133
		TOTAL:	305	185	101.5	79.2	118.2	41.6	109	50.8	25.8	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	13	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	99
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	24	12	7	HC-130	1	3	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	0	0	0	0	E-3	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	1	6	4	2	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	45	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	0	0	0	0									
F-15E	1	24	12	7	KC-10	1	12	9	7	0.0	14.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	4	47	26	13	0.0	12.2		
F-16C BLK 50	1	24	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	18	12	7	C-141	3	27	18	12	12.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	9	4	2	C-130	3	32	18	10	6.0	0.0		
					TOTAL:	24	305	185	109	50.8	26.2		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	12	7.4	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.2	16.3		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	1	8	2.0	0.0	4	7	4.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	9	74	65.2	63.7	66	96	49.0	6.3	12.4	10.2	16.3		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	79.2	41.6									
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 5 TANKERS:	0.0	35.5									
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	79.2	77.1				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
						COMBAT MISSIONS:		48	96				
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		48	66				
						TOTAL:		96	162				

APPENDIX 25 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 6 (SHAW AFB SC)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	0.0	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	12	7.4	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.2	16.3
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	15	3.6	0.0	8	14	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	93	75.0	70.9	77	115	53.2	7.5	14.7	10.2	16.3
		AVAIL "AS IS":	79.2	41.6							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 5 TANKERS:	0.0	29.5							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	79.2	71.1	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO ARLIFT:		0.0				
			DAY-DAY	SURGE							
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120							
		SUPPORT MSNS:	55	77							
		TOTAL:	115	197							
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	1	4	5.6	0.0	2	3	0.0	1.2	3.3	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	20	10.6	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.1	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	18	4.6	0.0	10	17	10.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	134	103.9	118.2	100	154	55.0	12.5	25.4	17.1	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	79.2	41.6							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 5	66.4	26.0				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
						COMBAT MISSIONS:		87	176		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		67	98		
		TOTAL AVAIL:	145.6	67.6			TOTAL:	154	274		

APPENDIX 25 (CONTINUED)

COMBAT AEF # 6 (SHAW AFB SC)

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	1	4	5.6	0.0	2	3	0.0	1.2	3.3	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	20	10.6	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.1	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	18	4.6	0.0	10	17	10.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	134	233.6	118.2	100	154	55.0	12.5	25.4	17.1	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	79.2	41.6				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 5	66.4	26.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:		87	176		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		67	98		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0		TOTAL:		154	274		
		READILY AVAIL	189.2	67.6							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	189.2	67.6	"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	0.0					

NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 91 ARS/6 ARW, 146 ARS/171 ARW and 50 AS/463 AG would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 91 ARS/6 ARW, 146 ARS/171 ARW, 50 AS/463 AG, and 61 AS/463 AG would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, both E-3 aircraft must deploy without tanker support.

NOTE 4: If Aviation Packages # 3 or # 4 are deployed, only the 91 ARS/6 ARW, 146 ARS/171 ARW, and 909 ARS/18 WG would remain in-place to support refueling operations.

NOTE 5: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations

NOTE 6: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.

NOTE 7: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.

NOTE 8: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.

NOTE 9: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.

NOTE 10: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the remaining squadron(s) had 70%.

APPENDIX 26

COMBAT AEF # 7 (BARKSDALE AFB LA)

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 7 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	271-360	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		23//181		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	0	ACTIVE DUTY:		11//84	AV PKG 1	77	66.3	76.0	63.7	73.9	97	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	81-170	ANG:		9//74	AV PKG 2	89	74.5	76.0	73.7	73.9	109	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	256-345	AFRC:		3//23	AV PKG 3	136	116.4	139.4	119.1	64.7	154	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	0	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		13//8	AV PKG 4	136	246.1	183.0	119.1	64.7	154	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	66-155	3-YR "ON-CALL":		94		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	60					DAY-DAY	106	N/A	47.6	N/A	27.1	N/A
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	2 BW	BARKSDALE AFB LA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	122 FS/159 FW (F-15A/B) [ANG]	JRB NEW ORLEANS LA	15	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	20 BS/2 BW (B-52) [ACTIVE DUTY]	BARKSDALE AFB LA	15	6	10.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	60
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	9 FS/49 FW (F-117) [ACTIVE DUTY]	HOLLOMAN AFB NM	24	12	14.9	0.0	26.3	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 1	123
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	77 FS/20 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	SHAW AFB SC	18	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	706 FS/926 FW [AFRC]	JRB NEW ORLEANS LA	15	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	41 RQS/347 WG (HH-60G) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MOODY AFB GA	14	4	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 1	123
	71 RQS/347 WG (HC-130) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MOODY AFB GA	9	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 1	123
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	963 AACS/ 552 ACW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 1	123
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	160 FS/187 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	DANNELLY FIELD AL	15	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	125 FS/138 FW (F-16C BLK 42) [ANG]	TULSA IAP OK	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	184 FS/188 FW (F-16A BLK 15) [ANG]	FT SMITH MAP AR	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	2 ARS/305 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	11	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	8	0.0	16.0	AEF 1	123
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	151 ARS/134 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	MCGHEE TYSON TN	9	5	3.2	0.0	0.0	3.5	3	0.0	2.1	0	60
	153 ARS/186 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	KEY FIELD MS	9	5	2.6	0.0	0.0	5.0	3	0.0	3.0	0	60
	99 ARS/19 ARG (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	ROBINS AFB GA	11	6	4.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	AEF 2	123
	72 ARS/434 ARW (KC-135R) [AFRC]	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	6	2.8	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	0	60

APPENDIX 26 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 7 (BARKSDALE AFB LA)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	9 AS/436 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	DOVER AFB DE	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 1	123
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	17 AS/437 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	AEF 11	120
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	4 AS/62 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	11	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	7	7.0	0.0	AEF 1	123
	729 AS/452 AW [AFRC]	MARCH ARB CA	7	5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	3	3.0	0.0	AEF 1	123
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	105 AS/118 AW [ANG]	NASHVILLE MET. TN	10	6	1.8	3.6	0.0	0.0	3	1.8	0.0	AEF 1	123
	165 AS/123 AW [ANG]	LOUISVILLE IAP KY	10	6	1.5	3.6	0.0	0.0	3	1.8	0.0	AEF 1	123
	181 AS/136 AW [ANG]	NAS DALLAS TX	8	4	1.1	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF1	123
		TOTAL:	294	181	114.0	76.0	119.1	42.5	106	47.6	27.1	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	13	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	94
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	15	12	7	HC-130	1	9	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	0	0	0	0	E-3	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	45	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	1	15	6	3									
F-15E	0	0	0	0	KC-10	1	14	11	8	0.0	16.0		
F-117	1	24	12	7	KC-135E/R	4	39	22	12	0.0	11.1		
F-16C BLK 50	1	18	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	15	12	7	C-141	2	24	16	10	10.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	14	4	2	C-130	3	28	16	8	4.8	0.0		
					TOTAL:	23	294	181	106	47.6	27.1		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	11	7.2	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.5	15.0		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	2	12	3.3	0.0	7	12	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	10	77	66.3	63.7	66	97	50.0	6.3	12.4	8.5	15.0		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	76.0	42.5			DAY-DAY	SURGE					
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 8 TANKERS:	0.0	31.4	COMBAT MISSIONS:		48	96					
					SUPPORT MISSIONS:		49	68					
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	76.0	73.9		TOTAL:	97	164					

APPENDIX 26 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 7 (BARKSDALE AFB LA)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	2.8	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	11	7.2	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.5	15.0
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	12	3.3	0.0	7	12	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	89	74.5	73.7	73	109	50.0	7.5	14.7	8.5	15.0
		AVAIL "AS IS":	76.0	42.5							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 8 TANKERS:	0.0	31.4							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	76.0	73.9	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO ARLIFT:		0.0				
			DAY-DAY	SURGE							
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120							
		SUPPORT MSNS:	49	68							
		TOTAL:	109	188							
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	1	6	10.8	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
F-15E	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-117	1	12	14.9	26.3	7	12	0.0	2.6	5.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	22	12.6	0.0	12	21	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.4	32.6
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	16	4.4	0.0	9	15	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	19	136	116.4	119.1	99	154	51.8	13.5	27.6	19.4	32.6
		AVAIL "AS IS":	76.0	42.5			DAY-DAY	SURGE			
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 8	63.4	22.2	COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180			
					SUPPORT MISSIONS:		65	96			
		TOTAL AVAIL:	139.4	64.7		TOTAL:	154	276			

APPENDIX 26 (CONTINUED) **COMBAT AEF # 7 (BARKSDALE AFB LA)**

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	1	6	10.8	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
F-15E	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-117	1	12	14.9	26.3	7	12	0.0	2.6	5.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	22	12.6	0.0	12	21	0.0	0.0	0.0	19.4	32.6
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	16	4.4	0.0	9	15	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	19	136	246.1	119.1	99	154	51.8	13.5	27.6	19.4	32.6
		AVAIL "AS IS":	76.0	42.5							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 8	63.4	22.2				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0				COMBAT MISSIONS:	89	180	
		READILY AVAIL	183.0	64.7				SUPPORT MISSIONS:	65	96	
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	183.0	64.7			TOTAL:	154	276		
					"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	0.0					
NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 99 ARS/19 ARG, 151 ARS/134 ARW, 105 AS/118 AW, and 165 AS/123 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 151 ARS/134 ARW, 99 ARS/19 ARG, 105 AS/118 AW, and 165 AS/123 AW, and would remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, one of the two E-3 aircraft must deploy without tanker support.											
NOTE 4: If Aviation Packages # 3 or # 4 are deployed, only the 151 ARS/134 ARW, 153 ARS/186 ARW, 99 ARS/19 ARG, and 72 ARS/434 ARW will remain in-place to support refueling operations.											
NOTE 5: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations											
NOTE 6: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.											
NOTE 7: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.											
NOTE 8: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.											
NOTE 9: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.											
NOTE 10: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the third squadron had 70%.											

APPENDIX 27

COMBAT AEF # 8 (ELLSWORTH AFB SD)

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 8 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	271-360	OPS SQ'S/A/C:		23//183		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	0	ACTIVE DUTY:		10//76	AV PKG 1	71	64.0	74.8	63.7	74.4	92	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	81-170	ANG:		13//107	AV PKG 2	86	73.4	74.8	73.7	74.4	106	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	256-345	AFRC:		0//0	AV PKG 3	137	114.0	141.2	114.7	63.4	154	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	0	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		12//8	AV PKG 4	137	243.7	184.8	114.7	63.4	154	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	66-155	5-YR *ON-CALL*:		96		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	60				DAY-DAY	108	N/A	47.8	N/A	26.2	N/A	
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S *ON-CALL* AVERAGE
LEAD WG	28 BW	ELLSWORTH AFB SD	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	110 FS/131 FW (F-15A/B) [ANG]	LAMBERT-ST LOUIS MO	15	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	37 BS/28 BW (B-1) [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELLSWORTH AFB SD	15	6	12.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	60
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	336 FS/4 FW (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB NC	24	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 2	123
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	157 FS/169 FW [ANG]	MCENTIRE ANGB SC	15	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	172 FS/110 FW [ANG]	KELLOGG ARPT MI	15	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	129 RQS/129 RW (HH-60G) [ANG]	MOFFETT FIELD CA	4	3	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 2	123
	129 RQS/129 RW (HC-130) [ANG]	MOFFETT FIELD CA	3	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	N/A	0
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	964 AACs/ 552 ACW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 2	123
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	175 FS/114 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	JOE FOSS FIELD SD	15	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	174 FS/185 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	SIOUX GATEWAY IA	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	178 FS/119 FW (F-16A-ADF (GP)) [ANG]	HECTOR IAP ND	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	6 ARS/60 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	7	0.0	14.0	AEF 2	123
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	145 ARS/121 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	4	3.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	2.0	0	60
	126 ARS/128 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	9	5	2.6	0.0	0.0	5.0	3	0.0	3.0	0	60
	191 ARS/151 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	SALT LAKE CITY UT	10	6	2.8	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	AEF 2	123
	912 ARS/319 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	6	4.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	AEF 1	123
	147 ARS/171 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	6	0.0	149	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	AEF 2	123

APPENDIX 27 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 8 (ELLSWORTH AFB SD)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	22 ARS/60 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 2	123
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	7 AS/62 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCHORD AFB WA	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	AEF 12	120
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	6 AS/305 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	7	0.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	5	5.0	0.0	AEF 2	123
	183 AS/172 AW [ANG]	JACKSON IAP MS	9	6	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	4	4.0	0.0	AEF 2	123
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	198 AS/156 AW [ANG]	MARIN IAP PUERTO RICO	6	3	1.2	1.8	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 2	123
	39 AS/317 AG [ACTIVE DUTY]	DYESS AFB TX	14	8	2.0	4.8	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	AEF 2	123
	40 AS/317 AG [ACTIVE DUTY]	DYESS AFB TX	14	8	1.4	4.8	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	AEF 2	123
		TOTAL:	283	183	109.2	74.8	118.2	41.4	108	47.8	26.2	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	12	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	96
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	15	12	7	HC-130	0	3	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	1	15	6	3	E-3	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	45	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	0	0	0	0									
F-15E	1	24	12	7	KC-10	1	12	9	7	0.0	14.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	5	48	27	14	0.0	12.2		
F-16C BLK 50	1	15	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	15	12	7	C-141	2	19	13	9	9.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	3	2	C-130	3	34	19	10	6.0	0.0		
					TOTAL:	23	283	183	108	47.8	26.2		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	10	7.0	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	16.0		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	9	9	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	1	8	2.0	0.0	5	8	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	9	71	64.0	63.7	63	92	46.6	6.3	12.2	10.0	16.0		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	74.8	41.4			DAY-DAY	SURGE					
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 7 TANKERS:	0.0	33.0	COMBAT MISSIONS:		48	96					
					SUPPORT MISSIONS:		44	58					
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	74.8	74.4	TOTAL:		92	154					

APPENDIX 27 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 8 (ELLSWORTH AFB SD)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	2.8	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	10	7.0	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.0	16.0
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	9	9	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	11	3.2	0.0	6	10	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	86	73.4	73.7	71	106	47.8	7.5	14.5	10.0	16.0
		AVAIL "AS IS":	74.8	41.4							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 7 TANKERS:	0.0	33.0							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	74.8	74.4	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO ARLIFT:		0.0				
			DAY-DAY	SURGE							
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120							
		SUPPORT MSNS:	46	63							
		TOTAL:	106	183							

AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	2	5.4	0.0	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	21	12.4	0.0	11	18	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	31.1
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	9	9	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	19	4.6	0.0	11	19	11.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	137	114.0	114.7	99	154	53.2	13.3	26.9	16.7	31.1
		AVAIL "AS IS":	74.8	41.4			DAY-DAY	SURGE			
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 7	66.4	22.0	COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180			
					SUPPORT MISSIONS:		65	96			
		TOTAL AVAIL:	141.2	63.4		TOTAL:	154	276			

APPENDIX 27 (CONTINUED)

COMBAT AEF # 8 (ELLSWORTH AFB SD)

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	2	5.4	0.0	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	21	12.4	0.0	11	18	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.7	31.1
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	9	9	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	19	4.6	0.0	11	19	11.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	137	243.7	114.7	99	154	53.2	13.3	26.9	16.7	31.1
		AVAIL "AS IS":	74.8	41.4				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 7	66.4	22.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		65	96		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0			TOTAL:	154	276		
		READILY AVAIL	184.8	63.4							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	184.8	63.4	"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT		0.0				

NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 145 ARS/121 ARW, 912 ARS/319 ARW and 39 AS/371 AG would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 145 ARS/121 ARW, 912 ARS/319 ARW, 198 AS/156 AW, and 39 AS/371 AG would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, one of the two E-3 aircraft must deploy without tanker support.

NOTE 4: If Aviation Packages # 3 or # 4 are deployed, only the 145 ARS/121 ARW, 126 ARS/128 ARW, 191 ARS/151 ARW and 912 ARS/319 ARW will remain in-place to support refueling operations.

NOTE 5: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations

NOTE 6: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.

NOTE 7: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.

NOTE 8: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.

NOTE 9: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.

NOTE 10: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the remaining squadron(s) had 70%.

APPENDIX 28 **COMBAT AEF # 9 (CANNON AFB NM)**

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 9 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	361-365	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		20//167		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	1-85	ACTIVE DUTY:		15//129	AV PKG 1	63	59.0	71.6	57.3	72.4	80	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	171-260	ANG:		5//38	AV PKG 2	85	71.9	72.3	70.1	72.4	101	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	346-365	AFRC:		0//0	AV PKG 3	127	105.8	145.0	110.1	62.4	142	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	1-70	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		14//8	AV PKG 4	127	235.5	188.6	110.1	62.4	142	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	156-245	3-YR *ON-CALL*:		93		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	61				DAY-DAY	99	N/A	45.2	N/A	25.9	N/A	
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S *ON-CALL* AVERAGE
LEAD WG	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	101 FS/102 FW (F-15A/B) [ANG]	OTIS ANGB MA	15	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	23 BS/5 BW (B-52) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MINOT AFB ND	12	6	10.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	61
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	494 FS/48 FW (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	428 FS/27 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	CANNON AFB NM	8	6	7.6	0.0	6.4	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	61
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	103 FS/111 FW [ANG]	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	15	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	56 RQS/85 GP (HH-60G) [ACTIVE DUTY]	KEFLAVIK NAS IC	4	3	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 4	121
	56 RQS/85 GP (HC-130) [ACTIVE DUTY]	KEFLAVIK NAS IC	1	1	2.3	0.0	1.8	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	N/A	0
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	962 AACs/ 3 WG [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELMENDORF AFB AK	2	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 3	121
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	524 FS/27 FW (F-16C BLK 40) [ACTIVE DUTY]	CANNON AFB NM	24	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
	522 FS/27 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ACTIVE DUTY]	CANNON AFB NM	18	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
	523 FS/27 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ACTIVE DUTY]	CANNON AFB NM	24	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	30 ARS/305 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCQUIRE AFB NJ	14	11	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	8	0.0	16.0	AEF 3	121
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	197 ARS/161 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	SKY HARBOR IAP AZ	10	6	3.4	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	0	61
	97 ARS/92 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	7	4.3	0.0	0.0	7.0	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 4	121
	351 ARS/100 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	RAF MILDENHALL UK	13	7	3.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 4	121

APPENDIX 28 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 9 (CANNON AFB NM)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	3 AS/436 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	DOVER AFB DE	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 3	121
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	14 AS/437 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	AEF 5	123
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	8 AS/62 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	11	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	7	7.0	0.0	AEF 3	121
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	517 AS/3 WG [ACTIVE DUTY]	ELMENDORF AFB AK	16	9	2.2	5.4	0.0	0.0	5	3.0	0.0	AEF 3	121
	187 AS/153 AW [ANG]	CHEYENNE MAP WY	8	4	1.3	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 3	121
	144 AS/176 WG [ANG]	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	8	4	1.1	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 3	121
		TOTAL:	273	167	102.8	71.6	110.1	40.2	99	45.2	26.1	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	14	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	93
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	15	12	7	HC-130	0	1	1	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	0	0	0	0	E-3	1	2	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	66	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	1	12	6	3									
F-15E	1	24	12	7	KC-10	1	14	11	8	0.0	16.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	3	35	20	11	0.0	9.9		
F-16C BLK 50	1	8	6	3	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	15	12	7	C-141	1	17	11	7	7.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	3	2	C-130	3	32	17	9	5.4	0.0		
					TOTAL:	20	273	167	99	45.2	25.9		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	6	7.6	6.4	3	5	0.0	0.5	1.2	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	1	7	4.3	0.0	4	7	0.0	0.0	0.0	7.0	11.2		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	1	9	2.2	0.0	5	8	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	8	63	59.0	57.3	55	80	44.6	5.6	11.0	7.0	11.2		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	71.6	40.2			DAY-DAY	SURGE					
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 10 TANKERS:	0.0	32.2	COMBAT MISSIONS:		41	84					
					SUPPORT MISSIONS:		39	53					
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	71.6	72.4		TOTAL:	80	137					

APPENDIX 28 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 9 (CANNON AFB NM)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	6	7.6	6.4	3	5	0.0	0.5	1.2	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	13	7.7	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.2	17.7
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	13	3.5	0.0	7	12	7.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	85	71.9	70.1	67	101	47.0	6.8	13.4	10.2	17.7
		AVAIL "AS IS":	71.6	40.2							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 10 TANKERS:	0.0	32.2							
											DAY-DAY
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNRK'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	72.3	72.4	"EXCESS" TNRK'S CONVERTED TO ARLIFT:		1.0	COMBAT MISSIONS:		53	108
								SUPPORT MISSIONS:		48	69
									TOTAL:	101	177
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	1	6	10.8	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	6	7.6	6.4	3	5	0.0	0.5	1.2	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	1	2.3	1.8	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	20	10.7	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.1	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	17	5.2	0.0	9	15	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	17	127	105.8	110.1	91	142	48.8	12.6	25.5	17.1	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	71.6	40.2				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 10	73.4	22.2	COMBAT MISSIONS:		82	168			
									SUPPORT MISSIONS:		60
		TOTAL AVAIL:	145.0	62.4			TOTAL:	142	256		

APPENDIX 28 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 9 (CANNON AFB NM)

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	1	6	10.8	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	6	7.6	6.4	3	5	0.0	0.5	1.2	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	1	2.3	1.8	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	20	10.7	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.1	28.8
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	7.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	17	5.2	0.0	9	15	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	17	127	235.5	110.1	91	142	48.8	12.6	25.5	17.1	28.8
		AVAIL "AS IS":	71.6	40.2							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 10	73.4	22.2				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0				82	168		
		READILY AVAIL	188.6	62.4				60	88		
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	188.6	62.4	"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT		TOTAL:	142	256		
NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 97 ARS/92 ARW and 517 AS/3 WG would remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 197 ARS/161 ARW, 97 ARS/92 ARW, 517 AS/3 WG, and 187 AS/153 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, one tanker must be converted to a cargo carrier.											
NOTE 4: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations											
NOTE 5: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.											
NOTE 6: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.											
NOTE 7: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.											
NOTE 8: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.											
NOTE 9: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the remaining squadron(s) had 70%.											

APPENDIX 29

COMBAT AEF # 10 (LANGLEY AFB VA)

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 10 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	361-365	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		24//191		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	1-85	ACTIVE DUTY:		9//81	AV PKG 1	73	64.4	83.6	63.7	74.6	98	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	171-260	ANG:		12//88	AV PKG 2	90	74.0	83.6	70.9	70.4	116	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	346-365	AFRC:		3//22	AV PKG 3	132	110.7	145.0	118.2	63.4	156	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	1-70	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		13//8	AV PKG 4	135	241.4	188.6	118.2	63.4	159	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	156-245	3-YR *ON-CALL*:		85		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	61				DAY-DAY	114	N/A	53.8	N/A	26.2	N/A	
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNITS "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	1 FW	LANGLEY AFB VA	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	61
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	27 FS/1 FW (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	LANGLEY AFB VA	24	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	128 BS/116 BW (B-1) [ANG]	ROBINS AFB GA	8	6	12.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	61
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	492 FS/48 FW (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 4	121
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	23 FS/52 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	SPANGDAHLEM AB GE	24	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	131 FS/104 FW [ANG]	BARNES MAP MA	15	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	102 RQS/106 RW (HH-60G) [ANG]	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4	3	5.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0	61
	102 RQS/106 RW (HC-130) [ANG]	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	N/A	0
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	965 AACS/ 552 ACW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 4	121
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	149 FS/192 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	RICHMOND IAP VA	15	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
	113 FS/181 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	HULMAN RAP IN	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
	163 FS/122 FW (F-16C BLK 25) [ANG]	FT WAYNE IAP IN	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	61
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	9 ARS/60 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	7	0.0	14.0	AEF 4	121
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	133 ARS/157 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	PEASE ANGB NH	9	5	3.8	0.0	0.0	5.0	3	0.0	3.0	0	61
	117 ARS/190 ARW (KC-135D/E) [ANG]	FORBES FIELD KS	10	6	3.4	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	0	61
	74 ARS/434 ARW (KC-135R) [AFRC]	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	6	2.8	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	0	61
	166 ARS/121 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	4	2.5	0.0	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	2.0	0	61
	150 ARS/108 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	6	0.0	15.7	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	AEF 4	121

APPENDIX 29 (CONTINUED) **COMBAT AEF # 10 (LANGLEY AFB VA)**

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	21 AS/60 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 4	121
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	15 AS/437 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	AEF 6	123
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	13 AS/305 AMW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	7	0.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	5	5.0	0.0	AEF 4	121
	97 AS/446 AW [AFRC-62 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	11	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	7	5.0	0.0	AEF 4	121
	730 AS/452 AW [AFRC]	MARCH ARB CA	7	5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	3	3.0	0.0	0	0
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	37 AS/86 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	RAMSTEIN AB GE	17	9	2.2	5.4	0.0	0.0	5	3.0	0.0	AEF 4	121
	139 AS/109 AW [ANG]	SCHENECTADY NY	9	5	1.4	3.0	0.0	0.0	3	1.8	0.0	AEF 4	121
	143 AS/143 AW [ANG]	QUONSET ST. ARPT RI	6	3	1.0	1.8	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 4	121
		TOTAL:	307	191	109.3	83.6	118.2	41.4	114	51.8	26.2	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	13	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	85
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	24	12	7	HC-130	0	4	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	1	8	6	3	E-3	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	45	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	0	0	0	0									
F-15E	1	24	12	7	KC-10	1	12	9	7	0.0	14.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	5	47	27	14	0.0	12.2		
F-16C BLK 50	1	24	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	15	12	7	C-141	3	34	23	15	15.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	3	2	C-130	3	32	17	10	6.0	0.0		
					TOTAL:	24	307	191	114	53.8	26.2		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	11	7.2	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.5	15.0		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	15	15	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	1	9	2.2	0.0	5	8	4.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	9	73	64.4	63.7	69	98	52.6	6.3	12.2	8.5	15.0		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	83.6	41.4									
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 9 TANKERS:	0.0	33.2									
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	83.6	74.6									
			DAY-DAY	SURGE									
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	48	96	158								
		SUPPORT MSNS:	50	67									
		TOTAL:	98	163									

APPENDIX 29 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 10 (LANGLEY AFB VA)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	0.0	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	11	7.2	0.0	6	10	0.0	0.0	0.0	8.5	15.0
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	15	15	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	14	3.6	0.0	8	14	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	90	74.0	70.9	79	116	56.2	7.5	14.5	8.5	15.0
		AVAIL "AS IS":	83.6	41.4							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 9 TANKERS:	0.0	29.0						DAY-DAY	SURGE
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	83.6	70.4	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:		0.0	COMBAT MISSIONS:		60	120
								SUPPORT MISSIONS:		56	75
								TOTAL:		116	195
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	21	12.5	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.6	31.1
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	15	15	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	14	3.6	0.0	8	14	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	17	132	110.7	118.2	102	156	56.2	13.3	26.9	17.6	31.1
		AVAIL "AS IS":	83.6	41.4				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 9	61.4	22.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		67	94		
		TOTAL AVAIL:	145.0	63.4			TOTAL:	156	274		

APPENDIX 29 (CONTINUED)

COMBAT AEF # 10 (LANGLEY AFB VA)

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	3	5.4	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
HC-130	0	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	4	21	12.5	0.0	11	19	0.0	0.0	0.0	17.6	31.1
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	15	15	15.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	17	4.6	0.0	10	17	10.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	135	241.4	118.2	104	159	58.0	13.3	26.9	17.6	31.1
		AVAIL "AS IS":	83.6	41.4							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 9	61.4	22.0				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0			COMBAT MISSIONS:	89	180		
		READILY AVAIL	188.6	63.4			SUPPORT MISSIONS:	70	99		
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TANKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	188.6	63.4	"EXCESS" TANKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	0.0	TOTAL:	159	279		
NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 133 ARS/157 ARW, 117 ARS/190 ARW, and 37 AS/86 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 133 ARS/157 ARW, 117 ARS/190 ARW, 37 AS/86 AW, and 139 AS/109 AW, would remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, both E-3 aircraft must deploy without tanker support. Additionally, mission planners must take extreme care in planning as the assumptions used in this table show this package is one half a KC-135R equivalent short of what is required for simultaneous deployment.											
NOTE 4: If Aviation Package # 3 is deployed, only the 133 ARS/157 ARW, 117 ARS/190 ARW, 74 ARS/434 ARW, 166 ARS/121 ARW, 37 AS/86 AW, and 139 AS/109 AW will remain in-place to support combat operations.											
NOTE 5: If Aviation Package # 4 is deployed, only the 133 ARS/157 ARW, 117 ARS/190 ARW, 74 ARS/434 ARW, and 166 ARS/121 ARW will remain in-place to support refueling operations.											
NOTE 6: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEF's timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations											
NOTE 7: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.											
NOTE 8: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.											
NOTE 9: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.											
NOTE 10: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.											
NOTE 11: For same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100% of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the third squadron had 70%.											

APPENDIX 30 **COMBAT AEF # 11 (MOUNTAIN HOME AFB ID)**

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 11 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	0	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		23//183		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	86-175	ACTIVE DUTY:		8//71	AV PKG 1	76	66.4	76.0	63.7	73.0	93	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	261-350	ANG:		6//50	AV PKG 2	94	74.6	76.0	70.9	73.0	113	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	0	AFRC:		9//62	AV PKG 3	134	110.1	144.4	118.2	67.6	149	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	71-160	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		12//8	AV PKG 4	134	237.7	188.0	118.2	67.6	149	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	246-335	3-YR "ON-CALL":		88		A/C	C-141 REQ	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	60					DAY-DAY	106	N/A	47.6	N/A	25.8	N/A
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	390 FS/366 WG (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MT HOME AFB ID	18	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	34 BS/366 WG (B-1) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MT HOME AFB ID	11	6	12.3	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	60
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	391 FS/355 WG (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MT HOME AFB ID	18	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	389 FS/366 WG [ACTIVE DUTY]	MT HOME AFB ID	22	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	190 FS/124 WG [ANG]	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	15	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	304 RQS/939 RW (HH-60G) [AFRC]	PORTLAND IAP OR	7	4	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0	60
	303 RQS/939 RW (HC-130) [AFRC]	PORTLAND IAP OR	3	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 5	121
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	970 AACs/ 513 ACG [AFRC-552 ACW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	0	60
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	466 FS/419 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [AFRC]	HILL AFB UT	15	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	124 FS/132 FW (F-16C BLK 42) [ANG]	DES MOINES MAP IA	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	176 FS/115 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	TRUAX FIELD WI	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	79 ARS/349 AMW [AFRC-60 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	9	0.0	0.0	0.0	18.0	7	0.0	14.0	0	60
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	22 ARS/366 WG (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MT HOME AFB ID	11	6	4.0	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	AEF 5	121
	909 ARS/18 WG (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	KADENA AB JAPAN	15	8	3.8	0.0	0.0	8.0	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 6	121
	349 ARS/22 ARW (KC-135E/R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	6	0.0	0.0	0.0	5.4	3	0.0	2.7	ALERT 3	132
	116 ARS/141 ARW (KC-135E) [ANG]	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	10	6	2.8	0.0	0.0	4.2	3	0.0	2.1	0	60

APPENDIX 30 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 11 (MOUNTAIN HOME AFB ID)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	312 AS/349 AW [AFRC-60 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	MOB 3	132
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	17 AS/437 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	CHARLESTOWN AFB SC	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	AEF 7	120
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	313 AS/446 AW [AFRC-62 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	11	0.0	11.0	0.0	0.0	7	7.0	0.0	AEF 5	121
	89 AS/445 AW [AFRC]	WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH	8	5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	3	3.0	0.0	0	60
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	189 AS/124 WG [ANG]	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	4	2	1.3	1.2	0.0	0.0	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 3	132
	167 AS/167 AW [ANG]	SHEPHERD FIELD WV	10	6	1.5	3.6	0.0	0.0	3	1.8	0.0	MOB 3	132
	731 AS/302 AW [AFRC]	PETERSON AFB CO	14	8	1.4	4.8	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	MOB 3	132
		TOTAL:	285	183	107.8	76.0	118.2	41.6	106	47.6	25.8	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	12	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	88
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY		C-141	KC-135R
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY				
F-15A/C	1	18	12	7	HC-130	1	3	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	1	11	6	3	E-3	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	45	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	0	0	0	0									
F-15E	1	18	12	7	KC-10	1	12	9	7	0.0	14.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	4	47	26	13	0.0	11.8		
F-16C BLK 50	1	22	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	15	12	7	C-141	2	25	16	10	10.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	7	4	2	C-130	3	28	16	8	4.8	0.0		
					TOTAL:	23	285	183	106	47.6	25.8		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL		DAY	SURGE
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	14	7.8	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.0	22.4		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	2	8	2.8	0.0	4	6	3.6	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	10	76	66.4	63.7	64	93	46.4	6.3	12.4	12.0	22.4		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	76.0	41.6				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 12 TANKERS:	0.0	31.4				COMBAT MISSIONS:	48	96			
								SUPPORT MISSIONS:	45	67			
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	76.0	73.0			TOTAL:	93	163				

APPENDIX 30 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 11 (MOUNTAIN HOME AFB ID)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	0.0	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	14	7.8	0.0	7	12	0.0	0.0	0.0	12.0	22.4
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	14	2.9	0.0	8	14	8.4	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.3	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	94	74.6	70.9	75	113	51.2	7.5	14.7	12.0	22.4
		AVAIL "AS IS":	76.0	41.6							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 12 TANKERS:	0.0	31.4							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	76.0	73.0	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:		0.0				
			DAY-DAY	SURGE							
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120							
		SUPPORT MSNS:	53	76							
		TOTAL:	113	196							
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	20	10.6	0.0	11	16	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.8	29.6
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	16	4.2	0.0	9	15	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.3	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	134	110.1	118.2	98	149	51.8	13.3	27.1	14.8	29.6
		AVAIL "AS IS":	76.0	41.6							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 12	68.4	26.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		60	92		
		TOTAL AVAIL:	144.4	67.6			TOTAL:	149	272		

APPENDIX 30 (CONTINUED) **COMBAT AEF # 11 (MOUNTAIN HOME AFB ID)**

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	1	6	12.3	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	20	10.6	0.0	11	16	0.0	0.0	0.0	14.8	29.6
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	10	10	10.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	16	4.2	0.0	9	15	9.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	129.9	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	134	237.7	118.2	98	149	51.8	13.3	27.1	14.8	29.6
		AVAIL "AS IS":	76.0	41.6				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 12	68.4	26.0		COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		60	92		
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0		TOTAL:		149	272		
		READILY AVAIL	188.0	67.6							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	188.0	67.6	"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	0.0					

NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 22 ARS/366 WG, 909 ARS/18 WG, 189 AS/124 WG, and 167 AS/167 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 22 ARS/366 WG, 909 ARS/18 WG, 167 AS/167 AW, and 731 AS/302 AW remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, both E-3 aircraft must deploy without tanker support.

NOTE 4: If Aviation Packages # 3 or # 4 are deployed, only the 22 ARS/366 WG, 909 ARS/18 WG, and 116 ARS/141 ARW will remain in-place to support refueling operations.

NOTE 5: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations

NOTE 6: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.

NOTE 7: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.

NOTE 8: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.

NOTE 9: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.

NOTE 10: For the same-type squadrons deploying, a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100 % of their requirement, the second squadron had 85%, and the third squadron had 70%.

APPENDIX 31 **COMBAT AEF # 12 (SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB NC)**

RECOMMENDED AEF FIGHTER, BOMBER, AIRLIFT, AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS													
AEF # 12 (90 DAYS)													
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	0	OPS SQ'S//A/C:		24//182		DEPLOYED A/C	C-141 REQ'D	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	86-175	ACTIVE DUTY:		9//69	AV PKG 1	77	66.4	77.4	63.7	70.4	98	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	261-350	ANG:		9//73	AV PKG 2	89	74.6	77.4	70.9	70.4	110	
	YR 4 (DAYS)	0	AFRC:		6//40	AV PKG 3	131	108.4	143.8	118.2	66.2	150	
	YR 5 (DAYS)	71-160	PAA/A/C REQ'D:		12//8	AV PKG 4	131	238.1	187.4	118.2	66.2	150	
	YR 6 (DAYS)	246-335	3-YR "ON-CALL":		101		A/C	C-141 REQ'D	AVAILABLE	KC-135R REQ	AVAIL	SORTIES/DAY	
	3-YR AVERAGE:	60				DAY-DAY	107	N/A	49.6	N/A	26.4	N/A	
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S REQ'D	C-141'S AVAIL	KC-135R'S REQ'D	KC-135R'S AVAIL	A/C DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	KC-135'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	4 FW	S-J AFB NC	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	60
AIR-AIR (F-15A-D) [AV PKG 1-3]	94 FS/1 FW (F-15C/D) [ACTIVE DUTY]	LANGLEY AFB VA	24	12	9.5	0.0	18.0	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
LONG RNG STRIKE (B-1, B-2, B-52) [AV PKG 2-3, ALERT]	93 BS/917 WG (B-52) [AFRC]	BARKSDALE AFB LA	8	6	10.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	3	0.0	0.0	0	60
STEALTH/ DEEP INT. (F-15E, F-117) [AV PKG 2-3]	335 FS/4 FW (F-15E) [ACTIVE DUTY]	SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB NC	24	12	9.4	0.0	25.4	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 6	121
SEAD (F-16C/D BLK 50) [AV PKG 1-3]	78 FS/20 FW [ACTIVE DUTY]	SHAW AFB SC	24	12	10.1	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 6	121
CLOSE AIR SUPPORT (A-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	104 FS/175 WG [ANG]	MARTIN STATE ARPT. MD	15	12	11.7	0.0	14.5	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
RESCUE (HH-60G, HC-130) [HH-60G AV PKG 1-3; HC-130 AV PKG 2-3]	66 RQS/57 WG (HH-60G) [ACTIVE DUTY]	NELLIS AFB NV	8	4	6.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	2	0.0	0.0	0	60
	39 RQS/939 RW (HC-130) [AFRC]	PATRICK AFB FL	3	2	3.0	0.0	3.5	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 6	121
COMMAND & CONTROL (E-3) [AV PKG 1-3]	966 AACS/ 552 ACW [ACTIVE DUTY]	TINKER AFB OK	6	2	6.3	0.0	5.6	0.0	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 6	121
INT. (F-16A-D BLK 15-42) [2 X AV PKG 1-3; 1 X AV PKG 2-3]	121 FS/113 WG (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	ANDREWS AFB MD	15	12	9.6	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	170 FS/183 FW (F-16C BLK 30) [ANG]	CAPTIAL MAP IL	15	12	8.2	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
	119 FS/177 FW (F-16C BLK 25) [ANG]	ATLANTIC CITY IAP NJ	15	12	6.7	0.0	12.8	0.0	7	0.0	0.0	0	60
TANKERS (KC-10) [AV PKG 1-3]	78 ARS/514 AMW [AFRC-305 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	11	0.0	0.0	0.0	22.0	8	0.0	16.0	0	60
(KC-135E/R) [AV PKG 1-3]	384 ARS/22 ARW (KC-135E/R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	6	4.0	0.0	0.0	5.4	3	0.0	2.7	AEF 6	121
	91 ARS/6 ARW (KC-135R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MACDILL AFB FL	11	6	3.4	0.0	0.0	6.0	3	0.0	3.0	AEF 6	121
	344 ARS/22 ARW (KC-135E/R) [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	6	2.8	0.0	0.0	5.4	3	0.0	2.7	ALERT 3	132
	173 ARS/155 ARW (KC-135R) [ANG]	LINCOLN MAP NE	8	4	0.0	0.0	0.0	4.0	2	0.0	1.8	AEF 5	121

APPENDIX 31 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 12 (SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB NC)

AIRLIFT (C-5) [AV PKG 1-3]	709 AS/512 AW [AFRC-436 AW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	DOVER AFB DE	16	9	0.0	28.8	0.0	0.0	5	16.0	0.0	AEF 6	121
(C-17) [AV PKG 1-3]	7 AS/62 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	MCCHORD AFB WA	12	9	0.0	21.6	0.0	0.0	7	16.8	0.0	AEF 8	120
(C-141) [AV PKG 1-3]	155 AS/164 AW [ANG]	MEMPHIS IAP TN	9	6	0.0	6.0	0.0	0.0	4	4.0	0.0	AEF 6	121
	356 AS/445 AW [AFRC]	WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB OH	8	5	0.0	5.0	0.0	0.0	3	3.0	0.0	AEF 6	121
	732 AS/514 AMW [AFRC-305 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	7	0.0	7.0	0.0	0.0	5	5.0	0.0	AEF 6	121
(C-130) [AV PKG 1-3]	156 AS/145 AW [ANG]	CHARLOTTE/DOUG. NC	12	7	1.9	4.2	0.0	0.0	4	2.4	0.0	MOB 3	132
	142 AS/166 AW [ANG]	NEW CASTLE CO. DL	8	4	1.3	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 3	132
	185 AS/137 AW [ANG]	ROGER WORLD ARPT OK	8	4	1.1	2.4	0.0	0.0	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 3	132
		TOTAL:	295	182	106.0	77.4	118.2	42.8	107	49.6	26.2	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	12	8	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	101
DAY-DAY SUMMARY:													
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED		EQUIV'S AVAIL DAY-DAY			
			AEF	DAY-DAY				AEF	DAY-DAY	C-141	KC-135R		
F-15A/C	1	24	12	7	HC-130	1	3	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-1B	0	0	0	0	E-3	1	6	2	1	0.0	0.0		
B-2A	0	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	45	36	21	0.0	0.0		
B-52H	1	8	6	3									
F-15E	1	24	12	7	KC-10	1	14	11	8	0.0	16.0		
F-117	0	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	4	41	22	11	0.0	10.4		
F-16C BLK 50	1	24	12	7	C-5	1	16	9	5	16.0	0.0		
					C-17	1	12	9	7	16.8	0.0		
A-10	1	15	12	7	C-141	3	27	18	12	12.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	8	4	2	C-130	3	28	15	8	4.8	0.0		
					TOTAL:	24	295	182	107	49.6	26.4		
AVIATION PKG # 1 SUMMARY													
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL			
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE		
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0		
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0		
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0		
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0		
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	1	12	9.6	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0		
KC-135E/R	2	12	7.4	0.0	7	11	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.4	18.5		
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
C-130	2	11	3.2	0.0	6	10	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
SUPPORT	0	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0		
TOTAL:	10	77	66.4	63.7	68	98	50.8	6.3	12.4	10.4	18.5		
		AVAILABLE "AS IS":	77.4	42.8				DAY-DAY	SURGE				
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF #	0.0	27.6			COMBAT MISSIONS:	48	96				
		11 TANKERS:					SUPPORT MISSIONS:	50	70				
		TOTAL AVAILABLE:	77.4	70.4			TOTAL:	98	166				

APPENDIX 31 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 12 (SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB NC)

AVIATION PKG # 2 SUMMARY											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	0.0	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	2	24	17.8	25.6	14	24	0.0	2.3	4.6	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	2	12	7.4	0.0	7	11	0.0	0.0	0.0	10.4	18.5
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	2	11	3.2	0.0	6	10	6.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	12	89	74.6	70.9	75	110	50.8	7.5	14.7	10.4	18.5
		AVAIL "AS IS":	77.4	42.8							
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 11 TANKERS:	0.0	27.6							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT:	77.4	70.4	"EXCESS" TNKR'S CONVERTED TO ARLIFT:		0.0				
			DAY-DAY	SURGE							
		COMBAT MISSIONS:	60	120							
		SUPPORT MSNS:	50	70							
		TOTAL:	110	190							
AVIATION PKG # 3 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	1	6	10.8	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	18	10.2	0.0	10	17	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.0	27.1
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	15	4.3	0.0	8	13	7.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	2.4	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	131	108.4	118.2	98	150	52.6	13.3	27.1	16.0	27.1
		AVAIL "AS IS":	77.4	42.8				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 11	66.4	23.4		COMBAT MISSIONS:		89	180		
						SUPPORT MISSIONS:		61	90		
		TOTAL AVAIL:	143.8	66.2		TOTAL:		150	270		

APPENDIX 31 (CONTINUED) **COMBAT AEF # 12 (SEYMOUR-JOHNSON AFB NC)**

AVIATION PKG # 4 SUMMARY:											
TYPE A/C	# DEPLOYED SQUADRONS	DEPLOYED PAA	"EQUIV'S" REQ'D TO DEPLOY		DAILY A/C AVAIL	SORTIES 2 "GO'S"	C-141'S AVAIL/ DAY	KC-135R'S REQ'D		KC-135R'S AVAIL	
			C-141'S	KC-135R'S				DAY-DAY	SURGE	DAY	SURGE
F-15A/C	1	12	9.5	18.0	7	12	0.0	1.6	3.2	0.0	0.0
B-1B	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-2A	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
B-52H	1	6	10.8	0.0	3	5	0.0	2.0	4.9	0.0	0.0
F-15E	1	12	9.4	25.4	7	12	0.0	2.3	4.7	0.0	0.0
F-117	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
F-16C BLK 50	1	12	10.1	12.8	7	12	0.0	1.2	2.3	0.0	0.0
A-10	1	12	11.7	14.5	7	12	0.0	1.4	2.8	0.0	0.0
HH-60G	1	4	6.2	0.0	2	3	0.0	0.3	0.7	0.0	0.0
HC-130	1	2	3.0	3.5	1	2	0.0	0.3	0.5	0.0	0.0
E-3	1	2	6.3	5.6	1	2	0.0	0.6	1.0	0.0	0.0
F-16A/C BLK 15-40	3	36	24.5	38.4	21	36	0.0	3.5	6.9	0.0	0.0
KC-10	0	0	0.0	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
KC-135E/R	3	18	10.2	0.0	10	17	0.0	0.0	0.0	16.0	27.1
C-5	0	0	0.0	0.0	5	5	16.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-17	0	0	0.0	0.0	7	7	16.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-141	0	0	0.0	0.0	12	12	12.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
C-130	3	15	4.3	0.0	8	13	7.8	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
SUPPORT	1	0	132.1	0.0	0	0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
TOTAL:	18	131	238.1	118.2	98	150	52.6	13.3	27.1	16.0	27.1
		AVAIL "AS IS":	77.4	42.8				DAY-DAY	SURGE		
		NON-DEPLOYED AEF # 11	66.4	23.4				COMBAT MISSIONS:	89	180	
								SUPPORT MISSIONS:	61	90	
		MOBILITY AEF	43.6	0.0				TOTAL:	150	270	
		READILY AVAIL	187.4	66.2							
		AVAIL W/"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	187.4	66.2		"EXCESS" TNKRS CONVERTED TO AIRLIFT	0.0				

NOTE 1: If Aviation Package # 1 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 384 ARS/22 ARW, 91 ARS/6 ARW, 156 AS/145 AW, and 142 AS/166 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 2: If Aviation Package # 2 is deployed, all tanker and airlift units would support deployment operations. However, only the 384 ARS/22 ARW, 91 ARS/6 ARW, 156 AS/145 AW, and 142 AS/166 AW would remain in-place to support combat operations.

NOTE 3: If Aviation Package # 2 is simultaneously deployed, both E-3 aircraft must deploy without tanker support. Additionally, mission planners must take extreme care in planning as the assumptions used in this table show this package is one half KC-135R equivalent short of what is required for simultaneous deployment.

NOTE 4: If Aviation Packages # 3 or # 4 are deployed, only the 384 ARS/22 ARW, 91 ARS/6 ARW, and 344 ARS/22 ARW would remain in-place to support refueling operations.

NOTE 5: Figures used for calculating what tankers and/or airlift (i.e., inter-theater airlift, the KC-10 squadron, and KC-135 squadrons) from the aligned AEF were available to support the various package's deployments were based on the assumption that no greater than the similar package was deployed at the same time, i.e., if Aviation Package # 1 is deployed from this AEF, it is assumed that Aviation Package # 1 from the aligned AEF is also deployed. Additionally, since Aviation Package # 4 involves using the aligned Mobility AEF, and since the Mobility AEFs timelines overlap these AEFs, the average available airlift and tankers was used in these calculations

NOTE 6: If this AEF is not tasked to supply any Aviation Packages to support contingency operations, it is assumed that the # of aircraft, C-141 equivalents, and KC-135R equivalents listed in the DAY-DAY columns are available for normal MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments. However, since this AEF is "on-call," these MAJCOM and/or AMC/ANG/AFRC taskings must be local area-based, out-and-back, or CONUS-based overnight missions.

NOTE 7: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for years 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.

NOTE 8: Sortie rates were based on a nominal two-"go" flying day with the Daily A/C Available being the "front lines" and the second "go" being equal-to or less-than the first "go." "Surge" capability was calculated using the following formula: Fighters/bombers at 2 x deployed PAA, support aircraft and C-130's at 1.6 x deployed PAA, Inter-theater airlift at "DAY-DAY" sortie rates.

NOTE 9: KC-135R's Required for the different Package's sorties were based on a nominal 500 NM distance to and from the target area (1000 NM round-trip). Fuels required/available were taken from AFPAM 10-1403, Table 9 and 10, 1 Mar 98. Since there were no figures for bombers and HH-60 G aircraft, 25,000 lbs of fuel was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each bomber and 7,000 lbs was used for a one-way trip to the target area for each HH-60G.

NOTE 10: For same-type squadrons deploying a graduated economy of scale was used for cargo requirements. The first squadron deploying had 100 % of their requirement, the second squadron had 85 %, and the third squadron had 70 %.

APPENDIX 32
MOBILITY AEF # 1 (POPE AFB NC)

RECOMMENDED MOBILITY AEF AIRLIFT AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS									
MOB # 1 (108 DAYS)									
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	1-108	SQ//A/C	7//39	C-141'S AVAIL "EMERG"	41.6			
	YR 2 (DAYS)	176-283	ACTIVE:	2//16	C-141'S AVAIL "DAY-DAY"	27.2			
	YR 3 (DAYS)	351-365	ANG:	2//11					
	YR 4 (DAYS)	1-93	AFRC:	3//12					
	YR 5 (DAYS)	161-268	PAA//A/C	10//6					
	YR 6 (DAYS)	336-365	3-YR ON-CALL:	75					
	3-YR AVERAGE:	75							
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S AVAIL	A/C REQ DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	43 AW	POPE AFB NC	0	0	0	0	0	0	75
AIRLIFT (C-5)	137 AS/105 AW [ANG]	STEWART IAP NY	12	7	22.4	4	12.8	0	75
(C-130)	2 AS/43 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	POPE AFB NC	14	8	4.8	8	4.8	0	75
	41 AS/43 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	POPE AFB NC	14	8	4.8	8	4.8	0	75
	130 AS/130 AW [ANG]	YEAGER ARPT WV	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	75
	815 AS/403 WG [AFRC]	KEESLER AFB MS	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	75
	357 AS/908 AW [AFRC]	MAXWELL AFB AL	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	75
	757 AS/910 AW [AFRC]	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	75
		TOTAL:	72	39	41.6	28	27.2	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	10	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	75
NOTE 1: Should a humanitarian/mobility "emergency" be declared, all unit's will employ with the aircraft numbers and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "MOBILITY" columns.									
NOTE 2: Should the applicable AEF Aviation Package # 4 be deployed, all airlift units and tanker units would be tasked for deployment and re-deployment cargo missions only and employ with MOB "emergency" aircraft numbers.									
NOTE 3: Should a humanitarian/mobility contingency be declared, but not considered an "emergency," all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns.									
NOTE 4: Should there be no humanitarian/mobility contingency declared, all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns for normal day-day AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments.									
NOTE 5: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for year 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.									

APPENDIX 33
MOBILITY AEF # 2 (TRAVIS AFB CA)

RECOMMENDED MOBILITY AEF AIRLIFT AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS									
MOB # 2 (108 DAYS)									
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	109-216	SQ//A/C	7//35	C-141'S AVAIL "EMERG"			44.4	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	284-365	ACTIVE:	1//6	C-141'S AVAIL "DAY-DAY"			26.2	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	1-26	ANG:	3//13					
	YR 4 (DAYS)	94-201	AFRC:	3//16					
	YR 5 (DAYS)	269-365	PAA//A/C	9//5					
	YR 6 (DAYS)	1-11	3-YR ON-CALL:	73					
	3-YR AVERAGE:	73							
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S AVAIL	A/C REQ DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	60 AMW	TRAVIS AFB CA	0	0	0	0	0	0	73
AIRLIFT (C-5)	301 AS/349 AMW [AFRC-60 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	9	28.8	5	16.0	0	73
(C-130)	115 AS/146 AW [ANG]	CHANNEL IS ANGB CA	12	7	4.2	4	2.4	0	73
	204 AS/154 WG [ANG]	HICKAM AFB HI	4	2	1.2	1	0.6	0	73
	169 AS/182 AW [ANG]	GREATER PEORIA IL	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	73
	36 AS/374 AW [ACTIVE DUTY]	YOKOTA AB JAPAN	10	6	3.6	6	3.6	0	73
	328 AS/914 AW [AFRC]	NIAGARA FALLS NY	6	3	1.8	2	1.2	0	73
	96 AS/934 AW [AFRC]	MINN-ST PAUL NM	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	73
		TOTAL:	64	35	44.4	22	26.2	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	9	5	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	73
NOTE 1: Should a humanitarian/mobility "emergency" be declared, all unit's will employ with the aircraft numbers and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "MOBILITY" columns.									
NOTE 2: Should the applicable AEF Aviation Package # 4 be deployed, all airlift units and tanker units would be tasked for deployment and re-deployment cargo missions only and employ with MOB "emergency" aircraft numbers.									
NOTE 3: Should a humanitarian/mobility contingency be declared, but not considered an "emergency," all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns.									
NOTE 4: Should there be no humanitarian/mobility contingency declared, all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns for normal day-day AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments.									
NOTE 5: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for year 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.									

APPENDIX 34
MOBILITY AEF # 3 (MCCONNELL AFB KS)

RECOMMENDED MOBILITY AEF AIRLIFT AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS									
MOB # 3 (108 DAYS)									
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	217-324	SQ//A/C	7//40	C-141'S AVAIL "EMERG"			47.4	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	0	ACTIVE:	0//0	C-141'S AVAIL "DAY-DAY"			25.6	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	27-134	ANG:	5//23					
	YR 4 (DAYS)	201-309	AFRC:	2//17					
	YR 5 (DAYS)	0	PAA//A/C	10//6					
	YR 6 (DAYS)	12-119	3-YR ON-CALL:	125					
	3-YR AVERAGE:	72							
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S AVAIL	A/C REQ DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	0	0	0	0	0	0	72
AIRLIFT (C-5)	312 AS/349 AMW [AFRC-60 AMW ASSOCIATE UNIT]	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	9	28.8	5	16.0	AEF 11	132
(C-130)	189 AS/124 WG [ANG]	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	4	2	1.2	1	0.6	AEF 11	132
	731 AS/302 AW [AFRC]	PETERSON AFB CO	14	8	4.8	4	2.4	AEF 11	132
	185 AS/137 AW [ANG]	ROGER WORLD ARPT OK	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	AEF 12	132
	142 AS/166 AW [ANG]	NEW CASTLE CO. DL	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	AEF 12	132
	156 AS/145 AW [ANG]	CHARLOTTE/ DOUG. NC	12	7	4.2	4	2.4	AEF 12	132
	167 AS/167 AW [ANG]	SHEPHERD FIELD WV	10	6	3.6	3	1.8	AEF 11	132
		TOTAL:	72	40	47.4	21	25.6	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	10	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	125
NOTE 1: Should a humanitarian/mobility "emergency" be declared, all unit's will employ with the aircraft numbers and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "MOBILITY" columns.									
NOTE 2: Should the applicable AEF Aviation Package # 4 be deployed, all airlift units and tanker units would be tasked for deployment and re-deployment cargo missions only and employ with MOB "emergency" aircraft numbers.									
NOTE 3: Should a humanitarian/mobility contingency be declared, but not considered an "emergency," all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns.									
NOTE 4: Should there be no humanitarian/mobility contingency declared, all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns for normal day-day AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments.									
NOTE 5: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for year 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.									

APPENDIX 35
MOBILITY AEF # 4 (GRAND FORKS AFB ND)

RECOMMENDED MOBILITY AEF AIRLIFT AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS									
MOB # 4 (108 DAYS)									
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	325-365	SQ//A/C	7//31	C-141'S AVAIL "EMERG"			39.4	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	1-67	ACTIVE:	0//0	C-141'S AVAIL "DAY-DAY"			20.0	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	135-242	ANG:	3//11					
	YR 4 (DAYS)	310-365	AFRC:	4//20					
	YR 5 (DAYS)	1-52	PAA//A/C	9//4					
	YR 6 (DAYS)	120-227	3-YR ON-CALL:	73					
	3-YR AVERAGE:	73							
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S AVAIL	A/C REQ DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	0	0	0	0	0	0	73
AIRLIFT (C-5)	68 AS/433 AW [AFRC]	KELLY AFB TX	14	8	25.6	4	12.8	0	73
(C-130)	164 AS/179 AW [ANG]	MANSFIELD LAHM OH	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	73
	773 AS/910 AW [AFRC]	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	73
	758 AS/911 AW [AFRC]	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	73
	327 AS/913 AW [AFRC]	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	73
	171 AS/127 WG [ANG]	SELFREDGE ANGB MI	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	0	73
	109 AS/133 AW [ANG]	MINN-ST PAUL IAP MN	6	3	1.8	2	1.2	0	73
		TOTAL:	60	31	39.4	16	20.0	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	9	4	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	73
NOTE 1: Should a humanitarian/mobility "emergency" be declared, all unit's will employ with the aircraft numbers and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "MOBILITY" columns.									
NOTE 2: Should the applicable AEF Aviation Package # 4 be deployed, all airlift units and tanker units would be tasked for deployment and re-deployment cargo missions only and employ with MOB "emergency" aircraft numbers.									
NOTE 3: Should a humanitarian/mobility contingency be declared, but not considered an "emergency," all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns.									
NOTE 4: Should there be no humanitarian/mobility contingency declared, all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns for normal day-day AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments.									
NOTE 5: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for year 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.									

APPENDIX 36
MOBILITY AEF # 5 (FAIRCHILD AFB WA)

RECOMMENDED MOBILITY AEF AIRLIFT AND TANKER ASSIGNMENTS									
MOB # 5 (108 DAYS)									
TASKING	YR 1 (DAYS)	0	SQ//A/C	7//41	C-141'S AVAIL "EMERG"			45.4	
	YR 2 (DAYS)	67-175	ACTIVE:	2//15	C-141'S AVAIL "DAY-DAY"			27.8	
	YR 3 (DAYS)	243-350	ANG:	3//11					
	YR 4 (DAYS)	0	AFRC:	2//15					
	YR 5 (DAYS)	53-160	PAA//A/C	11//6					
	YR 6 (DAYS)	228-335	3-YR ON-CALL:	N/A					
	3-YR AVERAGE:	72							
TYPE UNIT	SQUADRON/ WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ	C-141'S AVAIL	A/C REQ DAY-DAY	C-141'S DAY-DAY	OTHER AEF'S	UNIT'S "ON-CALL" AVERAGE
LEAD WG	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	0	0	0	0	0	0	72
AIRLIFT (C-5)	337 AS/439 AW [AFRC]	WESTOVER ARB MA	14	8	25.6	4	12.8	0	72
(C-130)	192 AS/152 AW [ANG]	RENO/TAHOE IAP NV	6	3	1.8	2	1.2	AEF 6	133
	180 AS/139 AW [ANG]	ROSECRANS MEM. MO	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	AEF 5	133
	158 AS/165 AW [ANG]	SAVANNAH IAP GA	8	4	2.4	2	1.2	AEF 5	133
	61 AS/463 AG [ACTIVE DUTY]	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	12	7	4.2	7	4.2	AEF 6	133
	95 AS/440 AW [AFRC]	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	12	7	4.2	4	2.4	AEF 5	133
	50 AS/463 AG [ACTIVE DUTY]	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	14	8	4.8	8	4.8	AEF 6	133
		TOTAL:	74	41	45.4	29	27.8	N/A	N/A
		AVERAGE:	11	6	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	118
NOTE 1: Should a humanitarian/mobility "emergency" be declared, all unit's will employ with the aircraft numbers and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "MOBILITY" columns.									
NOTE 2: Should the applicable AEF Aviation Package # 4 be deployed, all airlift units and tanker units would be tasked for deployment and re-deployment cargo missions only and employ with MOB "emergency" aircraft numbers.									
NOTE 3: Should a humanitarian/mobility contingency be declared, but not considered an "emergency," all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns.									
NOTE 4: Should there be no humanitarian/mobility contingency declared, all units will be tasked to provide the aircraft and lift/tanker capabilities listed under the "DAY-DAY" columns for normal day-day AMC/ANG/AFRC commitments.									
NOTE 5: A 3-YR period for averaging the days "ON CALL" was chosen because it most closely aligns to an active duty tour length. Since personnel can transfer units at any time after the proposed AEF schedule begins, in order to provide the most realistic idea of how many days a person would be "ON CALL" in a normal tour length, the 3-YR "ON CALL" average was calculated by adding the days "on call" for year 1-3, 2-4, 3-5, and 4-6, then dividing by 4.									

APPENDIX 37
COMBAT AEF # 1-2 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABEL FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

AEF # 1/2: AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL DAILY TASKING								
TYPE A/C	AEF # 1/2							
	SQ	WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ'D	C-141 EQUIVALENTS	KC-135R EQUIVALENTS	AEF ALIGNMENT
F-15C	27 FS	1 FW	LANGLEY AFB VA	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
F-15C	12 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	67 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	44 FW	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	58 FS	33 FW	EGLIN AFB FL	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
F-15C	60 FS	33 FW	EGLIN AFB FL	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 6
F-15A	101 FS	102 FW	OTIS ANGB MA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-15A	159 FS	125 FW	JACKSONVILLE IAP FL	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	110 FS	131 FW	LAMBERT-ST LOUIS MO	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
F-15A	123 FS	142 FW	PORTLAND IAP OR	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	199 FS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	122 FS	159 FW	JRB NEW ORLEANS LA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
B-1B	37 BS	28 BW	ELLSWORTH AFB SD	15	9	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
B-1B	128 BS	116 BW	ROBINS AFB GA	8	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
B-1B	127 BS	184 BW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	8	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
B-2A	325 BS	509 BW	WHITEMAN AFB MO	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 6
B-52H	20 BS	2 BW	BARKSDALE AFB LA	15	9	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
B-52H	23 BS	5 BW	MINOT AFB ND	12	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-15E	494 FS	48 FW	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-117	8 FS	49 FW	HOLLOMAN AFB NM	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
F-16C:	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.0	0.0	N/A
BLK 50	55 FS	20 FW	SHAW AFB SC	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
BLK 50	77 FS	20 FW	SHAW AFB SC	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
BLK 50	428 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	8	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
BLK 50	23 FS	52 FW	SPANGDAHLEM AB GE	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
BLK 50	157 FS	169 FW	MCENTIRE ANGB SC	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
A/OA-10	74 FS	23 FG	POPE AFB NC	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 6
A/OA-10	118 FS	103 FW	BRADLEY IAP CN	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
A/OA-10	131 FS	104 FW	BARNES MAP MA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
A/OA-10	172 FS	110 FW	KELLOGG ARPT MI	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
A/OA-10	103 FS	111 FW	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
A/OA-10	354 FS	355 WG	D-M AFB AZ	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
A/OA-10	706 FS	926 FW	JRB NEW ORLEANS LA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
HH-60G	33 RQS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	8	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
HH-60G	102 RQS	106 RW	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
HC-130	102 RQS	106 RW	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
HH-60G	301 RQS	939 RW	PATRICK AFB FL	9	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 6
HH-60G	305 RQS	939 RW	D-M AFB AZ	6	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 5

APPENDIX 37 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 1-2 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

E-3	961 AACs	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	2	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
E-3	965 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 4, 10
E-3	966 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
F-16:	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.0	0.0	N/A
C BLK 30	522 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 30	523 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 40	524 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 30	175 FS	114 FW	JOE FOSS FIELD SD	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
A ADF/GP	178 FS	119 FW	HECTOR IAP ND	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
C BLK 25	163 FS	122 FW	FT WAYNE IAP IN	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 40	125 FS	138 FW	TULSA IAP OK	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
C BLK 30	120 FS	140 WG	BUCKLEY ANGB CO	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
C BLK 25	138 FS	174 FW	SYRACUSE-HAN. NY	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 6
C BLK 42	112 FS	180 FW	TOLEDO EXP. ARPT OH	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 6
C BLK 30	113 FS	181 FW	HULMAN RAP IN	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 30	174 FS	185 FW	SIOUX GATEWAY IA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
C BLK 30	160 FS	187 FW	DANNELLY FIELD AL	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
A BLK 15	184 FS	188 FW	FT SMITH MAP AR	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
C BLK 30	149 FS	192 FW	RICHMOND IAP VA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 40	68 FS	347 WG	MOODY AFB GA	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
C BLK 40	69 FS	347 WG	MOODY AFB GA	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
C BLK 32	93 FS	482 FW	HOMESTEAD ARB FL	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 6
C BLK 32	302 FS	944 FW	LUKE AFB AZ	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
C BLK 25	194 FS	144 FW	FRESNO AIR TERM. CA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 5
A BLK 15	179 FS	148 FW	DULUTH IAP MN	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
KC-10	9 ARS	60 AMW	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	6	0.0	12.0	AEF 4, 10
KC-10	30 ARS	305 AMW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	7	0.0	14.0	AEF 3, 9
KC-135R	91 ARS	6 ARW	MACDILL AFB FL	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 6, 12
KC-135R	909 ARS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	15	6	0.0	6.0	AEF 6, 11
KC-135E/R	344 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	AEF 12, ALERT 3
KC-135E/R	349 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	AEF 12, ALERT 3
KC-135E/R	350 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	ALERT 3
KC-135E/R	384 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	AEF 6, 12
KC-135R	97 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 4, 9
KC-135R	351 ARS	100 ARW	RAF MILDENHALL UK	13	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 4, 9
KC-135E	132 ARS	101 ARW	BANGOR IAP MAINE	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 5
KC-135E	150 ARS	108 ARW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 4, 10
KC-135R	106 ARS	117 ARW	BIRMINGHAM ARPT AL	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 5
KC-135R	145 ARS	121 ARW	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 8
KC-135R	166 ARS	121 ARW	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135R	126 ARS	128 ARW	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 8
KC-135E	151 ARS	134 ARW	MCGHEE TYSON TN	9	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 7

APPENDIX 37 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 1-2 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

KC-135E	116 ARS	141 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 11
KC-135R	203 ARS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 4
KC-135R	173 ARS	155 ARW	LINCOLN MAP NE	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 5, 11
KC-135R	133 ARS	157 ARW	PEASE ANGB NH	9	1	0.0	2.0	AEF 10
KC-135E	197 ARS	161 ARW	SKY HARBOR IAP AZ	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 9
KC-135R	196 ARS	163 ARW	MARCH ARB CA	9	1	0.0	1.0	ALERT 2
KC-135R	168 ARS	168 ARW	EIELSON AFB AK	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 3
KC-135E	146 ARS	171 ARW	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 6
KC-135R	153 ARS	186 ARW	KEY FIELD MS	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 7
KC-135E	117 ARS	190 ARW	FORBES FIELD KS	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 10
KC-1354	22 ARS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 5, 11
KC-135R	72 ARS	434 ARW	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 7
KC-135R	74 ARS	434 ARW	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135R	336 ARS	452 AMW	MARCH ARB CA	9	1	0.0	1.0	ALERT 2
KC-135E	63 ARS	927 ARW	SELFDRIDGE ANGB MI	9	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 5
KC-135E	314 ARS	940 ARW	BEALE AFB CA	10	1	0.0	0.7	ALERT 2
C-5	21 AS	60 AMW	TRAVIS AFB CA	16	8	25.6	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-5	3 AS	436 AW	DOVER AFB DE	16	8	25.6	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-5	68 AS	433 AW	KELLY AFB TX	14	3	9.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-17	7 AS	62 AW	MCCHORD AFB WA	12	6	14.4	0.0	AEF 8, 12
C-17	17 AS	437 AW	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	6	14.4	0.0	AEF 7, 11
C-141	8 AS	62 AW	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	8	8.0	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-141	155 AS	164 AW	MEMPHIS IAP TN	9	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
C-141	13 AS	305 AMW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-141	89 AS	445 AW	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 11
C-141	356 AS	445 AW	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
C-141	730 AS	452 AW	MARCH ARB CA	7	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 9
C-141	756 AS	459 AW	ANDREWS AFB MD	8	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 5
C-130	517 AS	3 WG	ELMENDORF AFB AK	16	8	4.8	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-130	37 AS	86 AW	RAMSTEIN AB GE	17	8	4.8	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	139 AS	109 AW	SCHENECTADY NY	9	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	189 AS	124 WG	BOISE AIR TERM ID	4	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 11, MOB 3
C-130	171 AS	127 WG	SELFDRIDGE ANGB MI	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	109 AS	133 AW	MINN-ST PAUL IAP MN	6	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	185 AS	137 AW	ROGER WORLD ARPT OK	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 12, MOB 3
C-130	143 AS	143 AW	QUONSET ST. ARPT RI	6	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	156 AS	145 AW	CHARLOTTE/DOUG. NC	12	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 12, MOB 3
C-130	115 AS	146 AW	CHANNELL IS ANGB CA	12	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	187 AS	153 AW	CHEYENNE MAP WY	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-130	204 AS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	4	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	142 AS	166 AW	NEW CASTLE CO. DL	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 12, MOB 3
C-130	167 AS	167 AW	SHEPHERD FIELD WV	10	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 11, MOB 3

APPENDIX 37 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 1-2 "TIMEFRAME" AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

C-130	144 AS	176 WG	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-130	164 AS	179 AW	MANSFIELD LAHM OH	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	169 AS	182 AW	GREATER PEORIA IL	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	731 AS	302 AW	PETERSON AFB CO	14	3	1.8	0.0	AEF 11, MOB 3
C-130	36 AS	374 AW	YOKOTA AB JAPAN	10	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	773 AS	910 AW	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	758 AS	911 AW	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	327 AS	913 AW	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	328 AS	914 AW	NIAGARA FALLS NY	6	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	96 AS	934 AW	MINN-ST PAUL IAP MN	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 2
TOTAL:	N/A	N/A	N/A	1593	548	136.0	84.7	N/A
SUMMARY:								
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	
F-15A/C	12	216	96	HC-130	1	4	1	
B-1B	3	31	13	E-3	3	14	7	
B-2A	1	6	3	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	21	342	122	
B-52H	2	27	16					
F-15E	1	24	14	KC-10	2	26	13	
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	
F-117	1	18	10	KC-135E/R	31	307	62	
F-16C BLK 50	5	83	42	C-5	3	46	19	
				C-17	2	24	12	
A/OA-10	7	117	44	C-141	7	67	17	
HH-60G	4	27	8	C-130	24	214	49	
NOTE 1: Daily "A/C REQ'D" rates were calculated using the following parameters: Active Duty: Fighter/Bomber/Rescue/Command & Control unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had 60% of their PAA available. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 50% of their PAA available. Airlift and tanker aircraft outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had the AMC mandated "Threshold" level available. Within +/- 90 days "On Call" they had 50% of their PAA available. ANG/AFRC: Fighter/Bomber/Rescue/Command & Control unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had 30% of their PAA available. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 20% of their PAA available. Airlift and Tanker unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had one-half of the Active Duty AMC mandated "Threshold" levels. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 20% of their PAA available.								

APPENDIX 38
COMBAT AEF # 3-4 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

AEF # 3/4: AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL DAILY TASKING								
TYPE A/C	AEF # 3/4							
	SQ	WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ'D	C-141 EQUIVALENTS	KC-135R EQUIVALENTS	AEF ALIGNMENT
F-15C	27 FS	1 FW	LANGELY AFB VA	14	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
F-15C	94 FS	1 FW	LANGELY AFB VA	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
F-15C	12 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	67 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	44 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	101 FS	102 FW	OTIS ANGB MA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-15A	159 FS	125 FW	JACKSONVILLE IAP FL	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	110 FS	131 FW	LAMBERT-ST LOUIS MO	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
F-15A	123 FS	142 FW	PORTLAND IAP OR	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	199 FS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	122 FS	159 FW	JRB NEW ORLEANS LA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
F-15C	390 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
B-1B	37 BS	28 BW	ELLSWORTH AFB SD	15	9	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
B-1B	128 BS	116 BW	ROBINS AFB GA	8	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
B-1B	34 BS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	11	6	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
B-52H	20 BS	2 BW	BARKSDALE AFB LA	15	9	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
B-52H	93 BS	917 WG	BARKSDALE AFB LA	8	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
B-52H	23 BS	5 BW	MINOT AFB ND	12	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-15E	494 FS	48 FW	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-15E	391 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
F-16C:	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.0	0.0	N/A
BLK 50	77 FS	20 FW	SHAW AFB SC	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
BLK 50	428 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	8	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
BLK 50	23 FS	52 FW	SPANGDAHLEM AB GE	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
BLK 50	157 FS	169 FW	MCENTIRE ANGB SC	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
BLK 50	389 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	22	13	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A/OA-10	118 FS	103 FW	BRADLEY IAP CN	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
A/OA-10	131 FS	104 FW	BARNES MAP MA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
A/OA-10	172 FS	110 FW	KELLOGG ARPT MI	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
A/OA-10	103 FS	111 FW	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
A/OA-10	190 FS	124 WG	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A/OA-10	104 FS	175 WG	MARTIN STATE ARPT MD	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
A/OA-10	706 FS	926 FW	JRB NEW ORLEANS LA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
HH-60G	33 RQS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	8	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
HH-60G	66 RQS	57 WG	NELLIS AFB NV	8	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
HH-60G	102 RQS	106 RW	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
HC-130	102 RQS	106 RW	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
HH-60G	304 RQS	939 RW	PORTLAND IAP OR	7	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 11

APPENDIX 38 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 3-4 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

E-3	963 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 1, 7
E-3	964 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 2, 8
E-3	966 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
F-16:	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.0	0.0	N/A
C BLK 30	522 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 30	523 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 40	524 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 30	121 FS	113 WG	ANDREWS AFB MD	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	175 FS	114 FW	JOE FOSS FIELD SD	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
C BLK 30	176 FS	115 FW	TRUAX FIELD WI	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A ADF/GP	178 FS	119 FW	HECTOR IAP ND	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
C BLK 25	163 FS	122 FW	FT WAYNE IAP IN	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 40	124 FS	132 FW	DES MOINES IAP IA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
C BLK 40	125 FS	138 FW	TULSA IAP OK	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
C BLK 25	119 FS	177 FW	ATLANTIC CITY IAP NJ	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	113 FS	181 FW	HULMAN RAP IN	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 30	170 FS	183 FW	CAPTIAL MAP IL	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	174 FS	185 FW	SIOUX GATEWAY IA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 8
C BLK 30	160 FS	187 FW	DANNELLY FIELD AL	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
A BLK 15	184 FS	188 FW	FT SMITH MAP AR	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 7
C BLK 30	149 FS	192 FW	RICHMOND IAP VA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 40	68 FS	347 WG	MOODY AFB GA	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
C BLK 40	69 FS	347 WG	MOODY AFB GA	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
C BLK 30	466 FS	419 FW	HILL AFB UT	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A BLK 15	179 FS	148 FW	DULUTH IAP MN	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
KC-10	2 ARS	305 AMW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	7	0.0	14.0	AEF 1, 7
KC-10	6 ARS	60 AMW	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	6	0.0	12.0	AEF 2, 8
KC-135R	91 ARS	6 ARW	MACDILL AFB FL	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 6, 12
KC-135R	99 ARS	19 ARG	ROBINS AFB GA	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 2, 7
KC-135R	909 ARS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	15	6	0.0	6.0	AEF 6, 11
KC-135E/R	344 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	AEF 12, ALERT 3
KC-135E/R	349 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	AEF 12, ALERT 3
KC-135E/R	350 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	ALERT 3
KC-135E/R	384 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	AEF 6, 12
KC-135E	132 ARS	101 ARW	BANGOR IAP MAINE	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 5
KC-135R	136 ARS	107 ARW	NIAGARA FALLS IAP NY	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 2
KC-135R	106 ARS	117 ARW	BIRMINGHAM ARPT AL	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 5
KC-135R	145 ARS	121 ARW	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 8
KC-135R	166 ARS	121 ARW	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135R	126 ARS	128 ARW	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 8
KC-135E	151 ARS	134 ARW	MCGHEE TYSON TN	9	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 7
KC-135E	116 ARS	141 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 11

APPENDIX 38 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 3-4 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

KC-135E	191 ARS	151 ARW	SALT LAKE CITY UT	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 2, 8
KC-135R	173 ARS	155 ARW	LINCOLN MAP NE	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 5, 11
KC-135R	133 ARS	157 ARW	PEASE ANGB NH	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135E	197 ARS	161 ARW	SKY HARBOR IAP AZ	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 9
KC-135E	146 ARS	171 ARW	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 6
KC-135E	147 ARS	171 ARW	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 2, 8
KC-135R	153 ARS	186 ARW	KEY FIELD MS	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 7
KC-135E	117 ARS	190 ARW	FORBES FIELD KS	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 10
KC-135R	905 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 1, ALERT 4
KC-135R	906 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 1, ALERT 4
KC-135R	911 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 1, ALERT 4
KC-135R	912 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 1, 8
KC-135R	22 ARS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 5, 11
KC-135R	72 ARS	434 ARW	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 7
KC-135R	74 ARS	434 ARW	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135R	465 ARS	507 ARW	TINKER AFB OK	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 2
KC-135E	63 ARS	927 ARW	SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	9	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 5
C-5	9 AS	436 AW	DOVER AFB DE	16	8	25.6	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-5	337 AS	439 AW	WESTOVER ARB MA	14	7	22.4	0.0	MOB 5
C-5	68 AS	433 AW	KELLY AFB TX	14	2	6.4	0.0	MOB 4
C-17	14 AS	437 AW	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	6	14.4	0.0	AEF 5, 9
C-17	15 AS	437 AW	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	6	14.4	0.0	AEF 6, 10
C-141	155 AS	164 AW	MEMPHIS IAP TN	9	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
C-141	183 AS	172 AW	JACKSON IAP MS	9	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-141	6 AS	305 AMW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-141	89 AS	445 AW	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 11
C-141	356 AS	445 AW	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
C-141	729 AS	452 AW	MARCH ARB CA	7	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-141	730 AS	452 AW	MARCH ARB CA	7	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 9
C-141	756 AS	459 AW	ANDREWS AFB MD	8	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 5
C-130	105 AS	118 AW	NASHVILLE MET. TN	10	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-130	165 AS	123 AW	LOUISVILLE IAP KY	10	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-130	189 AS	124 WG	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	4	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 11, MOB 3
C-130	171 AS	127 WG	SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	109 AS	133 AW	MINN-ST PAUL IAP MN	6	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	181 AS	136 AW	NAS DALLAS TX	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-130	185 AS	137 AW	ROGER WORLD ARPT OK	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 12, MOB 3
C-130	180 AS	139 AW	ROSECRANS MEM. MO	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 5, MOB 5
C-130	156 AS	145 AW	CHARLOTTE/DOUG. NC	12	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 12, MOB 3
C-130	192 AS	152 AW	RENO/TAHOE IAP NV	6	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 6, MOB 5
C-130	198 AS	156 AW	MARIN IAP PUERTO RICO	6	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-130	158 AS	165 AW	SAVANNAH IAP GA	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 5, MOB 5

APPENDIX 38 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 3-4 "TIMEFRAME" AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

C-130	142 AS	166 AW	NEW CASTLE CO. DL	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 12, MOB 3
C-130	167 AS	167 AW	SHEPHERD FIELD WV	10	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 11, MOB 3
C-130	164 AS	179 AW	MANSFIELD LAHM OH	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	731 AS	302 AW	PETERSON AFB CO	14	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 11, MOB 3
C-130	39 AS	317 AG	DYESS AFB TX	14	7	4.2	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-130	40 AS	317 AG	DYESS AFB TX	14	7	4.2	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-130	95 AS	440 AW	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	12	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 5, MOB 5
C-130	50 AS	463 AG	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	14	7	4.2	0.0	AEF 6, MOB 5
C-130	61 AS	463 AG	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	12	6	3.6	0.0	AEF 6, MOB 5
C-130	773 AS	910 AW	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	758 AS	911 AW	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	327 AS	913 AW	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
TOTAL:	N/A	N/A	N/A	1597	543	126.0	91.7	N/A
SUMMARY:								
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	
F-15A/C	12	200	92	HC-130	1	4	1	
B-1B	3	34	17	E-3	3	18	9	
B-2A	0	0	0	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	21	342	122	
B-52H	3	35	18					
F-15E	2	42	24	KC-10	2	26	13	
F-117	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	32	319	70	
F-16C BLK 50	5	87	45	C-5	3	44	15	
				C-17	2	24	12	
A/OA-10	7	105	28	C-141	8	66	11	
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	
HH-60G	4	27	11	C-130	24	224	53	

NOTE 1: Daily "A/C REQ'D" rates were calculated using the following parameters: Active Duty: Fighter/Bomber/Rescue/Command & Control unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had 60% of their PAA available. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 50% of their PAA available. Airlift and tanker aircraft outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had the AMC mandated "Threshold" level available. Within +/- 90 days "On Call" they had 50% of their PAA available. ANG/AFRC: Fighter/Bomber/Rescue/Command & Control unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had 30% of their PAA available. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 20% of their PAA available. Airlift and Tanker unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had one-half of the Active Duty AMC mandated "Threshold" levels. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 20% of their PAA available.

APPENDIX 39
COMBAT AEF # 5-6 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

AEF # 5/6: AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL DAILY TASKING								
TYPE A/C	AEF # 5/6							
	SQ	WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ'D	C-141 EQUIVALENTS	KC-135R EQUIVALENTS	AEF ALIGNMENT
F-15C	27 FS	1 FW	LANGLEY AFB VA	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
F-15C	94 FS	1 FW	LANGLEY AFB VA	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
F-15C	71 FS	1 FW	LANGLEY AFB VA	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
F-15C	19 FS	3 WG	ELMENDORF AFB AK	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
F-15C	12 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	67 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	44 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	101 FS	102 FW	OTIS ANGB MA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-15A	159 FS	125 FW	JACKSONVILLE IAP FL	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	123 FS	142 FW	PORTLAND IAP OR	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	199 FS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	390 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
B-1B	9 BS	7 BW	DYESS AFB TX	15	9	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
B-1B	128 BS	116 BW	ROBINS AFB GA	8	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
B-1B	34 BS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	11	6	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
B-2A	393 BS	509 BW	WHITEMAN AFB MO	8	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
B-52H	93 BS	917 WG	BARKSDALE AFB LA	8	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
B-52H	23 BS	5 BW	MINOT AFB ND	12	7	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-15E	494 FS	48 FW	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
F-15E	391 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
F-16C:	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.0	0.0	N/A
BLK 50	79 FS	20 FW	SHAW AFB SC	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
BLK 50	428 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	8	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
BLK 50	14 FS	35 FW	MISAWA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
BLK 50	23 FS	52 FW	SPANGDAHLEM AB GE	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
BLK 50	389 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	22	13	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A/OA-10	75 FS	23 FG	POPE AFB NC	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
A/OA-10	118 FS	103 FW	BRADLEY IAP CN	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
A/OA-10	131 FS	104 FW	BARNES MAP MA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
A/OA-10	103 FS	111 FW	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
A/OA-10	190 FS	124 WG	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A/OA-10	104 FS	175 WG	MARTIN STATE ARPT MD	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
A/OA-10	303 FS	442 FW	WHITEMAN AFB MO	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
HH-60G	33 RQS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	8	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
HH-60G	66 RQS	57 WG	NELLIS AFB NV	8	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
HH-60G	102 RQS	106 RW	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
HC-130	102 RQS	106 RW	FS GABRESKI IAP NY	4	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
HH-60G	304 RQS	939 RW	PORTLAND IAP OR	7	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 11

APPENDIX 39 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 5-6 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

E-3	963 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 1, 7
E-3	964 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 2, 8
E-3	965 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 4, 10
F-16:	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.0	0.0	N/A
C BLK 30	522 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 30	523 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 40	524 FS	27 FW	CANNON AFB NM	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 9
C BLK 30	121 FS	113 WG	ANDREWS AFB MD	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	176 FS	115 FW	TRUAX FIELD WI	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
C BLK 25	163 FS	122 FW	FT WAYNE IAP IN	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 40	124 FS	132 FW	DES MOINES IAP IA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
C BLK 25	111 FS	147 FW	ELLINGTON FIELD TX	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
C BLK 40	188 FS	150 FW	KIRTLAND AFB NM	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
C BLK 25	119 FS	177 FW	ATLANTIC CITY IAP NJ	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	113 FS	181 FW	HULMAN RAP IN	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 30	170 FS	183 FW	CAPTIAL MAP IL	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	149 FS	192 FW	RICHMOND IAP VA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 10
C BLK 30	457 FS	301 FW	CARSWELL FIELD TX	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
C BLK 40	68 FS	347 WG	MOODY AFB GA	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
C BLK 40	69 FS	347 WG	MOODY AFB GA	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
C BLK 40	34 FS	388 FW	HILL AFB UT	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
C BLK 40	4 FS	388 FW	HILL AFB UT	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
C BLK 40	421 FS	388 FW	HILL AFB UT	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
C BLK 30	466 FS	419 FW	HILL AFB UT	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A BLK 15	179 FS	148 FW	DULUTH IAP MN	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
KC-10	9 ARS	60 AMW	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	6	0.0	12.0	AEF 4, 10
KC-10	30 ARS	305 AMW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	7	0.0	14.0	AEF 3, 9
KC-135R	99 ARS	19 ARG	ROBINS AFB GA	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 2, 7
KC-135R	92 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 3, ALERT 5
KC-135R	93 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 3, ALERT 5
KC-135R	96 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 3, ALERT 5
KC-135R	97 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 4, 9
KC-135R	351 ARS	100 ARW	RAF MILDENHALL UK	13	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 4, 9
KC-135R	136 ARS	107 ARW	NIAGARA FALLS IAP NY	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 2
KC-135E	141 ARS	108 ARW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	1	0.0	0.7	ALERT 1
KC-135E	150 ARS	108 ARW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 4, 10
KC-135R	145 ARS	121 ARW	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 8
KC-135R	166 ARS	121 ARW	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135R	108 ARS	126 ARW	SCOTT AFB IL	10	1	0.0	1.0	ALERT 1
KC-135R	126 ARS	128 ARW	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 8
KC-135E	151 ARS	134 ARW	MCGHEE TYSON TN	9	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 7
KC-135E	116 ARS	141 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 11

APPENDIX 39 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 5-6 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

KC-135E	191 ARS	151 ARW	SALT LAKE CITY UT	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 2, 8
KC-135R	203 ARS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 4
KC-135R	133 ARS	157 ARW	PEASE ANGB NH	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135E	197 ARS	161 ARW	SKY HARBOR IAP AZ	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 9
KC-135R	168 ARS	168 ARW	EIELSON AFB AK	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 3
KC-135E	147 ARS	171 ARW	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 2, 8
KC-135R	153 ARS	186 ARW	KEY FIELD MS	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 7
KC-135E	117 ARS	190 ARW	FORBES FIELD KS	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 10
KC-135R	905 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 1, ALERT 4
KC-135R	906 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 1, ALERT 4
KC-135R	911 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 1, ALERT 4
KC-135R	912 ARS	319 ARW	GRAND FORKS AFB ND	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 1, 8
KC-135R	72 ARS	434 ARW	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 7
KC-135R	74 ARS	434 ARW	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135R	465 ARS	507 ARW	TINKER AFB OK	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 2
KC-135R	77 ARS	916 ARW	S-J AFB NC	10	1	0.0	1.0	ALERT 1
C-5	137 AS	105 AW	STEWART IAP NY	12	2	6.4	0.0	MOB 1
C-5	68 AS	433 AW	KELLY AFB TX	14	2	6.4	0.0	MOB 4
C-5	337 AS	439 AW	WESTOVER ARB MA	14	2	6.4	0.0	MOB 5
C-17	7 AS	62 AW	MCCHORD AFB WA	12	6	14.4	0.0	AEF 8, 12
C-17	17 AS	437 AW	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	6	14.4	0.0	AEF 7, 11
C-141	4 AS	62 AW	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	8	8.0	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-141	183 AS	172 AW	JACKSON IAP TN	9	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-141	13 AS	305 AMW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	3	3.0	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-141	89 AS	445 AW	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 11
C-141	729 AS	452 AW	MARCH ARB CA	7	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-141	730 AS	452 AW	MARCH ARB CA	7	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 9
C-130	517 AS	3 WG	ELMENDORF AFB AK	16	8	4.8	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-130	2 AS	43 AW	POPE AFB NC	14	7	4.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	41 AS	43 AW	POPE AFB NC	14	7	4.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	37 AS	86 AW	RAMSTEIN AB GE	17	8	4.8	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	139 AS	109 AW	SCHENECTADY NY	9	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	105 AS	118 AW	NASHVILLE MET. TN	10	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-130	165 AS	123 AW	LOUISVILLE IAP KY	10	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-130	171 AS	127 WG	SELFDRIDGE ANGB MI	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	130 AS	130 AW	YEAGER ARPT WV	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	109 AS	133 AW	MINN-ST PAUL IAP MN	6	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	181 AS	136 AW	NAS DALLAS TX	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 1, 7
C-130	143 AS	143 AW	QUONSET ST. ARPT RI	6	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	187 AS	153 AW	CHEYENNE MAP WY	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-130	198 AS	156 AW	MARIN IAP PUERTO RICO	6	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-130	144 AS	176 WG	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 3, 9

APPENDIX 39 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 5-6 "TIMEFRAME" AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

C-130	164 AS	179 AW	MANSFIELD LAHM OH	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	39 AS	317 AG	DYESS AFB TX	14	7	4.2	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-130	40 AS	317 AG	DYESS AFB TX	14	7	4.2	0.0	AEF 2, 8
C-130	815 AS	403 WG	KEESLER AFB MS	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	357 AS	908 AW	MAXWELL AFB AL	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	757 AS	910 AW	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	773 AS	910 AW	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	758 AS	911 AW	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
C-130	327 AS	913 AW	WILLOW GROVE ARS PA	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 4
TOTAL:	N/A	N/A	N/A	1614	586	103.4	89.6	N/A
SUMMARY:								
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	
F-15A/C	12	216	104	HC-130	1	4	1	
B-1B	3	34	17	E-3	3	18	9	
B-2	1	8	4	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	21	351	140	
B-52H	2	20	9					
F-15E	2	42	24	KC-10	2	26	13	
F-117	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	31	310	66	
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	
F-16C BLK 50	5	90	51	C-5	3	40	6	
A/OA-10	7	114	38	C-17	2	24	12	
HH-60G	4	27	11	C-141	6	58	17	
				C-130	24	232	64	

NOTE 1: Daily "A/C REQ'D" rates were calculated using the following parameters: Active Duty: Fighter/Bomber/Rescue/Command & Control unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had 60% of their PAA available. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 50% of their PAA available. Airlift and tanker aircraft outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had the AMC mandated "Threshold" level available. Within +/- 90 days "On Call" they had 50% of their PAA available. ANG/AFRC: Fighter/Bomber/Rescue/Command & Control unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had 30% of their PAA available. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 20% of their PAA available. Airlift and Tanker unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had one-half of the Active Duty AMC mandated "Threshold" levels. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 20% of their PAA available.

APPENDIX 40
COMBAT AEF # 7-8 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
DAILY TASKING

AEF # 7/8: AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL DAILY TASKING								
TYPE A/C	AEF # 7/8							
	SQ	WING	BASE	PAA	A/C REQ'D	C-141 EQUIVALENTS	KC-135R EQUIVALENTS	AEF ALIGNMENT
F-15C	94 FS	1 FW	LANGELY AFB VA	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
F-15C	71 FS	1 FW	LANGELY AFB VA	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
F-15C	19 FS	3 WG	ELMENDORF AFB AK	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
F-15C	54 FS	3 WG	ELMENDORF AFB AK	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
F-15C	12 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	67 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	44 FS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	493 FS	48 FW	RAF LAKENHEATH UK	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 4
F-15A	159 FS	125 FW	JACKSONVILLE IAP FL	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	123 FS	142 FW	PORTLAND IAP OR	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15A	199 FS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
F-15C	390 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
B-1B	9 BS	7 BW	DYESS AFB TX	15	9	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
B-1B	77 BS	28 BW	ELLSWORTH AFB SD	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
B-1B	34 BS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	11	6	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
B-2A	393 BS	509 BW	WHITEMAN AFB MO	8	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
B-52H	96 BS	2 BW	BARKSDALE AFB LA	15	9	0.0	0.0	AEF 4
B-52H	93 BS	917 WG	BARKSDALE AFB LA	8	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
F-15E	90 FS	3 WG	ELMENDORF AFB AK	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
F-15E	391 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
F-16C:	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.0	0.0	N/A
BLK 50	79 FS	20 FW	SHAW AFB SC	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
BLK 50	13 FS	35 FW	MISAWA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
BLK 50	14 FS	35 FW	MISAWA AB JAPAN	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
BLK 50	22 FS	52 FW	SPANGDAHLEM AB GE	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 4
BLK 50	389 FS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	22	13	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A/OA-10	75 FS	23 FG	POPE AFB NC	24	14	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
A/OA-10	81 FS	52 FW	SPANGDAHLEM AB GE	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 4
A/OA-10	118 FS	103 FW	BRADLEY IAP CN	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
A/OA-10	190 FS	124 WG	BOISE AIR TERM. ID	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A/OA-10	104 FS	175 WG	MARTIN STATE ARPT MD	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
A/OA-10	355 FS	354 FW	EIELSON AFB AK	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
A/OA-10	303 FS	442 FW	WHITEMAN AFB MO	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
HH-60G	33 RQS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	8	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
HH-60G	66 RQS	57 WG	NELLIS AFB NV	8	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
HH-60G	210 RQS	176 WG	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	5	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
HC-130	210 RQS	176 WG	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	3	1	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
HH-60G	304 RQS	939 RW	PORTLAND IAP OR	7	2	0.0	0.0	AEF 11

APPENDIX 40 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 7-8 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
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E-3	965 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 4, 10
E-3	966 AACs	552 ACW	TINKER AFB OK	6	3	0.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
F-16:	N/A	N/A	N/A	0	0	0.0	0.0	N/A
C BLK 40	510 FS	31 FW	AVIANO AB IT	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 4
C BLK 40	555 FS	31 FW	AVIANO AB IT	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 4
C BLK 30	121 FS	113 WG	ANDREWS AFB MD	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	176 FS	115 FW	TRUAX FIELD WI	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A BLK 15	189 FS	120 FW	GREAT FALLS IAP MT	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
C BLK 30	107 FS	127 FW	SELFDRIDGE ANGB MI	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
C BLK 40	124 FS	132 FW	DES MOINES IAP IA	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
C BLK 25	111 FS	147 FW	ELLINGTON FIELD TX	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
C BLK 40	188 FS	150 FW	KIRTLAND AFB NM	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
C BLK 25	134 FS	158 FW	BURLINGTON IAP VT	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 4
C BLK 25	119 FS	177 FW	ATLANTIC CITY IAP NJ	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	170 FS	183 FW	CAPITAL MAP IL	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 12
C BLK 30	457 FS	301 FW	CARSWELL FIELD TX	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 2
C BLK 40	68 FS	347 WG	MOODY AFB GA	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
C BLK 40	69 FS	347 WG	MOODY AFB GA	18	10	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
C BLK 40	18 FS	354 FW	EIELSON AFB AK	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 3
C BLK 40	34 FS	388 FW	HILL AFB UT	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
C BLK 40	4 FS	388 FW	HILL AFB UT	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
C BLK 40	421 FS	388 FW	HILL AFB UT	18	10	0.0	0.0	AEF 1
C BLK 30	466 FS	419 FW	HILL AFB UT	15	4	0.0	0.0	AEF 11
A BLK 15	179 FS	148 FW	DULUTH IAP MN	15	4	0.0	0.0	RESERVE
KC-10	9 ARS	60 AMW	TRAVIS AFB CA	12	6	0.0	12.0	AEF 4, 10
KC-10	30 ARS	305 AMW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	14	7	0.0	14.0	AEF 3, 9
KC-135R	91 ARS	6 ARW	MACDILL AFB FL	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 6, 12
KC-135R	909 ARS	18 WG	KADENA AB JAPAN	15	6	0.0	6.0	AEF 6, 11
KC-135E/R	384 ARS	22 ARW	MCCONNELL AFB KS	11	4	0.0	3.6	AEF 6, 12
KC-135R	92 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 3, ALERT 5
KC-135R	93 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 3, ALERT 5
KC-135R	96 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 3, ALERT 5
KC-135R	97 ARS	92 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	12	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 4, 9
KC-135R	351 ARS	100 ARW	RAF MILDENHALL UK	13	5	0.0	5.0	AEF 4, 9
KC-135E	132 ARS	101 ARW	BANGOR IAP MAINE	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 5
KC-135R	136 ARS	107 ARW	NIAGARA FALLS IAP NY	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 2
KC-135E	141 ARS	108 ARW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	1	0.0	0.7	ALERT 1
KC-135E	150 ARS	108 ARW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 4, 10
KC-135R	106 ARS	117 ARW	BIRMINGHAM ARPT AL	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 5
KC-135R	166 ARS	121 ARW	RICKENBACKER IAP OH	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135R	108 ARS	126 ARW	SCOTT AFB IL	10	1	0.0	1.0	ALERT 1
KC-135E	116 ARS	141 ARW	FAIRCHILD AFB WA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 11

APPENDIX 40 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 7-8 “TIMEFRAME” AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
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KC-135R	203 ARS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 4
KC-135R	173 ARS	155 ARW	LINCOLN MAP NE	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 5, 11
KC-135R	133 ARS	157 ARW	PEASE ANGB NH	9	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135E	197 ARS	161 ARW	SKY HARBOR IAP AZ	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 9
KC-135R	196 ARS	163 ARW	MARCH ARB CA	9	1	0.0	1.0	ALERT 2
KC-135R	168 ARS	168 ARW	EIELSON AFB AK	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 3
KC-135E	146 ARS	171 ARW	PITTSBURGH IAP PA	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 6
KC-135E	117 ARS	190 ARW	FORBES FIELD KS	10	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 10
KC-135R	22 ARS	366 WG	MT HOME AFB ID	11	4	0.0	4.0	AEF 5, 11
KC-135R	74 ARS	434 ARW	GRISSOM ARB IN	10	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 10
KC-135R	336 ARS	452 AMW	MARCH ARB CA	9	1	0.0	1.0	ALERT 2
KC-135R	465 ARS	507 ARW	TINKER AFB OK	8	1	0.0	1.0	AEF 2
KC-135R	77 ARS	916 ARW	S-J AFB NC	10	1	0.0	1.0	ALERT 1
KC-135E	63 ARS	927 ARW	SELFRIDGE ANGB MI	9	1	0.0	0.7	AEF 5
KC-135E	314 ARS	940 ARW	BEALE AFB CA	10	1	0.0	0.7	ALERT 2
C-5	3 AS	436 AW	DOVER AFB DE	16	8	25.6	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-5	137 AS	105 AW	STEWART IAP NY	12	6	19.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-5	337 AS	439 AW	WESTOVER ARB MA	14	2	6.4	0.0	MOB 5
C-17	14 AS	437 AW	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	6	14.4	0.0	AEF 5, 9
C-17	15 AS	437 AW	CHARLESTON AFB SC	12	6	14.4	0.0	AEF 6, 10
C-141	8 AS	62 AW	MCCHORD AFB WA	17	8	8.0	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-141	155 AS	164 AW	MEMPHIS IAP TN	9	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
C-141	13 AS	305 AMW	MCGUIRE AFB NJ	10	3	3.0	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-141	89 AS	445 AW	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	2	2.0	0.0	AEF 11
C-141	356 AS	445 AW	WRIGHT-PAT. AFB OH	8	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 6, 12
C-141	730 AS	452 AW	MARCH ARB CA	7	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 9
C-141	756 AS	459 AW	ANDREWS AFB MD	8	1	1.0	0.0	AEF 5
C-130	517 AS	3 WG	ELMENDORF AFB AK	16	8	4.8	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-130	2 AS	43 AW	POPE AFB NC	14	7	4.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	41 AS	43 AW	POPE AFB NC	14	7	4.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	37 AS	86 AW	RAMSTEIN AB GE	17	8	4.8	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	139 AS	109 AW	SCHENECTADY NY	9	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	130 AS	130 AW	YEAGER ARPT WV	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	180 AS	139 AW	ROSECRANS MEM. MO	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 5, MOB 5
C-130	143 AS	143 AW	QUONSET ST. ARPT RI	6	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 4, 10
C-130	115 AS	146 AW	CHANNEL IS ANGB CA	12	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	192 AS	152 AW	RENO/TAHOE IAP NV	6	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 6, MOB 5
C-130	187 AS	153 AW	CHEYENNE MAP WY	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-130	204 AS	154 WG	HICKAM AFB HI	4	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	158 AS	165 AW	SAVANNAH IAP GA	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 5, MOB 5
C-130	144 AS	176 WG	ANCHORAGE IAP AK	8	1	0.6	0.0	AEF 3, 9
C-130	169 AS	182 AW	GREATER PEORIA IL	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 2

APPENDIX 40 (CONTINUED)
COMBAT AEF # 7-8 "TIMEFRAME" AIRCRAFT AVAILABLE FOR NORMAL
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C-130	36 AW	374 AW	YOKOTA AB JAPAN	10	5	3.0	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	815 AS	403 WG	KEESLER AFB MS	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	95 AS	440 AW	GEN MITCHELL FIELD WI	12	2	1.2	0.0	AEF 5, MOB 5
C-130	50 AS	463 AG	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	14	7	4.2	0.0	AEF 6, MOB 5
C-130	61 AS	463 AG	LITTLE ROCK AFB AR	12	6	3.6	0.0	AEF 6, MOB 5
C-130	357 AS	908 AW	MAXWELL AFB AL	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	757 AS	910 AW	YOUNGSTOWN OH	8	2	1.2	0.0	MOB 1
C-130	328 AS	914 AW	NIAGARA FALLS IAP NY	6	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 2
C-130	96 AS	934 AW	MINN-ST PAUL IAP MN	8	1	0.6	0.0	MOB 2
TOTAL:	N/A	N/A	N/A	1622	614	139.6	87.9	N/A
SUMMARY:								
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	
F-15A/C	12	225	114	HC-130	1	3	1	
B-1B	3	32	18	E-3	2	12	6	
B-2A	1	8	4	F-16A/C BLK 15-40	21	339	132	
B-52H	2	23	11					
F-15E	2	36	20	KC-10	2	26	13	
F-117	0	0	0	KC-135E/R	31	311	65	
TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	TYPE A/C	# SQ'S	# PAA	# A/C REQUIRED	
F-16C BLK 50	5	94	53	C-5	3	42	16	
				C-17	2	24	12	
A/OA-10	7	120	50	C-141	7	67	9	
HH-60G	4	28	11	C-130	24	232	71	
NOTE 1: Daily "A/C REQ'D" rates were calculated using the following parameters: Active Duty: Fighter/Bomber/Rescue/Command & Control unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had 60% of their PAA available. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 50% of their PAA available. Airlift and tanker aircraft outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had the AMC mandated "Threshold" level available. Within +/- 90 days "On Call" they had 50% of their PAA available. ANG/AFRC: Fighter/Bomber/Rescue/Command & Control unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had 30% of their PAA available. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 20% of their PAA available. Airlift and Tanker unit's outside +/- 90 days of being "On Call" had one-half of the Active Duty AMC mandated "Threshold" levels. If they were within +/- 90 days of being "On Call" they had 20% of their PAA available.								

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